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English Summary 
There is a persistent gap between human rights reality and human rights rhetoric. In theory everyone 
enjoys the same rights, but in practice some people are more equal than others. Women, lesbian, gay, 
transgender people, people with a disability, immigrants,  asylum seekers, Roma and other ethnic, 
cultural and religious minorities continue to suffer disproportionately from discrimination, 
marginalization and violence, both within the Council of Europe and beyond.  This is the reality that 
drives the present inquiry.  
 
This thesis analyzes the legal reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’, ‘the Court’ or 
‘the Strasbourg Court’). It investigates how the ECtHR can make its equality analysis more responsive to 
non-dominant groups. This is important, as the case law of the ECtHR provides guidance and inspiration 
to courts and human rights lawyers around the globe. In order to perform the legal analysis, the 
concepts of stereotyping and vulnerability are introduced in this thesis as novel analytical lenses. To a 
significant extent, the originality of this thesis lies in the concepts it employs; to my knowledge, this is 
the first study of ECtHR case law that focuses on stereotyping and vulnerability.  
 
Stereotypes are beliefs about groups of people. Examples from the case law of the ECtHR are notions 
like women are homemakers, Roma are thieves, and people with a mental disability are incapable of 
forming political opinions. This thesis submits that harmful stereotyping is a human rights issue, which 
the Strasbourg Court needs to address more specifically and consistently than it has so far done. The 
amount of cases where the ECtHR explicitly acknowledges stereotypes is limited, though it is increasing. 
On the other hand, whereas stereotyping needs to be framed more as a human rights issue by the 
Court, vulnerability is clearly already framed that way. The ECtHR case law is packed with references to 
“vulnerable” applicants and “vulnerable groups”. Vulnerability is understood in this thesis as both a 
universal and a particular human condition: everyone is vulnerable, but in different ways. Moreover, it is 
submitted that institutions – such as the Court itself – are vulnerable too.  
 
To summarize the aims of this study: the empirical aim is to analyze the Strasbourg Court’s case law on 
equal protection of non-dominant groups through the lens of the concepts of stereotyping and 
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vulnerability. Using these concepts, the normative aim of this dissertation is to suggest ways in which 
the Court can develop a more transformative equality jurisprudence, which addresses the underlying 
structural causes of inequality and discrimination. 
 
The introductory chapter, Chapter 1, sets out the background to this thesis. In the first place, that 
background is constituted of the Court’s  case law on the prohibition on discrimination (Article 14 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights). In recent years, there have been rapid developments in this 
jurisprudence which signal a more meaningful role for Article 14. However, several problems still persist 
with the Court’s legal reasoning on the topic of discrimination, and these are discussed as well. Next, the 
introductory chapter outlines the three concepts which are at the core of this thesis: equality, 
stereotyping and vulnerability. Equality is a deeply contested concept, and accordingly this thesis 
differentiates between formal, substantive and transformative equality. Equality as transformation is 
aimed at transforming the underlying frameworks that generate discrimination and inequality. As 
regards stereotyping; the central tenets of this concept are set out on the basis of social psychology 
literature. The concept of vulnerability is discussed primarily on the basis of the work of Martha 
Fineman, a legal theorist. After setting out these three concepts, the introductory chapter discusses the 
limits to what can be achieved by the ECtHR in terms of transformative equality. These limits consist of a 
principled and a practical component: in the first place it is acknowledged that the transformative 
potential of law (and the related discourse of rights) is inherently limited. In the second place, the 
institutional position of the ECtHR is such that the Court is vulnerable and cannot accomplish too much. 
The last part of this chapter discusses research methodology; first as regards the chapters on 
stereotyping, and then as regards the chapters on vulnerability. This part also explains the role that 
feminist legal methodology plays throughout this thesis. 
 
After the introductory chapter there are two chapters on the concept of stereotyping in relation to the 
case law of the ECtHR, and then two chapters on the concept of vulnerability in relation to the case law 
of the ECtHR. The central tenet of Chapter Two is that stereotypes are both cause and manifestation of 
the structural disadvantage and discrimination of certain groups of people. Focusing on the gender case 
law of the ECtHR, this chapter explores what conception of equality the Court should embrace to 
adequately address the harmfulness of stereotypes. It terms that conception of equality transformative. 
This chapter proposes ways in which the Strasbourg Court can integrate an anti-stereotyping approach 
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in its legal reasoning. The proposed analysis consists of two phases; ‘naming’ and ‘contesting’ 
stereotypes. This analysis is meant to be suggestive rather than definitive: the aim is to raise the kinds of 
questions that the Court needs to ask in order to dismantle harmful gender stereotypes. The whole 
argument is illustrated by Konstantin Markin v. Russia and Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, two recent 
cases in the area of gender equality. The chapter concludes by reflecting on the feasibility of adopting an 
anti-stereotyping approach in light of the institutional position of the Court. 
 
The next chapter, Chapter Three, refines these arguments by way of a comparative analysis of the case 
law of the American and Canadian Supreme Courts. Whereas the concept of stereotyping is novel in the 
case law of the ECtHR, anti-stereotyping has long been a central feature of equal protection law in both 
the U.S. and Canada. Thus, the aim of this chapter is to make recommendations about what the ECtHR 
can borrow from American and Canadian equal protection law. The chapter emphasizes that the ECtHR 
should not attempt to turn against all stereotypes, but that the Court should start seeing, naming and 
contesting invidious stereotypes.  The Court should not contest all stereotypes, because stereotyping 
can fulfill useful functions in human interaction and, moreover, laws are always based on 
generalizations. This chapter shows that the Strasbourg Court can learn a great deal about the 
conceptualization of stereotypes and about the connections between stereotyping and discrimination 
from American and Canadian equal protection doctrine. Concretely, these lessons are that stereotypes 
take different shapes and that the Court should also watch out for statistical and prescriptive 
stereotypes, because these can also be invidious; that stereotyping is connected to discrimination in a 
self-reinforcing circle; that in distinguishing whether a stereotype is invidious, context is everything; and 
that there are two ways of using Article 14 and integrating the margin of appreciation. 
 
Chapter Four shifts the inquiry to the notion of “vulnerable groups”. It draws attention to the fact that, 
without so far awakening much scholarly attention, the concept of vulnerable groups is gaining 
momentum in the case law of the Strasbourg Court. The Chapter shows that the Court has thus far used 
this concept in cases concerning Roma, people with mental disabilities, people living with HIV and 
asylum seekers. Drawing on theoretical debates on vulnerability as well as on the Court’s case law, this 
Chapter offers a critical assessment of the concept. Reasoning in terms of vulnerable groups opens a 
number of possibilities, most notably, the opportunity to move closer to a more robust idea of equality. 
However, the concept also has some inherent difficulties. This Chapter argues for a reflective use of the 
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concept and points out ways in which the Court can avoid its pitfalls. The Chapter finishes by reflecting 
on the institutional concerns associated with the Court’s use of group vulnerability. 
 
The vulnerability inquiry is widened in Chapter Five. It examines the concept of vulnerability more 
broadly in the case law of the ECtHR, with the aim of discovering what potential the concept has to 
more fully and consistently include the specific concerns of marginalized people into the Court’s legal 
reasoning. To that end, this chapter deploys Martha Fineman’s vulnerability thesis as a central 
theoretical framework within which the qualities of the Strasbourg Court’s case law are assessed. After 
explicating the central tenets of this framework and exploring why the relationship between 
vulnerability and human rights law is complex, this Chapter charts and critiques the ways in which the 
ECtHR reasons in terms of vulnerability. It then identifies vulnerability’s effects in the Strasbourg case 
law and proceeds to take an institutional perspective to show that the Court is also vulnerable itself. The 
chapter concludes with some reflections about the extent to which the ECtHR, in effect, adopts an 
approach consistent with the vulnerability thesis – and to what extent it has the possibility to do so. 
 
Chapter Six forms the conclusion of the thesis. It discusses the key findings as regards the concepts of 
stereotype and vulnerability, and reflects on how the Court can draw on these concepts to create a legal 
reasoning that is more sensitive to the demands of transformative equality. It then brings these 
concepts together and considers the tension and synergies between them. The conclusion closes by 
contemplating briefly on interesting topics for future research. 
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Nederlandse Samenvatting 
 
Er is een hardnekkige kloof tussen retoriek en werkelijkheid waar het mensenrechten betreft. In theorie 
komt iedereen dezelfde rechten toe, maar in de praktijk zijn sommigen meer gelijk dan anderen. 
Vrouwen, lesbiennes, homo’s, transseksuelen, mensen met een beperking, immigranten, asielzoekers, 
Roma en andere etnische, culturele en religieuze minderheden lijden nog steeds disproportioneel veel 
onder discriminatie, marginalisatie en geweld. Zowel binnen als buiten de Raad van Europa. Deze 
realiteit is de motivatie voor dit onderzoek. 
 
Dit proefschrift analyseert de redeneerwijzen van het Europese Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens 
(“EHRM”, “het Hof”, of “het Straatsburgse Hof). Onderzocht wordt hoe het EHRM zijn analyse van het 
gelijkheidsbeginsel zo kan versterken dat het meer recht doet aan niet-dominante groepen. Dit is 
belangrijk, omdat de jurisprudentie van het EHRM een leidraad vormt voor rechtbanken en 
mensenrechten juristen over de hele wereld. Om de juridische analyse uit te voeren, worden de 
concepten “stereotyperingen” en “kwetsbaarheid” in dit proefschrift geïntroduceerd als analytische 
lenzen. Voor een aanzienlijk deel schuilt de originaliteit van dit proefschrift in die concepten; bij mijn 
weten is dit de eerste studie die de concepten van stereotypen en kwetsbaarheid koppelt aan de 
jurisprudentie van het EHRM. 
 
Stereotypen zijn opvattingen over groepen mensen. Enkele voorbeelden uit de jurisprudentie van het 
EHRM zijn de opvattingen dat vrouwen voor het huishouden en kinderen horen te zorgen; dat Roma 
dieven zijn; en dat mensen met een verstandelijke beperking niet in staat zijn om politieke opvattingen 
te vormen. Dit proefschrift beargumenteert dat schadelijke stereotypen een mensenrechtelijk vraagstuk 
zijn, en dat het Hof stereotypen meer specifiek en consequent moet gaan aanpakken dan het tot nu toe 
heeft gedaan. Het aantal zaken waarin het Hof de rol van stereotypen expliciet erkend heeft is zeer 
beperkt, al doet het Hof dat wel steeds vaker. Aan de andere kant, “kwetsbaarheid” wordt duidelijk al 
gezien als een mensenrechten kwestie.  De jurisprudentie van het EHRM staat vol met verwijzingen naar 
“kwetsbare” verzoekers en “kwetsbare groepen”. In dit proefschrift wordt kwetsbaarheid opgevat als 
gelijktijdig een universeel en een specifiek element van het menselijk leven: iedereen is kwetsbaar, maar 
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mensen zijn dat op verschillende manieren en sommigen zijn kwetsbaarder dan anderen. Daarbij wordt 
in dit proefschrift onderstreept dat ook instituties – zoals het Hof zelf – kwetsbaar zijn.  
 
De doelstellingen van dit onderzoek kunnen als volgt worden samengevat: de empirische doelstelling is 
om de jurisprudentie van het EHRM op het gebied van gelijke behandeling van niet-dominante groepen 
te analyseren door de lens van de concepten van stereotype en kwetsbaarheid. De normatieve 
doelstelling is om werkwijzen voor te stellen waarop het Hof een meer transformationele 
gelijkheidsjurisprudentie kan ontwikkelen. Daarmee wordt een jurisprudentie bedoeld die de 
onderliggende structurele oorzaken van ongelijkheid en discriminatie aanpakt. 
 
Het inleidende hoofdstuk, Hoofdstuk Een, beschrijft de achtergrond van dit proefschrift. In de eerste 
plaats wordt die achtergrond gevormd door de rechtspraak van het EHRM over het verbod op 
discriminatie (Artikel 14 EVRM). In de afgelopen jaren zijn er snelle ontwikkelingen in de jurisprudentie 
geweest die duiden op een grotere rol voor Artikel 14 dan voorheen. Die ontwikkelingen worden 
beschreven, evenals de nog steeds bestaande problemen met de interpretatie van het Hof. Vervolgens 
schets dit inleidende hoofdstuk de drie kernconcepten van dit proefschrift: gelijkheid, stereotypen en 
kwetsbaarheid. Gelijkheid is een omstreden begrip, en dus wordt in dit proefschrift onderscheid 
gemaakt tussen formele, materiële en transformationele gelijkheid. Gelijkheid als transformatie richt 
zich op het veranderen van het onderliggende raamwerk dat discriminatie en ongelijkheid genereert; 
het pakt zo gezegd de wortels van ongelijkheid aan. Daarna, in het stuk over stereotypen, wordt 
aansluiting gezocht bij het onderzoek van sociaalpsychologen. Het concept kwetsbaarheid wordt 
voornamelijk besproken aan de hand van de rechtstheorie van Martha Fineman. Nadat deze drie 
kernconcepten uiteen gezet zijn, bespreekt het inleidende hoofdstuk wat de grenzen zijn aan de 
mogelijkheden van het EHRM om transformationele gelijkheidsjurisprudentie te ontwikkelen. Deze 
grenzen bestaan uit een principiële en een praktische component: in de eerste plaats wordt erkend dat 
de mogelijkheden van het recht (en het daaraan gerelateerde discours van ‘rechten’) inherent beperkt 
zijn. Ten tweede is de institutionele positie van het Hof kwetsbaar, en kan dus ook niet van het Hof 
verwacht worden dat het enorm veel bereikt. Het laatste onderdeel van dit hoofdstuk bespreekt de 
onderzoeksmethodiek; eerst met betrekking tot de hoofdstukken die over stereotypen gaan en dan met 
betrekking tot de hoofdstukken over kwetsbaarheid. Dit onderdeel verklaart ook de rol die feministische 
rechtsmethodologie in dit proefschrift speelt.  
16 
 
 
Na het inleidende hoofdstuk komen er eerst twee hoofdstukken over stereotypen en dan twee 
hoofdstukken over kwetsbaarheid. De centrale stelling van Hoofdstuk Twee is dat stereotypen zowel 
oorzaak als manifestatie zijn van de structurele achterstand en discriminatie van bepaalde groepen 
mensen. Met een focus op de rechtspraak over discriminatie op grond van geslacht, onderzoekt dit 
hoofdstuk wat voor conceptie van gelijkheid het Hof moet ontwikkelen om de schade die stereotypen 
aanrichten adequaat te kunnen aanpakken. Het noemt die conceptie van gelijkheid transformationeel. 
Dit onderzoekt stelt manieren voor waarop het Straatsburgse Hof een anti-stereotypen benadering kan 
integreren in zijn jurisprudentie. De voorgestelde analyse bestaat uit twee fasen: het benoemen en 
vervolgens het betwisten van stereotypen. Deze analyse is suggestief bedoeld: het doel is om het soort 
vragen op te werpen die het Hof behoort te stellen om schadelijke genderstereotypen te ontmantelen. 
Dit hele betoog wordt geïllustreerd aan de hand van de zaken Konstantin Markin t. Rusland en Rantsev 
t. Cyprus en Rusland; twee recente uitspraken op het gebied van gender gelijkheid. Het hoofdstuk sluit 
af door te reflecteren op de haalbaarheid van de anti-stereotypen benadering in het licht van de 
institutionele positie van het Hof.  
 
Het volgende hoofdstuk, Hoofdstuk Drie, verfijnt deze argumenten door middel van een 
rechtsvergelijkende analyse van de rechtspraak van de Amerikaanse en Canadese Hooggerechtshoven. 
Hoewel het stereotype concept nieuw is in de jurisprudentie van het EHRM, is dit al lang een centraal 
onderdeel van het gelijke behandelingsrecht in de VS en Canada. Zo doende is de doelstelling van dit 
hoofdstuk om aanbevelingen te doen over wat het EHRM kan leren van het Amerikaanse en Canadese 
gelijke behandelingsrecht. Dit hoofdstuk benadrukt dat het EHRM niet moet proberen zich tegen alle 
stereotypen te keren, maar dat het punt is dat het Hof kwalijke stereotypen moet leren herkennen, 
benoemen en betwisten. Het geeft geen zin om alle stereotypen te gaan betwisten, deels omdat 
stereotypen een nuttige functie kunnen vervullen in menselijke interactie, en deels ook omdat 
wettelijke regels altijd gebaseerd zijn op generalisaties. Dit hoofdstuk toont aan dat het Straatsburgse 
Hof veel kan leren over de conceptualisatie van stereotypen en over de connecties tussen stereotypen 
en discriminatie van de Amerikaanse en Canadese gelijke behandelingsdoctrines. Concreet zijn deze 
lessen dat stereotypen verschillende vormen aannemen, en dat het Hof ook alert moet zijn op 
statistische en prescriptieve stereotypen omdat die ook schadelijk kunnen zijn; dat stereotyperingen 
verbonden zijn met discriminatie in een zichzelf versterkende cirkel; dat het onderscheid tussen kwalijke 
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en niet-kwalijke stereotypen allemaal van context afhangt; en dat er twee manieren zijn waarop het Hof 
Artikel 14 kan inzetten en daarbij de doctrine van de beoordelingsmarge (“margin of appreciation”) kan 
integreren.  
 
Hoofdstuk Vier richt de analyse op het begrip “kwetsbare groepen”. Het vestigt de aandacht op het feit 
dat het concept van kwetsbare groepen aan momentum wint in de rechtspraak van het Straatsburgse 
Hof. Dit hoofdstuk laat zien dat het Hof dit concept nu gebruikt heeft in zaken betreffende Roma, 
mensen met een verstandelijke beperking, mensen die HIV-positief zijn, en asielzoekers. Op basis van 
theoretische literatuur over kwetsbaarheid, alsook op basis van de jurisprudentie van het Hof, biedt dit 
hoofdstuk een kritische beoordeling van dit concept. Redeneren in termen van kwetsbare groepen heeft 
het potentieel om materiële gelijkheid te ontwikkelen. Er zitten echter ook inherent nadelen aan het 
concept. Dit hoofdstuk pleit voor een reflectief gebruik van het concept en wijst op manieren waarop 
het Hof valkuilen kan vermijden. Het hoofdstuk sluit af met enkele overwegingen over de institutionele 
problemen die het gebruik van dit concept kunnen oproepen. 
 
Hoofdstuk Vijf verbreedt het onderzoek naar het begrip kwetsbaarheid. Het onderzoekt dit begrip in 
brede zin binnen de rechtspraak van het EHRM, met als doelstelling om te ontdekken wat voor 
potentieel het heeft om de analyse van het EHRM gevoeliger te maken voor de posities van 
gemarginaliseerde mensen. Daartoe gebruikt dit hoofdstuk Martha Fineman’s theorie over 
kwetsbaarheid als centraal theoretisch kader. Binnen het kader van Fineman (en anderen) worden de 
kwaliteiten van de jurisprudentie van het EHRM beoordeeld. Na het uiteenzetten van Fineman’s kader, 
wordt uitgelegd waarom de relatie tussen het idee van (menselijke) kwetsbaarheid en mensenrechten 
complex is. Daarna brengt dit hoofdstuk kritisch in kaart hoe het EHRM refereert aan kwetsbaarheid. 
Vervolgens identificeert het hoofdstuk wat voor gevolgen het Hof verbindt aan kwetsbaarheid, en 
neemt dit hoofdstuk ook een institutioneel perspectief door aan te tonen dat het Hof zelf óók kwetsbaar 
is. Het hoofdstuk sluit af met enkele beschouwingen over de mate waarin de aanpak van het Hof 
overeenkomt met de theorie van Fineman, en in welke mate het Hof eigenlijk wel de mogelijkheid heeft 
om dat te doen. 
 
Hoofdstuk Zes vormt de conclusie van dit proefschrift. Het bespreekt de belangrijkste bevindingen wat 
betreft stereotyperingen en kwetsbaarheid, en overdenkt de werkwijzen waarop het Hof kan putten uit 
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deze concepten om een juridische analyse te creëren die meer transformationele gelijkheid 
bewerkstelligt. Vervolgens brengt deze conclusie die twee begrippen bij elkaar en beschouwt het zowel 
de synergie als de spanning tussen hen. Ten slotte brengt dit hoofdstuk interessante onderwerpen voor 
toekomstig onderzoek naar voren. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
I. Introduction: Aims of this Study 
 
This thesis introduces stereotyping and vulnerability as novel conceptual lenses to analyze the legal 
reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR, “the Court” or “the Strasbourg Court”). By 
means of these concepts, this study investigates how the ECtHR can better integrate the needs and 
particularities of non-dominant groups in its equality analysis. Such a fresh look at the Strasbourg 
Court’s equality analysis is urgently called for, because – despite the considerable advancements in 
human rights protection during the 60 years that the European Convention on Human Rights (“the 
Convention” or “ECHR”) has been in force1 – there is a persistent gap between human rights rhetoric 
and human rights reality. In theory everyone enjoys the same fundamental rights, but in practice some 
are more equal than others. Women, lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people (LGBT’s), people 
with a disability, immigrants,  asylum seekers, Roma and other ethnic, cultural and religious minorities 
continue to suffer disproportionately from discrimination, marginalization and violence, both within the 
Council of Europe and beyond.2  
The Strasbourg Court is by many regarded as the most advanced human rights protection body 
in the world.3 Although this view smacks of complacency,4 it is fair to say that the Court’s judgments 
provide guidance and inspiration to courts and human rights lawyers around the globe. The Court’s 
                                                          
1
 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 
222. The Convention entered into force on 3 September 1953. 
2
 See, e.g., THOMAS HAMMARBERG, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE: NO GROUNDS FOR COMPLACENCY. VIEWPOINTS BY THOMAS 
HAMMARBERG COUNCIL OF EUROPE COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (2011); COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 
DISCRIMINATION ON GROUNDS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY IN EUROPE (2
ND
 ED., 2011); and COMMISSIONER FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS OF ROMA AND TRAVELLERS IN EUROPE (2012).  The fact that some groups suffer more from 
discrimination, marginalization and violence than others, is not only reflected in the work of the Council of Europe, 
but also in the work of numerous NGO’s such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.  
3
 See, e.g., MICHAEL GOLDHABER, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 189-190 (2007) at 189-190 
(and the literature quoted there); and Laurence R. Helfer, Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights: 
Embeddedness as a Deep Structural Principle of European Human Rights Regime, 19 THE EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 125, 126 (2008). 
4
Thomas Hammarberg, former Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, emphasizes that there are “no 
grounds for complacency” about human rights. See HAMMARBERG, supra note 2. 
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leading role in the development of human rights norms makes it all the more important that its legal 
reasoning is of high-quality. Sharing this view is a large and still growing contingent of Court-watchers, 
who closely monitor the developments in the Court’s legal reasoning, who are always ready to point out 
its strengths and weaknesses, and who often seek to suggest ways in which the legal reasoning could be 
improved.5 The present author is one of their number. In a sense, therefore, this thesis is a case study 
which forms part of the wider research project of strengthening the legal reasoning of the ECtHR.6 
But what constitutes good legal reasoning? That is, of course, a matter of perennial debate. 
When it comes to strengthening the equality analysis of the ECtHR, it is submitted that it is extremely 
important that the legal reasoning of the Court does justice to the experiences of the rights-holders.7 In 
other words, a judgment needs to acknowledge the reality of the rights-holder in question.8 The only 
way the Court can do that, in my opinion, is by being sensitive to context.9 Arguably, the real moral 
authority of the ECtHR “inheres in its responsiveness to injustice.”10 Accordingly, this thesis is 
sympathetic to the idea that good legal reasoning is reasoning that is capable of responding to injustice. 
To be clear: this thesis does not seek to develop a general “theory of interpretation” of the ECHR,11 nor 
does it seek to build a general framework of how the Strasbourg Court could interpret the rights of non-
dominant groups. Instead, this thesis offers a critical analysis of the Strasbourg case law, using the 
concepts of stereotyping and vulnerability. 
                                                          
5
 Of recent years, Court-watchers have taken to the legal blogosphere to express their views regarding the recent 
developments in the Strasbourg case law. See, e.g., ECHR Blog, http://echrblog.blogspot.com; ECHR Sexual 
Orientation Blog, http://echrso.blogspot.nl/; Strasbourg Observers, http://strasbourgobservers.com; and UK 
Human Rights Blog, http://ukhumanrightsblog.com. 
6
 The research for this PhD thesis was conducted within the framework of the ERC Starting Grant project 
‘Strengthening the European Court of Human Rights: More Accountability Through Better Legal Reasoning’, led by 
Professor Eva Brems. The six PhD researchers in this team – Maris Burbergs, Laurens Lavrysen, Saïla Ouald Chaib, 
Lourdes Peroni, Stijn  Smet and myself - all work on the wider topic of strengthening the legal reasoning of the 
ECtHR.  
7
 In the context of equal protection law, it has long been argued that courts are prone to adopt the world-view of 
the perpetrators instead of the victims of discrimination. See, e.g., Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial 
Discrimination through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Overview of the Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 
1049 (1978). 
8
 This standpoint is closely related to the idea of “procedural justice”, which essentially means that, in their contact 
with the law, people care a great deal about the way their case is handled. One of the aspects of procedural justice 
is “respect”: “People should be given the feeling that they and their concerns are taken seriously by the legal 
system.” See Eva Brems & Laurens Lavrysen, Procedural Justice in Human Rights Adjudication: The European Court 
of Human Rights, 35 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 176, 181 (2013). 
9
 The importance of a contextual analysis is further discussed in the part of this chapter that concerns 
methodology. See infra Part V.C. 
10
 Ann Scales, Feminist Legal Method: Not So Scary, 2 UCLA WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL 1, 28 (1992). (“Outsider 
jurisprudence asserts that the real moral authority of the law inheres in its responsiveness to injustice.”) 
11
 Cf. GEORGE LETSAS, A THEORY OF INTERPRETATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2007). 
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Before proceeding to explain more elaborately how this thesis proposes to deploy the concepts 
of stereotyping and vulnerability to analyze and strengthen the Strasbourg Court’s equality analysis 
regarding non-dominant groups, it should be acknowledged that the terminology concerning this topic is 
thorny. By using the term “groups”, this thesis does not mean to imply that there is necessarily a great 
deal of cohesion or uniformity amongst the people in question.12 Groups can be loose entities. Non-
dominant groups can be broadly understood as groups who do not control the value system and 
rewards in a particular society.13 These are, in other words, the less powerful and often marginalized 
segments of society.14 This study does not focus on any one group in particular, but includes analysis of 
cases concerning women, Roma, asylum seekers, people with a physical and/or mental disability, and 
sexual minorities. It might as well have included cases on other non-dominant groups – like the Kurds in 
Turkey or religious minorities all around Europe. However, to repeat, the focus of this thesis is on legal 
concepts, rather than on a specific non-dominant group. 
Turning now to the concept of stereotyping: stereotypes can be described as beliefs about 
groups of people.15 Examples from the case law of the ECtHR are notions like women are homemakers,16 
Roma are thieves,17 and people with a mental disability are incapable of forming political opinions.18 This 
thesis submits that harmful stereotyping is a human rights issue, which the Strasbourg Court needs to 
address more specifically and consistently than it has so far done. There are many factors that 
complicate such an endeavor for the Court: stereotyping partly fulfills useful functions and stereotypes 
are not always harmful. Indeed, legislation is often based on stereotypes. Recognizing these 
                                                          
12
 There is extensive literature in the fields of law, political science and sociology pointing out problems with group-
based analysis. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, ‘Groups’ and the Advent of Critical Race Scholarship, ISSUES IN LEGAL 
SCHOLARSHIP: THE ORIGINS AND FATE OF ANTISUBORDINATION THEORY, Article 10 (2003); ROGERS BRUBAKER, ETHNICITY WITHOUT 
GROUPS (2004); and Iris Marion Young, Status Inequality and Social Groups, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP: THE ORIGINS 
AND FATE OF ANTISUBORDINATION THEORY, Article 9 (2002). 
13
 See the entry for “dominant group” in Mosby’s Medical Dictionary, available at: http://medical-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/dominant+group. 
14
 Other studies of the Convention have related marginalization to lack of political power. See Dia Anagnostou, The 
Strasbourg Court, Democracy and the Protection of Marginalised Individuals and Minorities, in THE EUROPEAN COURT 
OF HUMAN RIGHT AND THE RIGHTS OF MARGINALISED INDIVIDUALS AND MINORITIES IN CONTEXT 1, 2 (Dia Anagnostou & Evangelia 
Psychogiopoulou eds., 2010). (“By the term ‘maginalised individuals and minorities’ we mean those segments of 
the society who, due to a variety of reasons, are silenced within the democratic process, or at least are significantly 
constrained in voicing and pursuing their claims through it.”) This study, however, purposively takes a wider view 
by focusing on non-dominance. Women, for example, are non-dominant even though they do have (more or less 
effective) access to the democratic process. 
15
 See infra Part III.B for a more thorough account of how this thesis understands the concept of stereotype. 
16
 See, among many other cases, Abdulaziz, Cabales, and Balkandali v. United Kingdom A 94 (1985); 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 
471; Konstantin Markin v. Russia (GC), App. No. 30078/06, 56 Eur. H.R. Rep. 8 (2013). 
17
 See, e.g., Aksu v. Turkey (GC), App. Nos. 4149/04; 41029/04, 15 March 2012. 
18
 Alajos Kiss v. Hungary, App. No.  38832/06, 20 May 2010. 
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complexities, this thesis yet sounds the alarm bells about stereotyping, as stereotypes generate and 
reinforce inequality. They are the preconceptions that underlie inequality and discrimination; they are 
what make it so hard to turn formal legal entitlements to equal treatment into a substantive reality for 
non-dominant groups. Thus, in Chapters Two and Three, this thesis aims to deploy the concept of 
stereotyping to develop a more transformative equality jurisprudence; meaning a jurisprudence which 
contests and seeks to transform the root-causes of inequality and discrimination.19 
Whereas stereotyping needs to be framed as a human rights issue by the Strasbourg Court, 
vulnerability is clearly already framed that way. Indeed, both human rights law (including Strasbourg 
case law) and human rights literature are packed with references to “vulnerable groups” and 
“vulnerability”, and the amount of references is steadily increasing. Despite vulnerability’s great legal 
momentum, however, most of the time this term seems to be used mechanically, without real reflection 
on its content. Thus filling a void, this thesis provides an analysis of the concept of vulnerability in the 
case law of the ECtHR, in order to uncover the potential of this concept to strengthen the ECtHR’s 
reasoning as regards non-dominant groups – who the Court often designates as “vulnerable”. What 
promise holds this concept to develop a more transformative notion of equality in the Court’s case law? 
Vulnerability is understood in this thesis as both a universal and a particular human condition. 
Moreover, it is submitted that institutions are vulnerable too.20 Chapters Four and Five will detail how, 
in the Court’s case law, vulnerability is something some groups suffer from; it is not referred to as a 
universal experience. In the same Chapters, it will be explored what effects vulnerability has in the 
jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court: these effects, it will turn out, are very real and range from 
enhanced positive obligations on the part of the State to a narrowing of the margin of appreciation.21 
By reference to the concepts of stereotyping and vulnerability, the aim of this thesis can be 
described as having an empirical and a normative component. The empirical aim of this study is to 
analyze the Strasbourg Court’s case law on equal protection of non-dominant groups through the lens of 
these concepts. The normative aim of this dissertation is to suggest ways in which the Court can develop 
a more transformative equality jurisprudence, which addresses the underlying structural causes of 
                                                          
19
 See infra Part III.A for discussion of the different forms of equality which this thesis distinguishes, namely formal, 
substantive and transformative equality. 
20
 Vulnerability not only characterizes humans and human-built institutions, but it also inheres in animals and the 
environment. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to go into wider questions of vulnerability, but see, e.g., Ani B. 
Satz, Animals as vulnerable subjects: beyond interest-convergence, hierarchy, and property, in VULNERABILITY: 
REFLECTIONS ON A NEW ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR LAW AND POLITICS (Martha Fineman & Anna Grear eds., 2013).  
21
 See infra Chapter 4.IV; Chapter 5.IV; and Chapter 6.III.D. 
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inequality and discrimination. The primary focus of this analysis is thereby on the role of Article 14 (the 
Convention’s non-discrimination provision22). However, the Court has the tendency to cover the 
egalitarian aspects of an application under one of the free-standing Convention articles, without 
invoking Article 14. For example, the Court has several times addressed the disadvantaged position of 
gay people through Article 8 (the right to private and family life),23 as well as Article 11 (the right 
peaceful assembly and freedom of association);24 it has addressed the equality of minority religious 
groups under Article 9 (the freedom of religion);25 and it has addressed the disadvantaged position of 
Roma under Article 8.26 This means that an analysis of the equality jurisprudence would miss crucial 
cases if it were to focus exclusively on Article 14 case law. The present analysis will therefore focus on, 
but not confine itself to, Article 14 jurisprudence. 
In what follows, Part 2 will situate this study in the broader context of the Court’s non-
discrimination case law and the scholarship on this topic: first the basic elements of Article 14 analysis 
will be set out; then recent developments in the jurisprudence which signal a more meaningful role for 
this non-discrimination provision will be discussed; and closing this part is a look at the problems that 
still persist in Article 14 jurisprudence. Part 3 will outline the core concepts of this dissertation, namely 
equality, stereotyping and vulnerability. Part 4 briefly takes stock of the limits to the Court’s abilities to 
achieve change: first it is acknowledged that there are fundamental critiques of rights which point out 
that it is problematic to resort to human rights law to ameliorate the position of disadvantaged groups, 
and, second, more practical difficulties will be discussed which have to do with the institutional position 
of the Strasbourg Court. Part 5 discusses the research methods that have been used in this thesis. The 
methods of the chapters that explore the concept of stereotyping are discussed first, followed by a 
discussion of the methods of the chapters that concern the concept of vulnerability. This part closes by 
addressing the issue of method on a more conceptual/ideological level, namely by discussing the role of 
                                                          
22
 Article 14 ECHR is supplemented by Protocol 12 to the Convention, which contains a free-standing right to non-
discrimination. Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,  
Nov. 4, 2000, E.T.S. 177.  See infra text accompanying note 32.  
23
 See, e.g., Smith and Grady v. UK, app. Nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96, 27 September 1999 (concerning the 
participation of homosexuals in the military). 
24
 See, e.g., Bączkowski and Others v. Poland, App. No. 1543/06, 3 May 2007 (concerning the prohibition of a LGBT 
equality parade). 
25
 See, e.g., Bayatyan v. Armenia (GC), App. No. 23459/03, 7 July 2011, ¶ 126 (concerning the conscientious 
objection of a Jehovah’s witness to military service) 
26
 See, e.g., V.C. v. Slovakia, App. No. 18968/07, 8 November 2011; and N.B. v. Slovakia, app no. 29518/10, 12 June 
12 (concerning the forced sterilization of Roma women). 
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feminist legal methods in this study. Part 6 concludes the present introductory chapter by outlining the 
structure of this thesis. 
 
 
II. Background: developments in Article 14 ECHR jurisprudence 
 
This part will provide general background to the PhD articles in Chapters Two to Five by outlining the 
contours of the Court’s non-discrimination jurisprudence. First the central tenets of this jurisprudence 
will be summarized (section A); then several recent developments in this jurisprudence will be discussed 
which signal a more significant role for Article 14 than it used to have (section B); and finally some 
continuing problems with Article 14 jurisprudence will be highlighted (section C). 
A) The Central Tenets of the Court’s Approach to Discrimination27 
 
The prohibition of discrimination is laid down in Article 14 of the Convention, which states:  
 
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without 
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other 
status. 
 
The Court established the basic framework for its analysis of this provision in the very first Article 14 
case it decided on the merits: the Belgian Linguistics case of 1968.28 This case concerned Belgian 
legislation that restricted the use of French in Flemish schools. The Court held that “the principle of 
equality of treatment [in the exercise of a right laid down in the Convention] is violated if the distinction 
has no objective and reasonable justification”.29 In this early case, the Court also affirmed the accessory 
nature of Article 14 – meaning that it has no independent existence and is applicable only in relation to 
                                                          
27
 For good general overviews of the Article 14 case law, see, e.g., ODDNÝ MJÖLL ARNARDÓTTIR , EQUALITY AND NON-
DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2003); D.J. Harris, M. O’Boyle, Colin Warbrick & Ed 
Bates, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, Ch. 15 (2009); Janneke Gerards, Gelijke Behandeling en het 
EVRM, Artikel 14 EVRM: van krachteloze waarborg naar ‘norm met tanden’?, 29 NJCM-BULLETIN 176 (2004).   
28
 Case “Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education Belgium” 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
A) (1968).  
29
 Id., p. 31 at 10. 
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the rights set forth in the Convention.30 In other words, Article 14 can only be invoked if a case falls 
within the “ambit” of another Convention Article.31 In Belgian Linguistics the Court added, however, that 
Article 14 is applicable also when none of the substantive Articles of the Convention is violated standing 
alone. The fact that Article 14 does not contain a free-standing right to non-discrimination significantly 
limits the scope of this provision. Protocol 12 to the Convention, which entered into force in 2005, is 
aimed at rectifying this situation. Protocol 12 states in its first Article that:  
 
1 The enjoyment of any right set forth by law shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such 
as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with 
a national minority, property, birth or other status. 
2 No one shall be discriminated against by any public authority on any ground such as those mentioned in 
paragraph 1.
32
 
 
However, this Protocol has not generated a substantive body of case law yet – in fact, only one case has 
so far been examined on the merits under this Protocol.33  
The discrimination grounds listed in both Article 14 and Protocol 12 are not exhaustive, as is 
illustrated by the words “discrimination on any ground” and “other status”.34 This broadens the 
potential scope of these provisions, as grounds that are not explicitly listed can be included by the Court. 
The Court has done so with the grounds of sexual orientation35 and disability,36 for example.  
Based on early articulations like the one in Belgian Linguistics, the Grand Chamber now regularly 
defines discrimination as follows: 
 
                                                          
30
 Id., p. 30 at 9. 
31
 On the ambit of Article 14, see, e.g., Robert Wintemute, ‘‘Within the Ambit”: How Big is the ‘‘Gap’’ in Article 14 
European Convention on Human Rights?, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 366 (2004). 
32
 As of 1 August 2013, 18 of the 47 Council of Europe countries have ratified this Protocol. 
33
 Sejdić and Finci v. Bosina and Herzegovina, App. Nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06, 22 December 2009. In the case of 
Savez Crkava “Riječ života” and Others v. Croatia the Court held that it was not necessary to examine the Protocol 
No. 12 complaint separately. See Savez Crkava “Riječ života” and Others v. Croatia, App. No. 7798/08, 9 December 
2010, ¶ 114-115. 
34
 Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir, Non-Discrimination under Article 14: the Burden of Proof, 51 SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES IN LAW 
13, 14 (2007). For analysis of the discrimination grounds see Janneke Gerards, The Discrimination Grounds of 
Article 14 of the European Court of Human Rights, 13 HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 99 (2013). 
35
 Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, App. No. 33290/96, 21 December 1999, ¶ 28. 
36
 Glor v. Zwitserland, App. No. 13444/04, 30 April 2009, ¶ 80. 
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“Discrimination for the purposes of Article 14 of the Convention means treating differently, 
without an objective and reasonable justification, persons in relevantly similar situations.”
37
 
In the case of Thlimmenos v. Greece (2000) it has added to this definition by holding that: 
 “the right not to be discriminated . . . is also violated when States without an objective and 
reasonable justification fail to treat differently persons whose situations are significantly 
different.”
38
  
These two formulations of discrimination are two sides of the same coin: states are under an obligation 
to treat similar cases similarly, and they are under an obligation to treat different cases differently.  
In the second stage of its analysis, the Court turns to justifications. Once the applicant has 
shown that there is a difference in treatment, it is for the Government to prove that this treatment is 
justified.39 This means that it will have to prove that the difference in treatment pursued a legitimate 
aim and that a reasonable relationship of proportionality existed between the means employed and the 
aim sought to be realized.40 This is where the Court usually brings into play its margin of appreciation 
doctrine: Governments “enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent 
differences in otherwise similar situations justify a difference in treatment.”41 The width of the margin of 
appreciation determines how strict the Court will scrutinize the Government’s conduct. In the context of 
discrimination, the Court has developed the “very weighty reasons test”, which essentially means that 
the Court will scrutinize distinctions made on some grounds more strictly than others: some differences 
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in treatment require “very weighty reasons” before they “could be regarded as compatible with the 
Convention”.42 In other words: when the Court applies the very weighty reasons test, it applies a narrow 
margin of appreciation. So far distinctions on the basis of sex,43 race,44 sexual orientation,45 nationality,46 
illegitimate birth,47 religion,48 mental faculties,49 and HIV-status50 call for very weighty reasons. 
 
B) Article 14: Cinderella Has Come to the Ball  
 
The equal protection case law of the ECtHR is a dynamic research topic. The fortunes of Article 14 have 
recently been likened to the story of Cinderella: after years of neglect – in which the Court hardly 
examined applications under this Article, adhered largely to a formal conception of equality, 51 and did 
not develop its legal reasoning under this provision much – the Article has finally appeared in the Court’s 
ballroom.52 The Court is increasingly adjudicating cases under the prohibition of discrimination and its 
legal reasoning on that topic is gaining depth. Naturally, this has not escaped the notice of Court 
watchers.53 In what follows, this section will briefly set out the most salient recent developments in the 
Court’s Article 14 analysis.  
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First of all, the Grand Chamber has built on the Thlimmenos-test by unequivocally holding in 
D.H. and Others v. Czech Republic (2007) that the Convention also covers indirect discrimination.54 
Indirect discrimination occurs when a general policy or measure which is couched in neutral terms 
creates a disproportionate negative impact on a protected group.55 The Court also confirmed in D.H. and 
Others that discrimination need not arise from legislative measures, but that it can also result from a de 
facto situation.56 D.H. concerned the de facto segregation of Roma children in special schools that were 
vastly inferior to the normal schools. Both the Thlimmenos and D.H. and Others rulings are extremely 
important, because they make clear that the Convention covers both direct and indirect discrimination. 
Both rulings are also significant because they signal that the Court can recognize the need to 
accommodate difference. These cases should be distinguished though. Thlimmenos concerns a claim of 
unjustified similar treatment:57 the applicant in this case claimed that the State ought to have 
differentiated between people who were convicted as a direct result of their religious beliefs and people 
who were convicted because of other reasons. D.H. and Others concerns a claim of unjustified 
differential treatment:58 the group of Roma schoolchildren (and their parents) claimed that they should 
not have received disadvantageous treatment compared with other schoolchildren. 
The judgment of D.H. and Others is also important for what it said about evidence in indirect 
discrimination cases. In the past the Court held that statistical data could not in themselves constitute 
evidence of a discriminatory practice.59 In D.H. the Court explicitly distanced itself from this approach. It 
held that if applicants bring forward reliable statistical data this can be enough evidence for a prima 
facie finding of indirect discrimination, which then shifts the burden of proof to the State to establish 
that the law or measure in question was justified.60 This can greatly ease the applicants’ burden in 
raising a presumption of indirect discrimination. To what extent statistical data can be adduced as 
evidence in cases of indirect discrimination outside of the educational sphere is not yet clear, however.  
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Another evolution in the Article 14 case law concerns the Court’s development of the doctrine 
of positive obligations.61 As early as the Belgian Linguistics case the Court has held that differential 
treatment can be permitted under Article 14 when it serves to correct an existing inequality,62 but in the 
case of Stec and Others v. UK (2006) the Court went one step further and indicated that there can 
actually be a duty to correct inequality.63 Stec concerned a complaint about the cut-off date for reduced 
earnings allowances, which were linked to pensionable age: in the UK the pensionable age for women 
was 60 whereas the age for men was 65. In Stec the Grand Chamber held that “in certain circumstances 
a failure to attempt to correct inequality through different treatment may in itself give rise to a breach 
of Article 14.”64 This observation is dicta in Stec,65 but the case of Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary (2013) 
really turns on the issue of a duty of affirmative action.66 Horváth and Kiss is another case concerning 
the misplacement of Roma children in special schools. The Court found that the applicants successfully 
established a prima facie indication of indirect discrimination and then it found that the Government did 
not succeed in showing that it had taken adequate measures to ensure that Roma children with a 
mental disability were placed in the right schools. The Court formulates the positive equality duty as 
follows: “the Court considers that the State has specific positive obligations to avoid the perpetuation of 
past discrimination or discriminative practices disguised in allegedly neutral tests.”67 And it even goes 
further by referring to “the positive obligations of the State to undo a history of racial segregation in 
special schools”.68 Chapters Four and Five will analyze this judgment as part of the Court’s development 
of the vulnerable group concept, but for now I just wish to note that the Court has considerably 
deepened the notion of positive equality duties.  
Indeed, the judgments of Belgian Linguistics, Thlimmenos, Stec and Horváth and Kiss can be 
viewed as existing along a continuum. In Belgian Linguistics the Court observed that a positive 
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undertaking on the part of the State to differentiate between different groups does not necessarily 
breach Article 14; in Thlimmenos the Court held that Article 14 can bring with it the obligation to 
accommodate difference in order not to create inequality;69 in Stec the Court subsequently announced 
that under certain circumstances Article 14 might require positive steps on the part of the State to 
ensure equality; and in Horváth and Kiss the Court made this concrete by holding that the State has a 
duty to remedy inequality in certain circumstances. In other words, the positive equality duties of the 
CoE Member States have progressively become farther-reaching.  
Another instance of a positive duty under Article 14 is the duty to investigate whether prejudiced 
motives played a role in cases concerning violent incidents.70 In the Grand Chamber judgment of 
Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria (2005), the Court held that there is a substantive aspect and a 
procedural aspect to Article 14 when that Article is examined in conjunction with Articles 2 or 3 (the 
right to life and the prohibition of torture): the first going to the question whether impermissible 
motives (in this case racism) played a part in the case and the second going to the investigation of such 
motives.71 Nachova concerned the killing of two Roma men by a Bulgarian policeman who had also 
allegedly shouted “You damn Gypsies” to a bystander.72  
Though it has been argued that the performance of the Court in cases that concern race 
discrimination is still problematic,73 inter alia because the Court is extremely hesitant to find substantive 
Article 14 violations,74 it is a noteworthy development in itself that the Court has started to flesh out the 
prohibition of race discrimination in its legal reasoning. It took the Court a long time to start talking 
about racism. The most powerful indictment of this state of affairs came from Judge Bonnello in his 
famous dissent in Anguelova v. Bulgaria (2002), a case about the death of a Roma boy in police custody: 
 
Leafing through the annals of the Court, an uninformed observer would be justified to conclude 
that, for over fifty years democratic Europe has been exempted from any suspicion of racism, 
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intolerance or xenophobia. . . Kurds, coloureds, Muslims, Roma and others are again and again 
killed, tortured or maimed, but the Court is not persuaded that their race, colour, nationality or 
place of origin has anything to do with it. Misfortunes punctually visit disadvantaged minority 
groups, but only as the result of well-disposed coincidence.
75
 
 
The first time a Section of the Court held a State accountable for racial discrimination was only in the 
Chamber judgment of Nachova in 2004.76 Since then, however, the Court has delivered numerous 
rulings on race discrimination – both concerning racist violence and concerning other kinds of race 
discrimination.77 Many of these cases involve members of the Roma community, such as the above 
mentioned cases of D.H. and Horváth and Kiss. Several of these cases will be studied in the next 
Chapters. 
The anti-Roma violence cases are also part of the last development that will be highlighted here, 
namely that the Court is slowly coming to see that violence can constitute a form of discrimination. So 
far, the most salient case in this respect is Opuz v. Turkey (2009), concerning domestic violence against 
women.78 A mother and her daughter (the applicant) were the victim of repeated abuse and threats by 
the partner of the daughter. The police knew of the situation and remained passive. Eventually, the man 
killed the applicant’s mother. The Strasbourg Court found violations of Articles 2 (the right to life), 3 (the 
prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment) and Article 14 in conjunction with these 
articles. Referring both to the indirect discrimination doctrine as developed in D.H. and Others, and to 
broader international human rights protection mechanisms such as the Convention on the Elimination 
of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (“CEDAW”),79 the Court noted that “the alleged 
discrimination at issue was not based on the legislation per se but rather resulted from the general 
attitude of the local authorities.”80 The local authorities viewed domestic violence as a private matter, 
beyond their reach. The Court held that: “Bearing in mind its finding above that the general and 
discriminatory judicial passivity in Turkey, albeit unintentional, mainly affected women, the Court 
considers that the violence suffered by the applicant and her mother may be regarded as gender-based 
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violence which is a form of discrimination against women.”81 The ruling in Opuz has opened the door for 
other successful claims of discrimination in the context of domestic violence against women.82 
Finally, there are the two developments in the Article 14 case law that this thesis analyzes in 
depth, namely the adoption of an anti-stereotyping approach in several cases and the emergence of the 
“vulnerable groups” concept. As these developments will be amply discussed in later Chapters, they will 
not be explored further now. 
C) Continuing Problems with Article 14 Jurisprudence  
 
Despite these developments, numerous problems with the Court’s equality reasoning remain. This 
section will sketch four of these problems briefly, so as to provide background to the concrete proposals 
that the next chapters make as regards the concepts of stereotyping and vulnerability. These four 
problems are the Court’s reluctance to examine Article 14; its narrow conception of discrimination; its 
emphasis on intent; and the uncertainty surrounding the margin of appreciation doctrine. 
 The first persistent issue regarding the Court equality jurisprudence is the Court’s propensity to 
omit an analysis of Article 14 if it has already found another violation of the Convention. This is related 
to what some call the “subsidiarity” of the non-discrimination provision.83 The Court often reiterates 
that: 
 
Article 14 has no independent existence . . . Where a substantive Article of the Convention has 
been invoked both on its own and together with Article 14 and a separate breach has been 
found of the substantive Article, it is not generally necessary for the Court to consider the 
case under Article 14 also, though the position is otherwise if a clear inequality of treatment in 
the enjoyment of the right in question is a fundamental aspect of the case.
84
 
 
The problem is that the Court is often reluctant to acknowledge (or perhaps it is unable to see) that 
inequality of treatment is a fundamental aspect of a case. Take for instance V.C. v. Slovakia and other 
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cases that the Court has recently examined concerning forced sterilizations of Roma women.85 In V.C. 
the Court found a violation of Articles 3 and 8 (prohibition of degrading treatment and the right private 
and family life). It mentions in the Article 8 analysis that the issue of improper sterilizations affects 
mostly women from vulnerable groups and ethnic minorities and that Roma women are at particular 
risk.86 The Court also observes that the physician of V.C. had noted in her medical file “patient is of 
Roma origin”.87 And yet the Court “does not find it necessary to separately determine whether the facts 
of the case also gave rise to a breach of Article 14 of the Convention.”88 Thus, the Court stops short of 
truly examining how the ethnic origin of the applicant and the widespread prejudice that exists about 
the applicant’s community prompted her forced sterilization.  
V.C. is but one example: in my view, the Court regularly misses the crux of a complaint by 
passing over Article 14. 89 This is unfortunate both for the individual applicant who might feel that the 
core of her complaint is not taken seriously, and from the wider perspective of case law development.90 
If the Court does not examine the egalitarian dimension of human rights abuses, it makes a real 
engagement with the gap that was identified in the introduction of this Chapter – the gap between 
human rights rhetoric and reality, which is biggest when it comes to non-dominant people – difficult.  
The second problem regarding the Court’s legal reasoning about equality is the Court’s narrow 
conception of what discrimination is. Rory O’Connell has rightly argued that “[t]he greatest weakness in 
traditional Art 14 jurisprudence has been the limited understanding of what was covered by the term 
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‘discrimination’. . . it has tended to prohibit only 'direct and overt' discrimination, and has failed to reach 
more covert or subtle forms of discrimination.”91 O’Connell is quite sanguine, however, about the 
impact of the recent developments that were described in the preceding section, such as the Court’s 
recognition of indirect discrimination: he thinks these developments signal a turn to a substantive 
conception of equality.92 Though I largely agree with O’Connell, I am more cautiously optimistic, as the 
Court’s conception of discrimination remains narrow. The first section of this part showed that the Court 
equates discrimination with (unjustified) differential treatment (or, as in the case of Thlimmenos, a 
failure to provide differential treatment).93 Even indirect discrimination is put in the differential 
treatment box. Thus, the Court held in D.H. that: “a difference in treatment may take the form of 
disproportionately prejudicial effects”.94 In other words, the rulings in Thlimmenos and D.H. have done 
little to dislodge the differential-treatment paradigm as such.  
This extremely strong focus on differential treatment is problematic because it causes the Court 
to reduce the whole problem of discrimination and inequality to just one of its manifestations. 
Discrimination can take many forms, 95 and not all of these forms can be contested through the notion if 
differential treatment.96 Iris Marion Young, for example, has theorized that there are “five faces of 
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oppression”, namely exploitation; marginalization; powerlessness; cultural imperialism and violence.97 
The Court will not go far in contesting these kinds of harms if it persists in thinking in terms of 
differential treatment. Chapter Three of this thesis will argue this point specifically in relation to 
stereotyping: it will contend that the problem of stereotyping cannot be adequately captured under the 
header of differential treatment, because stereotyping can be harmful in and of itself (rather than 
because one group of people is stereotyped differently than another group).98 
The third problematic aspect of Article 14 reasoning, namely the Court’s occasional emphasis on 
discriminatory intent, is related to the first issue of the Court’s reluctance to examine Article 14. In 
several cases, like the forced sterilization case of V.C. v. Slovakia, the Court gave as a reason for not 
examining Article 14 that there was no evidence of a discriminatory intent on the part of the domestic 
authorities. The Court stated: “notwithstanding the fact that the applicant’s sterilisation without her 
informed consent calls for serious criticism, the objective evidence is not sufficiently strong in itself to 
convince the Court that it was part of an organised policy or that the hospital staff’s conduct was 
intentionally racially motivated”.99 In other cases, the Court referred to the applicant’s failure to 
establish a discriminatory intent to declare the Article 14 complaint inadmissible.100 Also, some separate 
opinions contain indications that there are individual judges at the Court who think that a finding of 
discriminatory intent is a prerequisite to a finding of discrimination.101 In contrast, in several cases of 
indirect discrimination, like D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic, the Court has explicitly held that 
where legislation produces an indirect discriminatory effect it is not necessary to prove a discriminatory 
intent on the part of the relevant authorities.102 It appears from the jurisprudence that an intention to 
discriminate need not be proven in cases that concern employment, the provision of services or the 
educational sphere,103 but that in cases that concern allegations of racist violence proof of a 
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discriminatory intent is vital in order to obtain a finding of a substantive Article 14 violation.104 To be 
sure, this seems to be an area of the Strasbourg jurisprudence that is rapidly developing. At the moment 
the Court’s approach to intent is ambiguous, however, as the cases of V.C. on the one hand and D.H. on 
the other hand show.  
What is wrong with the focus on intent? The paradoxical result of the Strasbourg jurisprudence 
as it stands is that the more violent discrimination is, the less likely the Court is to recognize it as 
discrimination. Moreover, as American equal protection law scholars have shown, discrimination often 
does not occur by intent, but through unconscious stereotyping.105 This is corroborated by the work of 
social psychologists. For present purposes this finding is important: as stereotyping often occurs 
unconsciously, the Strasbourg Court will not be able to respond adequately to stereotypes if it persists in 
focusing on the presence of a discriminatory intent.106  
The last enduring difficulty with the Court’s equality jurisprudence which will be discussed in this 
section concerns the margin of appreciation, and more specifically the ‘very weighty reasons’-doctrine. 
It is unclear what the “unifying principle[s]”107 is/are that determine whether a discrimination ground 
requires very weighty reasons or not.108 Up to a few years ago, the only consideration that the Court 
regularly mentioned was the existence of a European consensus: if a State failed to meet a common 
European standard, its margin of appreciation would be narrower and the State would be obliged to 
justify the distinction with very weighty reasons.109 The Court still relies on the consensus-argument to 
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help “delineate protected groups”,110 but the Court has also elaborated other principles now. It has 
mentioned immutability, group vulnerability due to a history of discrimination, and importance for 
individual self-fulfillment as other criteria.111 The immutability criterion means that if a trait is based on 
personal choice rather than on an immutable characteristic, then distinctions on the basis of this trait 
will not require a very weighty justification. The Court has employed this reasoning in a 2011 case 
concerning immigration status; Bah v. UK.112 The vulnerable group argument, on the other hand, was 
developed in cases concerning Roma and persons with a disability, and is thoroughly explored in 
Chapter Four. The self-fulfillment criterion, lastly, stems from a freedom of religion case. In Vojnity v. 
Hungary (2013), the Court mentioned “the importance of the rights enshrined in Article 9 [the right to 
freedom of religion] of the Convention in guaranteeing the individual’s self-fulfillment” as the reason for 
assigning strict scrutiny to discrimination on the basis of religion.113 
It is not in itself problematic that several factors can intensify the Court’s scrutiny. Indeed, this 
enables a dynamic non-discrimination case law that is capable of responding to changing 
circumstances.114 There are tensions between these different factors, however, which the Court does 
not seem to acknowledge. In the case of Bah v. UK, for example, the Court uses the immutability-
argument to determine that the scrutiny is not strict.115 If it had used the group vulnerability argument, 
however, it might well have determined that immigration status is a ground that does require strict 
scrutiny. Furthermore, as Chapter Two will argue, the Court is not consistent in its application of the 
very weighty reason doctrine: sometimes the Court pays lip-service to the notion of very weighty 
reasons, while it in practice carries out a more lenient scrutiny.116 For these reasons, the Article 14 case 
law is somewhat arbitrary and inconsistent.    
Now that the Court’s approach to the prohibition of discrimination has been sketched, as well as 
the recent developments in Article 14 jurisprudence that signal a more important role for that provision 
in the Court’s work, and the problems that still remain with the Court reasoning about non-
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discrimination, it is time to introduce the three concepts that are at the heart of the analysis of this PhD 
thesis. 
 
III. Core Concepts: Equality, Stereotyping and Vulnerability 
 
To a significant extent, the originality of this thesis lies in the concepts it employs. To my knowledge, I 
am the first commentator to analyze and critique the case law of the ECtHR through the lens of 
“stereotyping”. Similarly, to my knowledge, Lourdes Peroni and I are the first to use “vulnerability” as a 
concept through which to study the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.  
This part of the chapter will summarize the central tenets of the three concepts that are at the 
core of this dissertation: equality (section A), stereotyping (section B) and vulnerability (section C). These 
concepts are all deeply contested in legal as well as non-legal literature. This part is confined, therefore, 
to setting out my understanding of these concepts; the critical exploration of other interpretations is left 
to the next chapters.  
 
A) Equality: formal, substantive, and transformative117 
 
This study distinguishes between three legal conceptions of equality: formal, substantive and 
transformative.118 Formal equality is usually understood as equality as sameness: it dictates identical 
treatment (treating likes alike).119 Formal equality demands that no distinctions can be made on the 
basis of certain traits, such as gender, race, sexual orientation, religion etc., without sufficient 
justification. One of the hallmarks of a formal equality approach is its focus on comparability: a formal 
equality analysis demands a comparator who does not share the trait in question (such as a specific sex 
or sexual orientation) and who was treated differently than the complainant.120 Another hallmark of a 
formalist approach to equality is that it is decontextualized; it tends to employ disembodied reasoning 
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and it privileges “abstract principles over material facts”.121 A recent judgment that epitomizes a formal 
equality approach is the already mentioned case of Bah v. UK. Ms. Bah came from Sierra Leone and 
claimed asylum in the UK. This request was refused, but she was exceptionally granted leave to remain 
in the UK indefinitely. Her teenage son was allowed to join her there, on the condition that he would not 
have recourse to public funds. Ms. Bah was renting a room in a private home, but her landlord asked her 
to leave when her son arrived because he did not want to house the son as well. Usually, unintentional 
homeless persons with minor children would have priority access to social housing. Ms. Bah, however, 
did not qualify as being in “priority need” because of her son’s immigration status.122 She complained to 
the Strasbourg Court that this constitutes discrimination. The response of the Court sounds formulaic: 
“only where there is differential treatment, based on an identifiable characteristic or “status”, of 
persons in analogous or relevantly similar positions, can there be discrimination.”123 And then the Court 
immediately turns the analysis to “the question of who is the appropriate comparator to this 
applicant”.124   
 The problems with formal equality have been the subject of much theorizing by critical legal 
scholars over the past four decades.125 Briefly, a central objection to the formal equality approach is 
that, with its abstract and decontextualized analysis, it is blind to pre-existing disadvantage and cannot 
do justice to the messy reality in which people find themselves. Moreover, a formal equality approach is 
thought to favor dominant groups,126 because it takes as its point of reference the experience of 
dominant groups.127 So, for example, formal equality will bring women equality only as far as they are 
the same as men, disabled people will only be protected to the extent that they are the same as non-
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disabled people, and religious minorities will only find protection to the extent that their claims are in 
line with the dominant religion. Many feminist legal theorists attribute formal equality thinking to liberal 
ideology and liberal notions of the state and of personhood.128 Formal equality “is underpinned by an 
idealized version of the liberal individual: autonomous, self-interested and self-determined.”129 The ideal 
of the liberal individual making free choices is also behind the judgment in Bah. The Court emphasizes 
that the applicant “chose to have her son join her in the United Kingdom” and that as she was “in full 
awareness of the condition attached to his leave to enter, the applicant accepted this condition and 
effectively agreed not to have recourse to public funds in order to support her son.”130 The Court 
reasoning does not consider how Ms. Bah found herself in a very precarious situation; having to take 
care of a 13 year old child by herself, in a new country, while she was being threatened by 
homelessness. Nor does the Court reflect on how Ms. Bah’s situation affected her choices. Instead, the 
judgment reduces Ms. Bah’s case to an abstract debate about proper comparators. This is not to say 
that a formal equality approach does not serve a purpose. Formal equality provides a clear analytical 
tool and, moreover, it can count on broad support within liberal communities. In the past the Court has 
booked important successes on the non-discrimination terrain while employing a formal equality 
approach.131 This approach has let the Court to bring previously unprotected groups – such as 
illegitimate children132 – within the protective reach of the Convention. When discrimination is the result 
of an obvious difference in treatment between a protected group and another group, then formal 
equality is an effective tool. 
Substantive equality is a more diffuse concept, which has generated many different 
interpretations. In contrast to formal equality, it seeks to understand people in their social and historical 
contexts. “Unlike formal equality”, Sandra Fredman has noted, “substantive equality is expressly 
asymmetric . . . [t]hus instead of aiming to treat everyone alike, regardless of status, substantive equality 
focuses on the group which has suffered disadvantage”.133 From this perspective it is not problematic to 
focus on women rather than men, gays rather than heterosexuals, minorities rather than majorities: 
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indeed, the aim of a substantive equality approach is the de facto equality of disadvantaged groups. This 
de facto equality is multi-dimensional:134 at a minimum, it refers both to equality in the distribution of 
material goods and resources, and to equality in terms of social recognition.135  
Many of the developments that were described in the preceding part in relation to cases like 
Thlimmenos, D.H. and Horváth and Kiss show that the Court is moving towards a more substantive 
conception of equality.136 Especially the Court’s recognition of indirect discrimination and its expanding 
of positive obligations to promote equality can do much to improve the de facto position of 
disadvantaged groups. Chapter Four will argue that also the Court’s adoption of the vulnerable group 
concept signals a turn to substantive equality.137 The limitation of the substantive equality approach, at 
least as that approach has been sketched here, is that it does not necessarily address the root causes of 
discrimination and inequality.138 Substantive equality, in the version that is presented here, tends to 
address the symptoms (of inequality) but not the disease itself. 
That is where equality as transformation enters the debate. Equality as transformation is aimed 
at transforming the underlying causes of discrimination and inequality. Nancy Fraser describes this as 
“restructuring the underlying generative framework”.139 In other words, the term transformative 
equality “denote[s] change of a fundamental and far-reaching nature”.140 To flesh out what this entails 
in the context of judicial review, it is helpful to contrast transformation with inclusion. A justice project 
that aims for transformation is more radical than a justice project that aims for inclusion. South African 
scholars Elsje Bonthuys and Catherine Albertyn suggest that an inclusionary judgment is one that 
“expands the groups of people who can claim legal protection … [but] leaves the legal and social status 
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quo largely intact”, whereas transformative jurisprudence would locate disadvantage within systemic 
inequalities “and thus dislodge the underlying norms and structures that create and reinforce a rigid and 
hierarchical status quo.”141 Equality scholars often center their efforts on inclusion; typically, this means 
that they claim that the judiciary should protect a group which previously lacked specific protection. This 
dissertation, however, will argue that the ECtHR should now direct its energies towards developing 
transformative equality.142 Only by addressing and contesting the underlying causes of discrimination 
and inequality will the Court be able to do something about the gap between human rights reality and 
rhetoric as regards non-dominant groups.  
 My focus on and understanding of equality as transformation owes a great deal to the CEDAW 
Committee and its scholars.143 Even though the CEDAW Committee exclusively addresses gender 
equality, its views are extremely helpful in conceptualizing equality more generally.144 The CEDAW 
Committee has provided a clear formulation of its views on gender equality in General Recommendation 
No. 25.145 In this Recommendation the Committee observes that “three obligations are central to States 
parties’ efforts to eliminate discrimination against women”.146 These three obligations are to: (1) ensure 
that there is no direct or indirect discrimination against women; (2) improve the de facto position of 
women, and (3) address prevailing gender relations
 
and the persistence of gender-based stereotypes.147 
These obligations broadly correspond to formal equality, substantive equality, and transformative 
equality respectively.148 About the third, transformative, obligation the CEDAW Committee has said:  
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The position of women will not be improved as long as the underlying causes of discrimination 
against women, and of their inequality, are not effectively addressed. The lives of women and 
men must be considered in a contextual way, and measures adopted towards a real 
transformation of opportunities, institutions and systems so that they are no longer grounded 
in historically determined male paradigms of power and life patterns.
149
 
 
It is submitted that this insight does not only hold true for women, but also for other non-dominant 
groups:150 their position will not be improved as long as the underlying causes of discrimination and 
inequality are not effectively addressed. Likewise, not just male paradigms of power and life patterns 
need to be challenged, but all historically determined dominant paradigms of power. 
As Chapter Two explicates, the obligation to transform the underlying structures that generate 
gender inequality is grounded in Article 5 CEDAW.151 Section A of this provision provides that States 
ought to take all appropriate measures: 
 
To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving 
the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of 
the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.  
 
This provision puts the focus on stereotypes as one of the underlying causes of (gender) 
discrimination.152 Contesting stereotypes is, in other words, an important strategy in achieving 
transformative equality. As Chapters Two and Three will explore in depth, the recent Strasbourg case 
law shows some promising signs that the ECtHR is prepared to address stereotypes vigorously. Especially 
the Grand Chamber judgment of Konstantin Markin v. Russia (2012), concerning parental leave for a 
military serviceman, holds out hope that an anti-stereotyping approach can bring the Court nearer to 
equality as transformation.153 
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Before the next section can delve deeper into the concept of stereotyping, it should be noted 
that in the legal literature the concepts of substantive and transformative equality frequently overlap.154 
Most scholars only make a distinction between formal and substantive equality; they would rank what is 
described as transformative equality here under the header of substantive equality.155 I find the term 
“transformative equality” useful, however, to indicate that contesting the root causes of inequality is a 
crucial element of equality analysis. Currently, the biggest challenge for the Court’s Article 14 
jurisprudence is to develop a conception of equality as transformation. That is not to say that the Court 
should let go of formal and substantive equality; all three conceptions of equality serve their purpose 
and should therefore co-exist. And, in fact, this is already somewhat the case in the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence. As this discussion already showed and Chapter Two will further explore, these 
conceptions of equality are nowadays all three reflected in the Strasbourg Court’s reasoning (though 
formal equality predominates). Indeed, a single judgment can contain elements of several of these 
approaches: a judgment can contain both formal and substantive, or substantive and transformative 
equality reasoning. But equality as transformation is where the frontier of the legal reasoning lies, and 
where, this thesis posits, the Court should now direct its energies. 
 
B) Stereotyping  
 
Transformative equality leads to the topic of stereotypes. The rationale for assigning such a central place 
to the concept of stereotyping in this dissertation is essentially twofold. On a normative level, the 
concept captures what the ECtHR should now be addressing: the underlying frameworks which generate 
persistent inequality in Europe. On a more strategic level, the concept seems particularly fit for this 
purpose because it is already present in human rights law (most prominently in the work of the CEDAW 
Committee156) and in equal protection law of some national jurisdictions (notably the U.S. and Canada, 
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which is explored in Chapter Three). The present section will draw on social psychology literature to gain 
a better understanding of stereotypes. 
This dissertation deploys a neutral definition of stereotypes, namely that stereotypes are beliefs 
about groups of people. Stated more elaborately, stereotypes are preconceptions about the 
characteristics, roles and attributes of groups of people.157 These characteristics, roles or attributes are 
then attributed to all individual members of the group in question, without regard to the individual’s 
actual situation.158  
First of all, stereotypes are held at the individual level. A lot of psychological research has 
focused on how stereotypes work at a cognitive level, or, in other words, on how they are mentally 
represented.159 Stereotypes are stored in our memory in the form of cognitive representations.160 
Stereotypes can be triggered automatically when we come into contact with members of the 
stereotyped group. This plays out at an unconscious level, without awareness or intention.161 Studies 
have also shown that it is quite possible that people explicitly disavow a certain stereotype, while at the 
same time their behavior is implicitly guided by it: in these cases there is a “conflict between explicit 
beliefs and implicit stereotype associations.”162  
Stereotypes are held individually, but at the same time they are also undoubtedly held 
collectively: they are a social/cultural phenomenon.163 At a fundamental level stereotypes are social 
norms; the extent to which people hold and express stereotypes depends on what they deem fit within 
their social environment.164 “[M]any (perhaps most) of our stereotypes are in fact widely held and 
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culturally sanctioned.”165 The content of these stereotypes is contingent on history.166 There is a vast 
body of fascinating historical research into the development of specific stereotypical prototypes, such as 
“the sensual Oriental woman” and “the greedy Jew”.167 
People stereotype for a myriad of reasons. A first or “epistemic” function of stereotypes is to 
understand and simplify our social environment.168 This is true for both the individual and the collective 
level of stereotypes.169 Stereotypes can both “supplement an information-impoverished environment” 
and “reduce the complexity of an information-rich environment.”170 Either way, stereotypes provide 
predictability.171 A second function of stereotypes concerns our feelings about ourselves. Stereotyping is 
a “self-image-maintenance” strategy.172 In order to function properly humans need to feel good both 
about themselves and about the groups they belong too.173 We routinely judge people from our own 
groups (“in-groups”) more favorably than members from other groups (“out-groups”), this is known as 
“in-group favoritism”.174 Another way of putting in-group favoritism is that it allows us to differentiate 
between “us” and “them”. Thus, one of the things that stereotypes do is that they assign difference.175 
Assigning difference often happens with the purpose of defining our own identity,176 by setting our own 
identity up against a less worthy “Other”.177 This defining of the “self” in opposition to “others” happens 
both at the individual and at the collective level.178 
As to the content of stereotypes, they can be positive, negative and ambivalent.179 It is a 
misconception to think that stereotypes are necessarily negative or inaccurate.180 They are primarily 
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negative, however: when people are asked to list stereotypes, they come up with many more negative 
than positive ones.181 Susan Fiske and her colleagues have developed the “stereotype content model”.182 
They argue that when people encounter members from out-groups, they ask themselves two questions: 
“Do they intend to harm me; and are they capable of harming me?”183 These questions correspond to 
perceived warmth and competence, which are – according to these researchers - the two primary 
dimensions of stereotype content. This model, which suggests that people are primarily worried about 
the harm that can happen to them, accords with what lawyer Zanita Fenton has claimed: “Social power, 
its acquisition and maintenance, is the driving force behind the formulation of stereotypes.”184 
Even though this dissertation deploys a neutral formulation of stereotypes, this is not to say that 
their effects are neutral; far from it. Indeed, the reason why scholars across disciplines are so 
preoccupied with stereotypes is that they are closely related to a variety of social ills. Stereotyping is a 
big part of the complicated dynamic that pins some groups to “the underside of society” and keeps 
them there.185 A central claim of this thesis is that stereotyping reinforces discrimination and inequality 
and that therefore the Strasbourg Court should formulate a fitting response to stereotypes. Chapter 
Two will argue that the injurious effects of stereotyping are felt in three realms; namely in the realms of 
(social) recognition, (material) distribution, and individual psychological well-being.186 What is more, it 
would be a mistake to think that only negative stereotypes – of the variety “overweight people are lazy” 
or “Roma are thieves” – have such negative consequences. Positive stereotypes can be malignant too.187 
Salient examples are the many benevolent yet patronizing stereotypes about women: when women are 
held to be nurturing, warm and caring, this serves to justify a system of patriarchy where men perform 
the leading roles and women the supportive ones. 
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Stereotype is narrowly linked with a number of other concepts such as prejudice, stigma and 
discrimination. In social psychology literature, stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination are often 
examined together.188 This literature commonly describes stereotype as a belief; prejudice as a feeling 
or attitude; and discrimination as behavior.189 Stereotypes can be both positive and negative, but 
prejudice is defined as a negative feeling or attitude towards a group or members of a group.190 The 
relations between these three concepts are complex, and both social psychologists191 and lawyers still 
have a lot of work to do here. It is uncontested that stereotypes and prejudice can cause discrimination, 
but the causal connection can also be reversed.192 This topic is picked up in Chapter Three. For now, I 
just wish to add that stigma is also closely related to stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination.193 A 
stigma is a badge of inferiority; it is a social label that signals that somebody is unworthy.194 Several legal 
scholars – notably R.A. Lenhardt in the American context and Iyiola Solanke in the European context – 
view stigma as the most promising concept to improve equal protection law.195 The reason the focus in 
this dissertation is not primarily on stigma, is that the scope of this concept is too limited: stigma holds 
much less purchase when it comes to explaining the harm that “positive” stereotypes can do (as in the 
case of benevolent sexism). Nor can stigma explain what harm a stereotype that is statistically correct 
but incorrect for a specific individual can do: 196 is it fair, for example, to exclude women from combat 
positions in the military because they are generally less strong than men, when there are individual 
women who might be very well qualified for such positions?197 The notion of stigma will not help much 
                                                          
188
 See, e.g., STEREOTYPES AND PREJUDICE: ESSENTIAL READINGS (Charles Stangor ed., 2000); HANDBOOK OF PREJUDICE, 
STEREOTYPING AND DISCRIMINATION (Todd D. Nelson ed., 2009); THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING AND 
DISCRIMINATION 3, 5 (John F. Dovidio et al. eds., 2010); and SCHNEIDER, supra note 165, at 376-433. 
189
 See, e.g., Stangor, supra note 160, at 1. 
190
 Stangor, supra note 164, at 2. 
191
 See, e.g., Susan T. Fiske e.a., The Future of Research on Prejudice, Stereotyping and Discrimination, in 
HANDBOOK OF PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING AND DISCRIMINATION 525, 526 (Todd D. Nelson ed., 2009). 
192
 Cf. SCHNEIDER, supra note 165, at 268. 
193
 See, e.g., id. at 474-500; and Jo C. Phelan, Bruce G. Link & John F. Dovidio, Stigma and prejudice: One animal or 
two?, 67 SOCIAL SCIENCE & MEDICINE 358 (2008). 
194
 See generally ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY (1963). 
195
 R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW 
REVIEW 803 (2004); and Iyiola Solanke, Stigma: A limiting principle allowing multiple-consciousness in anti-
discrimination law?, in EUROPEAN UNION NON-DISCRIMINATION LAW: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON MULTIDIMENSIONAL 
EQUALITY LAW 115 (Dagmar Schiek & Victoria Chege eds., 2009). 
196
 About statistical stereotypes, see infra Chapter 3.III.B and V.A. 
197
 See for a discussion of the links between this exclusion from combat and stereotypes, e.g., Valorie K. Vojdik, 
Beyond Stereotyping in Equal Protection Doctrine: Reframing the Exclusion of Women From Combat, 57 ALABAMA 
LAW REVIEW 303 (2005-2006). 
49 
 
in answering these kinds of questions. Ultimately, in my opinion, stereotype is a broader concept than 
stigma, and carries more potential to explain and contest the mechanisms that generate inequality. 
Thus this thesis will argue that the Strasbourg Court can deploy the anti-stereotype concept to 
develop a more deeply transformative equality case law, and it will propose that the Court does this by 
integrating the concept in Article 14 analysis. That does not mean that this thesis will argue that the 
Strasbourg Court is the answer to all problems connected with stereotyping. To the contrary, I think of 
the Strasbourg Court as a minor actor in a bigger battle against harmful stereotyping.198 This battle is 
held on many fronts: both legal and non-legal (such as via media and education). The only way the Court 
can play its role, however, is by carefully crafting legal reasoning that names stereotypes and exposes 
their harm. In that context, there is one point that requires particular emphasis. John Hart Ely has stated 
that point concisely: “[s]tereotypes . . . are the inevitable stuff of legislation.”199 Equality scholars have 
long been aware that a state cannot be run by judges who balance each individual case ad hoc: we need 
laws and laws are based on generalizations.200 Therefore, the point of this dissertation is not that the 
ECtHR should turn itself against all stereotypes. That would be a fool’s errant. The challenge is to 
separate “the acceptable stereotypes from the unacceptable.”201 This thesis will advance some 
suggestions as to how the Strasbourg Court can do that: most important is that the Court makes a 
thorough contextual analysis which exposes the effect that a stereotype has on a particular applicant 
and her group.202 
 
C) Vulnerability 
 
The concept of vulnerability is the other lens through which this thesis critically analyses the legal 
reasoning of the ECtHR. Whereas the focus on stereotyping grew out of a realization that stereotyping is 
a distinctive (empirical) problem that needs to be addressed through human rights law, the focus on 
vulnerability comes from my engagement with human rights doctrine. As was already mentioned in the 
introduction to this chapter, human rights law and literature are full with references to “vulnerable 
groups” and “vulnerability”. This is quite striking, once one becomes aware of it. Most of the time, 
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however, it seems that these terms are used automatically, without any reflection on their precise 
meaning. The case law of the ECtHR forms no exception. A search in the Court’s search engine, Hudoc, 
using the term “vulnerable”, delivers hundreds of hits. The origins of the reasoning in terms of 
vulnerability lie in cases from the early 1980s – including Dudgeon v. UK,203 Glasenapp v. Germany,204 
and X. and Y. v. the Netherlands205 – where the Commission and the Court referred to the vulnerability 
of children. However, despite these old roots and the frequency with which the term occurs in the case 
law nowadays, the Strasbourg Court has hardly made any effort to clarify how it understands 
vulnerability.206 This thesis investigates how the Court uses both the concept of “vulnerable groups”, 
and the concept of “vulnerability” more generally, in order to see what potential these concepts have to 
strengthen the Court’s reasoning. 
 How should vulnerability be understood? Chapters Four and Five address this question 
extensively, both from theoretical and jurisprudential viewpoints. Briefly then, the word “vulnerable” 
comes from the Latin vulnus, meaning “wound”.207 In line with this, many definitions conceive of 
vulnerability as the openness to attack or hurt.208 The etymology of the term draws attention to the 
close connection of vulnerability to embodiment: people are vulnerable, they can be wounded, because 
they are embodied. As embodied beings, vulnerability is part of our human condition. Thus, vulnerability 
is universal. At the same time however, vulnerability is also particular.209 Depending on the 
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particularities of our body, our geographical location, our social resources and a host of other factors, 
everybody experiences their vulnerability differently. Moreover, vulnerability is not only physical: 
people can also be economically, emotionally, or socially vulnerable. Depending on these different 
factors, some are more vulnerable than others.  
This thesis builds on a rapidly growing field of legal scholarship that theorizes vulnerability, and 
in particular on Martha Fineman’s work. Fineman has developed a vulnerability thesis, which she 
describes as follows: 
 
I want to claim the term "vulnerable" for its potential in describing a universal, inevitable, 
enduring aspect of the human condition that must be at the heart of our concept of social 
and state responsibility. Vulnerability thus freed from its limited and negative associations is a 
powerful conceptual tool with the potential to define an obligation for the state to ensure a 
richer and more robust guarantee of equality than is currently afforded under the equal 
protection model.
210
 
 
Fineman emphasizes that vulnerability is not only a negative human condition; in many ways it is also 
generative. Vulnerability causes people to forge bonds with each other and with their environment, and 
it causes people to create institutions.211 Fineman argues that her analysis is capable of delivering 
substantive equality (in my vocabulary this would be transformative equality) because it turns the 
inquiry to the “institutional practices that produce the identities and inequalities in the first place.”212 
She thinks of social institutions as the mechanisms through which “we gain access to resources with 
which to confront, ameliorate, satisfy, and compensate for our vulnerability.”213 What complicates the 
analysis, however, is that as human constructs, institutions are vulnerable in and of themselves.214  
Fineman’s vulnerability thesis is more directed towards law- and policymakers than towards 
judges. Her thesis is not “a blueprint for judicial review”, nor does this dissertation draw on it as such.215 
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This study merely uses her framework as a yardstick against which to assess the Strasbourg Court’s case 
law; it does not suggest that the Strasbourg Court adopt the vulnerability thesis wholesale. Two features 
of the vulnerability thesis seem particularly apt in the context of the ECtHR, however. First is the 
emphasis on universal vulnerability – with the attendant reminder that when only particular groups are 
held to be vulnerable, this is likely to affix a stigma to these groups and will not lead to transformative 
equality. The second helpful feature of the thesis is its focus on institutions and their vulnerability. As 
Chapter Five will discuss, the Strasbourg Court forms in this respect no exception: the Court is 
vulnerable too and this has powerful implications for its legal reasoning in terms of vulnerability. 
 
 
IV. Limits to what is possible: critiques of rights and the precarious institutional position 
of the Strasbourg Court 
 
Thus far this introductory chapter might have given the impression that this study, which is focused on 
“improving the legal reasoning” and “transformative equality”, is very ambitious in its goals for the 
ECtHR and, by extension, very confident in the powers of the Court. In truth, I am ambivalent about the 
possibilities for human rights law generally (including the ECtHR more particularly) to close the gap 
between rhetoric and reality that was identified at the beginning of this chapter. There is one principled 
problem and one pragmatic problem that need to be mentioned here more specifically.216 The 
principled problem is that the potential of rights to achieve change is limited. This is a fundamental 
issue, which has been much explored in critical legal scholarship. Section IV.A will acknowledge the 
validity of the critiques of rights and clarify the position of this thesis vis-à-vis these critiques. The 
practical problem concerns the institutional position of the Strasbourg Court: as a supranational judicial 
body, there are clearly limits to what the Court can achieve. This practical constraint runs explicitly as a 
common thread throughout the next chapters; section IV.B will just provide a short introduction to the 
question how the institutional position of the ECtHR shapes the possibilities to improve its legal 
reasoning. 
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A) Principled difficulties: critiques of rights 
 
What promise have human rights to deliver justice to disadvantaged or marginalized people? Feminist 
theorists and other critical legal scholars have long cautioned against the simple adoption of rights 
discourse.217 Their point is well taken. This section will reflect on these critiques and the position of this 
PhD in relation to the inherent difficulties of rights strategies.  
On the one hand, the appeals of rights are manifold. Importantly, couching a claim in terms of a 
“right” provides the claim with legitimacy, or at least legibility.218 Indeed, as Carol Smart pointed out in 
her classic Feminism and the Power of Law (1989):  
 
“It is very difficult to formulate demands of the state which can command popular support and 
which are translatable into legislation and policy without drawing on the discourse of rights. Not 
only are rights part of the very history of modern social movements, they also give status to the 
groups or minorities who are making demands. The person demanding her rights is not a 
supplicant or a seeker of charity, but a person with dignity demanding a just outcome according 
to widely accepted criteria of fairness.”
219
 
 
Accordingly, asserting one’s rights can be an empowering experience, especially, it has been argued, for 
people whose rights were invisible before.220 The idea of rights has provided an important tool in the 
struggle of many social movements, such as the civil rights movement in the United States, the struggle 
of women to get the vote and – later on – equality in marriage, and the current struggle of the LGBT 
community for recognition of marriage equality.221 That is to say: rights have brought non-dominant 
groups important gains. 
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On the other hand, “rights are a creature of the state and hence a function of existing 
configurations of power.”222 The language of human rights is used by states to legitimize and enhance 
their power.223 In that context, rights are arguably of limited use to oppressed groups who want to 
challenge existing power relations. Audre Lorde has captured this kind of objection powerfully: “the 
master's tools will never dismantle the master's house”.224 Indeed, using human rights law to further an 
emancipatory goal carries grave dangers with it: it may entrench the very hierarchies it seeks to 
challenge, inter alia because human rights discourse is so deeply steeped in a victims-rhetoric.225 And 
this is just part of the ills that beset rights:226 other problems are the individualism of rights, meaning 
that rights are held by individuals who are thought to be in a competition with others to assert their 
entitlement,227 and the limited range of remedies for individual rights’ violations.  
In face of these critiques, the present PhD project raises qualms: its focus on case law analysis 
might seem to put law, and the possibilities of law to achieve equality, on a pedestal. Moreover, the 
articles about stereotyping argue in favor of a stronger role of the ECtHR in a domain where – prima 
facie at least – extralegal measures (such as consciousness-raising through media and education) might 
seem more apposite.228 To a certain extent, my work on stereotyping envisages a greater role for human 
rights law than it has at present. Furthermore, the focus on “vulnerability” might only seem to heighten 
the victims-discourse that is so damaging to the human rights project. In different ways, therefore, the 
(anti-)stereotyping and vulnerability approaches can run afoul of the pitfalls of rights that were just 
described. Whenever I can identify a concrete pitfall – as with the risk of vulnerability reasoning to 
reinforce victimization229 – this is indicated in the text, together with suggestions how the Court can deal 
with it.  
To respond to the principled critiques of rights on the same principled level, it should be 
emphasized that this PhD is ultimately a constructive project. It is based on the premise that human 
rights should not be given up as a hopeless endeavor; on the contrary, human rights need to be 
strengthened – they need to be fought for. In this context, the present study views human rights as 
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aspirations, as “perpetual callings”: they are not something that can be achieved, but only something 
that can be struggled for.230 And human rights are worth the struggle. If the world could start with a 
clean slate we would probably not devise the current human rights regime as the preeminent justice 
idea.231 At this point in history, however, it is very hard to contemplate restructuring this regime and the 
attendant idea of rights.232 For better and worse, human rights carry huge symbolic and political force. 
So for me, as for many others, the resort to human rights law to ameliorate the position of 
disadvantaged groups is a pragmatic and strategic choice.233 This is also the spirit in which the (anti-
)stereotyping approach and the vulnerability approach are offered: these approaches will surely not 
allow the Strasbourg Court to definitively close the gap between the human rights of the “haves” and 
the human rights of the “have nots” in Europe – that is beyond the power of the Court – but it is hoped 
that these approaches can provide valuable tools in the struggle.  
 
B) Practical difficulties: the institutional position of the ECtHR 
 
On a more pragmatic level, what runs as a common thread throughout the next chapters is a concern 
with the practical feasibility of the ambitious equality agenda that this thesis advocates. In order to be 
persuasive, any proposal for improvement of the Court’s legal reasoning has to be concretely feasible. 
This is foremost a matter of taking the institutional position of the ECtHR into account. In other words, 
what one can ask of the Court to do is intrinsically bound up with the Court’s institutional reality. 
 As the guardian of the European Convention, the Strasbourg Court is influential and vulnerable 
at the same time. The Court is influential in the sense that its judgments are binding and domestic 
judges in all the 47 member states of the Council of Europe look to it for guidance in interpreting 
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domestic law.234 As the Convention is a “living document,” the Court moreover applies the Convention in 
an ever broader range of areas. But, to repeat, the Court is also vulnerable. Several features render it 
vulnerable. First, there is what has been described as the “dual functionality” of the Court:235 the 
Strasbourg Court has to deliver both individual and constitutional justice.236 Individual justice refers to 
the individual complaints mechanism which is at the core of the Convention system:237 thanks to this 
mechanism everyone within the Council of Europe – approximately 800 million people238 – is entitled to 
file a complaint with the ECtHR and – when the admissibility criteria have been met239– to receive 
judgment from the Court on their case. As regards individual justice, it is conventional wisdom that the 
Court is becoming a “victim of its own success”.240 By the end of 2012 there were 128,100 applications 
pending before the Court.241 The real victims of this state of affairs are of course the applicants, not the 
Court itself. Undeniably, however, the backlog in cases creates problems for the Court: it weakens the 
Court’s legitimacy and puts the Court under a lot of pressure to deliver an ever-increasing amount of 
judgments. Constitutional justice, on the other hand, can be understood to mean several things but at a 
minimum it connotes the Court’s role as clarifier and developer of general standards and principles of 
European human rights Convention law. On this view, the Convention is “a constitutional instrument of 
European public order” 242 in the field of human rights and the Court’s job is to develop general human 
rights principles, which then need to be implemented on the domestic level. Its dual functionality, which 
entails that the Court delivers both a great quantity of judgments and great quality of legal reasoning, 
stretches the Court thin.  
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The second major factor that renders the Court vulnerable is political will. Successive Presidents 
of the Court have now emphasized the importance of this factor.243 Judge Bratza put it like this in 2012: 
 
The Court is a dynamic institution, but also in many respects a fragile one, which ultimately relies 
heavily on the support and good faith of the Council of Europe member States. … protecting human 
rights does not make you popular. Standing up for the rule of law will not win you votes, at least not 
in the short term. Accepting that even those who come to destroy democracy must benefit from the 
protection of the fundamental rights without which democracy has no real sense is never going to be 
easy to sell to public opinion. Yet that is the essence of what we do here, what the Court represents 
and what the Council of Europe stands for.
244
 
 
In recent years the Strasbourg case law has triggered a barrage of criticism for what is perceived as its 
meddling with sensitive issues that should properly belong to the purview of domestic authorities.245 
Examples include the frustration of the British following the case of Hirst v. UK (No.2) concerning the 
voting rights of prisoners,246 and their anger following the case of Othman (Abu Qatada) v. UK at not 
being allowed to extradite Abu Qatada to his native Jordan, where he was convicted of terrorism , 
because there was a real risk that the evidence against Qatada was obtained through torture.247 This 
kind of criticism, which attacks the Court for interfering in matters of human rights law application that 
pertain to the States, comes from politicians,248 judges,249 and academics alike.250As the Court is not only 
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dependent on the Council of Europe Member States for the implementation of its judgments, but also 
for its very survival, it has no choice but to take these critiques seriously. Put simply, one cannot expect 
the Strasbourg Court to move too far ahead of the Member States.  
How does the Court’s institutional position put a limit on the proposals of this PhD, that center 
on anti-stereotyping and vulnerability reasoning? The first-mentioned factor that characterizes the 
Court’s precarious institutional position, namely its work overload due to its dual functionality, 
undoubtedly has an impact on projects like this one that aim to improve the legal reasoning of the 
Court. When the Court is structurally pressed for resources, can one ask the Court to spend more 
thought on the problem of stereotyping,251 and to be more careful in its reasoning to explicate the 
factors that render a specific applicant vulnerable?252 It is submitted that the answer is yes, precisely 
because there is so much at stake here. Devising effective human rights protection for non-dominant 
groups and “making equality rights real” in the legal reasoning should be at the core of the Court’s 
work.253 The second factor that renders the Court vulnerable – political will – has even more significant 
implications for the present study. It is remarkable how often the sharpest Court-criticism is reserved for 
cases that concern applicants from non-dominant groups, such as prisoners and asylum seekers. To 
rephrase Judge Bratza;254 protecting the human rights of non-dominant groups will not necessarily make 
the Court popular, nor will adhering to a transformative equality agenda do so. The next chapters 
indicate where the rubs lie precisely between my proposals and the Court’s institutional reality.255 
Before the present introductory chapter can be concluded, however, the research methods on which 
this thesis has relied will be discussed. 
 
 
V. Research Methods 
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This thesis provides a close analysis of the legal reasoning of the ECtHR. Thus, the primary source of this 
analysis is the Strasbourg case law itself. From the beginning of the European Research Council project 
“Strengthening the European Court of Human Rights: More Accountability Through Better Legal 
Reasoning” in the autumn of 2009, Professor Brems’ research team has met every two weeks to discuss 
the latest case law. This allowed the whole team, including myself, to remain up-to-date with the recent 
developments in the legal reasoning of the Court.256 To a significant extent, the research of this thesis 
has been led by these developments. The focus on the concept of vulnerability in particular, as section 
V.B will shortly proceed to explain, has been developed as a response to recent case law.   
 My strategy has been similar as regards both stereotyping and vulnerability: these concepts 
were chosen because (a) they were already present in the case law; (b) because, in contrast to other 
legal concepts – notably “dignity”257 – they are under-theorized in (the Strasbourg Court’s) human rights 
law and literature; 258 and (c) both hold unexplored potential to improve the Court’s legal reasoning as 
regards non-dominant groups. This part will now first proceed to discuss in very practical terms the 
methodology as regards the articles on stereotyping (section V.A) and then the methodology of the 
articles on vulnerability (section V.B). It concludes by addressing the question of methodology on a more 
conceptual level, namely by reflecting on the role of feminist methods in this thesis (section V.C). 
 
A) Stereotyping Articles: Chapters Two and Three 
 
Part 3 of this chapter already mentioned that my understanding of equality, and the central role of 
stereotyping therein, has been crucially influenced by the work of the CEDAW Committee. In fact, it was 
through the work of CEDAW scholars – particularly Rikki Holtmaat259 – that I was first made aware of the 
concept of stereotyping and its relevance to human rights law. Subsequently, I have turned to social 
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psychological literature to strengthen my grasp on the topic of stereotypes. As social psychologists have 
developed a whole field of science around this topic, the relevant literature is vast. That is why I have 
chosen several handbooks on stereotyping and discrimination and started my investigation there, using 
a snowball method.260 While this study does not pretend to be interdisciplinary in scope or purpose, it is 
based on the assumption that the central empirical findings of social psychologists are relevant to take 
into account. The legal understanding of the concept of stereotype should diverge as little as possible 
from the psychological/empirical understanding. 
  In the context of my research on stereotyping, two events need to be mentioned. The first is 
that the Human Rights Centre of Ghent University submitted a third party intervention to the Grand 
Chamber in the case of Konstantin Markin v. Russia on May 17, 2011.261 As a third party, the Human 
Rights Centre had access to the case file which included the briefs submitted by the applicant and the 
State. I was actively involved in the writing of this third party intervention and this experience greatly 
impacted my doctoral research. The submissions by the Russian Government convinced me that many 
CoE Member States are unaware of the harm they can do by perpetuating stereotypes so that there is a 
lot of work to be done in this respect;262 moreover, the Grand Chamber judgment, when it came out on 
22 March 2012,263 encouraged me in my belief that stereotyping is a concept that the Court is willing 
and able to develop further. 
The other event I should mention was my research visit to the University of Toronto Law School, 
which took place from 15 October till 15 November 2012. The purpose of this visit was to carry out 
research for the second stereotyping article, entitled Judging Stereotypes: What the European Court of 
Human Rights Can Learn from American and Canadian Equal Protection Law (Chapter Three). Especially 
the Canadian part of this comparative work was researched in Toronto. Professor Rebecca Cook very 
generously acted as my sponsor and constant interlocutor during this visit. Professor Cook has written 
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extensively about gender stereotypes and is co-author of Gender Stereotyping: Transnational Legal 
Perspectives.264 My understanding of Canadian equal protection law was also greatly enhanced by the 
conversations I had in Toronto with Professor Sophia Moreau and Professor David Schneiderman. 
 
Case law selection and analysis 
How were the ECtHR judgments for the two articles on stereotyping obtained? As with the social 
psychology literature on stereotypes, I have partly used a snowball method. By way of the Court’s 
references to its own case law, as well as on the basis of both secondary literature and the bi-weekly 
case law discussions of Professor Brems’ research team, I sought to find the most salient cases on the 
topic of stereotyping. As a result, this study does not represent a systematic analysis of all the Court’s 
judgments that include a stereotyping issue. That was not feasible, since that would require an analysis 
of all the 16.000+ judgments the Court ever delivered. The problem is that the Court does not explicitly 
use the term “stereotype” regularly when it is confronted with stereotypes – indeed, that is part of my 
argument: that the Court should start naming stereotypes as such265 – therefore there is no reliable way 
of obtaining the relevant case law through a straightforward search in the Court’s database, Hudoc. One 
possibility was to analyze all Article 14 cases, but that would not yield an exhaustive list of stereotyping 
cases either, as stereotypes often appear in cases that are examined under other Convention 
provisions.266 While my chosen method implies that not all ECtHR cases that include a stereotyping issue 
are discussed in this thesis, it is submitted that this does not undermine the strength of the analysis, as 
this thesis is based on the cases which contain the most interesting lines of reasoning about stereotypes.  
In contrast to the ECtHR, the American and Canadian Supreme Courts do use the term 
stereotype. This greatly facilitated the case law search for Chapter Three; the Chapter entitled Judging 
Stereotypes: What the European Court of Human Rights Can Learn from American and Canadian Equal 
Protection Law. Consequently, the American and Canadian jurisprudence was obtained through 
Westlaw using the search term “stereotyp*”, thus receiving all the cases that include the words 
stereotype(s) or stereotyping.267 I checked all the results which were found in this manner, and selected 
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the most important judgments for inclusion in this thesis on the basis of secondary literature from the 
U.S. and Canada. 
Once a case was selected I would proceed to analyze it on the basis of close reading.268 
Generally speaking, such a technique is well-suited to the overall project of “improving the legal 
reasoning of the Court”, as is borne out by this explanation of Mitchel De S.-O.-L.’E. Lasser of what 
“close reading” means:  
 
“The basic idea is to approach the documents or arguments produced by a legal system as if 
they were serious literary works and thus to treat them with a similar degree of careful, 
detailed and almost exhaustive attention. . . . [T]his literary methodology assumes that . . . 
judicial decisions and other legal texts are significant not only because of the substantive results 
they enact, suggest or order, but also because of the ways those texts are composed.”
269
 
 
For this study this would entail a meticulous reading and re-reading of the text of the judgment, during 
which I would pay special attention to the ways in which stereotypes seem to play a role in the case – 
whether perhaps the facts reveal that the Government implicitly or explicitly relied on a stereotype, or 
whether perhaps the applicant would uncover and complain about a stereotype in her submissions to 
the Court. Stereotypes are sometimes signaled by phrases like “in general”, “assumption” and 
“traditionally”, therefore I would take particular notice when these phrases are used in a judgment. 
Next I would closely read the Court’s response to these stereotypes: because silence is as much a 
constitutive feature of the Court’s reaction to stereotypes as is explicit response, this means I would 
dissect the text to find both explicit references to stereotypes and missed chances to do so.   
In Chapter Three, which aims to draw lessons about stereotyping for the Strasbourg Court from 
the American and Canadian Supreme Courts, the case law analysis was furthermore informed by the 
comparative methodology of this part of the thesis. Concretely, comparing judgments from these three 
courts allowed me to distinguish more clearly among the different forms that stereotypes take. It turns 
out, as Chapter Three argues primarily on the basis of U.S. jurisprudence, that stereotypes can appear in 
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four different shapes in legal reasoning.270 In this way, the comparative study enriched my case law 
analysis: it allowed me to “see” more in the text of the judgments; to go through the case law about 
stereotypes with a finer comb. 
 
B) Vulnerability Articles: Chapters Four and Five 
 
As mentioned above, the focus on vulnerability is a response to developments in the recent ECtHR case 
law. It was the separate opinion of Judge Sajó in the asylum case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (2011) 
that first drew Professor Brems’ research team attention to “vulnerability”.271 Judge Sajó claimed that: 
“The concept of a vulnerable group has a specific meaning in the jurisprudence of the Court.”272 And he 
then proceeded to expound at length on what this meaning is in his eyes. Frankly, up till that point I had 
not been much aware that “vulnerable groups” was a specific concept in the ECtHR case law. My 
colleague Lourdes Peroni analyzed Judge Sajó’s separate opinion in a blog post entitled M.S.S. v. Belgium 
and Greece: When Is a Group Vulnerable?, of 10 February 2011.273 Lourdes and I subsequently started 
discussing the idea of “vulnerable groups” and that is how our joint project started.  
The resulting article, entitled Vulnerable Groups: the Promise of an Emergent Concept in 
European Human Rights Convention Law (Chapter Four), is essentially a product of dialogue. In the first 
place there was a constant dialogue between Lourdes and me. Importantly, we also had conversations 
with five ECtHR judges on the concept of vulnerable groups in the Court’s case law, namely Judges 
Tulkens, Myjer, Sajó, Power, and Vajić. These were informal conversations and they took place at the 
premises of the ECtHR in Strasbourg between 6 and 9 June 2011. These conversations left me with the 
impression that the Court, divided as it is in five Chambers, does not consciously employ a consistent 
policy when it comes to the concepts of “vulnerable groups” and “vulnerability”. At the same time, most 
judges expressed the sentiment that human vulnerability is really at the core of the work of the Court. 
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  Lourdes and I also spent a few weeks as visiting scholars at the “Vulnerability and the Human 
Condition Initiative” at Emory Law School in Atlanta, USA.274 I was there from 16 February till 4 March 
2012. The Vulnerability Initiative was established by Professor Martha Fineman. As mentioned above, 
Fineman views vulnerability as something that is universally and constantly inherent in human life. She 
emphasizes that vulnerability is not a condition that only applies to specific groups. The conversation 
that Lourdes and I had with Professor Fineman at Emory confirmed what we already thought: that the 
Court’s “vulnerable group” approach is in tension with Fineman’s vulnerability thesis.275 
   
Case law selection and analysis 
Turning now again to the question of how the ECtHR judgments were obtained, in our joint article 
Lourdes and I examined all ECtHR cases that make specific mention of “vulnerable group[s]”. On 1 
March 2013, when we concluded our research, this amounted to approximately 20 judgments.276 For my 
other article about the concept of vulnerability more broadly in the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg 
Court (Chapter Five), the search for case law was more challenging, as there are many more relevant 
judgments. As of 1 September 2012, when I concluded the main part of the research for this article, 
typing in the terms “vulnerable” and “vulnerability” in Hudoc delivered approximately 600 hits.277 
Articles 2 (the right to life), 3 (the prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment), 6 (the 
right to a fair trial) and 8 (the right to private and family life) are the most prevalent in this case law. I 
focused my search on Level-1 cases (being the cases that the Court itself classifies as the most important 
ones278), and examined other cases in so far as I found interesting references to them in the Court’s 
Level-1 cases, or in the bi-weekly discussions of Professor Brems’ research team.  
 As with the judgments about stereotypes, the case law analysis proceeded on the basis of close 
reading. In contrast to the analysis of the stereotyping cases, however, it was not necessary to be so 
focused on “missed chances” in the judgments to name vulnerability. Though there are undoubtedly 
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 More information on the Vulnerability Initiative is available at: 
http://web.gs.emory.edu/vulnerability/index.html.  
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 This is explored infra in Chapter 4.II.B and Chapter 5 generally. 
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 This is only counting the cases where the Court itself refers to the concept of vulnerable groups (so excluding 
the cases where the term “vulnerable groups” is merely used in the “facts” part of the judgment or in the 
arguments of one of the parties.) 
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 At the time of writing, less than a year later (June 2013), the amount of judgments has increased to over 750, 
which shows how popular the notion of vulnerability currently is. 
278
 Level 1 cases are described as “High importance: All judgments, decisions and advisory opinions not included in 
the Case Reports which make a significant contribution to the development, clarification or modification of its 
case-law, either generally or in relation to a particular State.”  
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cases in which the Court does not apply a vulnerability analysis where it could or even should have done 
so,279 my main focus was on how the Court renders the applicants’ vulnerability and what kind of impact 
this has on the rest of the judgment. I read the texts of the judgments with questions in mind like: which 
factors make that the Court conceives of this particular applicant (or group of applicants) as vulnerable? 
Does the Court simply assume that the applicant is inherently vulnerable, or is it careful to distinguish 
what the situational factors are that construct the applicant’s vulnerability? How does the Court’s 
account of the applicant’s vulnerability differ from the Government’s account and the applicant’s own 
account (and the account, if any, from the third party intervenor)? What consequence does the Court 
attach to a finding of vulnerability? 
My analysis of the case law was informed by vulnerability theory. For our joint article on the 
concept of vulnerable groups (Chapter Four), Lourdes and I carried out a study of the theoretical 
literature on vulnerability, and found that vulnerability is an important concept in (bio)ethics as well as 
law.280 We decided to focus on the legal literature and, in that context, we refer to Fineman’s thesis as 
one of several existing interpretations of vulnerability.281 Undoubtedly, however, Fineman’s thesis 
provides the most elaborate legal interpretation of the concept of vulnerability. Therefore, in my other 
article on vulnerability, which is entitled A Quiet Revolution: Vulnerability in the European Court of 
Human Rights (Chapter Five) and which analyses the concept of vulnerability more broadly in the ECtHR 
case law, Fineman’s thesis figures as the central theoretical framework within which I assess the merits 
of the Strasbourg case law.282 In fact, this PhD article will appear in a volume edited by Fineman herself 
and Anna Grear, entitled “Vulnerability: Reflections on a New Ethical Foundation for Law and Politics”, 
which includes engagements with Fineman’s thesis from several different areas of law and political 
philosophy.283 
 
C) Feminist Legal Methods 
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 See infra Chapter 4.III.B (the part entitled “blanks on the map”, which discusses cases about Roma in which the 
Court did not reason in terms of group vulnerability). 
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 See for an account of this literature study infra Chapter 4.II.  
281
 See infra Chapter Four Part Part I A and B. 
282
 To enable the case law analysis, Chapter Five will begin by setting out Fineman’s thesis and by reflecting on how 
her thesis is enriched by human rights scholarship. See infra Chapter Five.II. 
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 VULNERABILITY: REFLECTIONS ON A NEW ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR LAW AND POLITICS (Martha A. Fineman & Anna Grear 
eds., Ashgate forthcoming 2013). 
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The present section will approach the question of research methods on a more conceptual and 
ideological level. That is to say, it will illuminate the role of feminist legal thought in this PhD. Underlying 
this thesis is namely a commitment to feminism, even though my focus is not directly on women’s 
rights. Accordingly, this section seeks to show why feminist legal methods are pertinent for a research 
project like this one, which investigates the equality of non-dominant groups more broadly. 
There are several varieties of feminist critique – liberal, cultural, radical and post-modern in 
orientation – and they have all found a place in human rights scholarship.284 Janet Halley provides the 
following description of the essential/minimum elements of feminism:  
“First, to be feminism, a position must make a distinction between m and f. Different feminisms do 
this differently: some see men and women; some see male and female; some see masculine and 
feminine. While ‘men’ and ‘women’ will almost always be imagined as distinct human ‘groups’, the 
other paired terms can describe many different things: traits, narratives, introjects.  . . . And secondly 
. . . a position must posit some kind of subordination as between m and f, in which f is the 
disadvantaged or subordinated element. At his point feminism is both descriptive and normative; it 
takes on the quality of a justice project while also becoming a subordination hypothesis. Feminism is 
feminism because, as between m and f, it carries a brief for f.”
285
  
Cutting across different types of feminist legal theory is the central insight that law is not neutral or 
objective:286 law is gendered. This is an insight that has been developed since the 1970’s. The CEDAW 
Committee has formulated a useful working definition of gender:  
 
“gender refers to socially constructed identities, attributes and roles for women and men and 
society’s social and cultural meaning for these biological differences resulting in hierarchical 
relationships between women and men and in the distribution of power and rights favouring men 
and disadvantaging women.”
287 
                                                          
284
 See for discussion of these different feminist schools in relation to human rights law, e.g., Eva Brems, Enemies 
or Allies? Feminism and Cultural Relativism as Dissident Voices in Human Rights Discourse, 19 HUMAN RIGHTS 
QUARTERLY 136 (1997); DEMBOUR, supra note 73, at Ch. 7; Lacey, supra note 217; Françoise Tulkens, Droits de 
l’homme, droits des femmes: les requérantes devant la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, in HUMAN RIGHTS – 
STRASBOURG VIEWS: LIBER AMICORUM LUCIUS WILDHABER, 423 (Lucius Caflisch et.al. eds, 2007). 
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 Janet Halley, Take a Break from Feminism?, in GENDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS 57, 61 (Karen Knop ed., 2004).  
286
 See, e.g., Scales, supra note 10, at 10-13. 
287
 CEDAW-Committee, General Recommendation No. 28 on the core obligations of States parties under article 2 of 
the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, CEDAW/C/GC/28, 16 December 
2010,  ¶ 5. 
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What the concept of gender expresses is that “m” and “f” are socially and culturally constructed 
identities (not natural or biological givens) and that, moreover, these identities are constructed in such 
manner as to create hierarchical power relationship between them.288 Therefore, what the insight that 
law is gendered signifies, at a minimum, is that “law insists on a specific version of gender 
differentiation” which ultimately disadvantages “f”.289 
From the 1980’s onward, feminist legal theory has steadily widened its inquiry to cover ever more 
issues and legal domains.290 Important for present purposes is that “the feminist gaze” has well 
expanded beyond the category of “f” to include other non-dominant groups and subjectivities.291 First 
there came an insistence that women are differently situated, depending on their race, social 
background, physical ability, geographical location etc. This generated the concept of “intersectional 
discrimination,” meaning that discrimination can be based on a mixture of grounds, which interact to 
produce specific types of discrimination that cannot be captured by simply adding two types of 
discrimination together.292 So, for example, the subordination that black women can experience is 
different than that of both white women and black men. Moreover, questions of gender identity and 
sexual orientation also came within the folds of feminist legal theory;293 just as questions of 
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 Cf. the well-known definition of gender of Joan Wallach Scott:  “gender is a constitutive element of social 
relationships based on perceived differences between the sexes, and gender is a primary way of signifying 
relationships of power.” Joan W. Scott, Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis, THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL 
REVIEW 1067 (1986). See more recently: Joan W. Scott, The Uses and Abuses of Gender, 16 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR 
GENDERSTUDIES 63 (2013). 
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 Carol Smart, The Woman of Legal Discourse, in LAW, CRIME AND SEXUALITY: ESSAYS IN FEMINISM 191 (1995). Smart 
argues that law is also a “gendering strategy”, in the sense that, she claims, we must analyze law as “a process of 
producing fixed gender identities rather than simply as the application of law to previously gendered subjects.” Id. 
at 191 
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 My purpose in this section is to describe the relevance of feminist legal theory for this thesis; the purpose is not 
to put forward a general historical overview of feminist legal theory. This field of scholarship is too complex – there 
is a too great multiplicity of viewpoints – for me to be able to do justice to it here. Other scholars have attempted a 
general account of the developments in feminist legal theory during the past four decades, see, e.g., Katherine T. 
Bartlett, Feminist Legal Scholarship: A History Through the Lens of the California Law Review, 100 CALIFORNIA LAW 
REVIEW 381 (2012). 
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 The term “the feminist gaze” comes from Brenda Cossman e.a., Gender, Sexuality and Power: Is Feminism 
Enough?, 12 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW 601, 625 (2003). 
292
 The seminal article is Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence 
Against Women of Colour, 43 STANFORD LAW REVIEW 1241 (1990-1991).  In the European context see, e.g., EUROPEAN 
UNION NON-DISCRIMINATION LAW AND INTERSECTIONALITY. INVESTIGATING THE TRIANGLE OF RACIAL, GENDER AND DISABILITY 
DISCRIMINATION (Dagmar Schiek & Anna Lawson eds., 2011). 
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 See, e.g., JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM (2006). Halley ultimately 
rejects feminist theory as an appropriate tool to analyze questions of gender identity and sexuality.   
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masculinities, such as how men suffer from gender-role stereotypes.294 Feminists started theorizing and 
challenging not only the hierarchical binary of “m”-“f”, but also other such binaries like able-disabled, 
citizen-noncitizen, white-black, heterosexual-homosexual. In doing so, gender is not the only analytical 
tool feminist legal scholars have developed to diagnose and redress inequality. Indeed, vulnerability is a 
good example of another concept that has been advanced in feminist quarters with this goal in mind.295 
Accordingly, nowadays, “feminist scholarship speaks to . . . scholars not necessarily engaged in 
feminist scholarship”.296 Feminists do not only carry a brief for women,297 they carry a brief for all those 
who suffer from structural oppression. Feminist legal scholars have developed remarkably extensive and 
sophisticated approaches to equality. They have shown that law is constructed in a particular way that 
does not do justice to the experiences of women and other non-dominant subjects.298 Feminist justice 
projects come in many forms, some being primarily aimed at legal deconstruction, but they are 
generally aimed at transforming the law so that it does better justice to non-dominant groups (often 
women in particular). It is for these reasons that feminist legal scholarship is relevant for every research 
project that seeks to advance equality and improve the position of non-dominant groups, including this 
one.  
Returning now to the question of method: what does it mean to “do” law as a feminist, what are 
feminist legal methods?299 In a classic law review article Katharine Bartlett has identified several feminist 
legal methods, which this thesis employs. First is the method of “looking beneath the surface of law to 
identify the gender implications of rules and the assumptions underlying them”.300 Writing in 1990, 
Bartlett called this “Asking the Woman Question”, but she indicated that this question was being 
converted into “the Question of the Excluded”.301 This method entails posing questions like: what 
assumptions are made by law about those whom it effects? Whose point of view do these assumptions 
reflect? How might excluded viewpoints be taken into account?302 These are indeed the kinds of 
questions that the next chapters pose. Second is what Bartlett terms “feminist practical reasoning”, 
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 See, e.g., Nancy E. Dowd, Masculinities and Feminist Legal Theory, 23 WISCONSIN JOURNAL OF LAW GENDER & SOCIETY 
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which essentially means reasoning that is sensitive to situation and context.303 This, too, is a method 
that will be applied in the next chapters.  
These feminist methods of analysis are arguably pertinent in all areas of human rights law:304 
not just specifically in the area of women’s rights. The next chapters bear out this belief. Chapter Two, 
entitled Toward an Anti-Stereotyping Approach for the European Court of Human Rights, is indeed 
primarily focused on gender equality. Chapter Three, called Judging Stereotypes: What the European 
Court of Human Rights Can Borrow from American and Canadian Equal Protection Law, also contains 
many examples from gender discrimination cases although this chapter investigates the concept of 
stereotyping in general. The reason why these chapters refer so much to gender equality judgments is 
because the concept of stereotyping is furthest developed in this field. Chapters Four and Five, however, 
which concentrate on the concept of vulnerability as it relates to the case law of the ECtHR, contain far 
less gender-based analysis. The focus of these chapters is on non-dominant groups and vulnerability 
broadly. Still, to repeat, feminist legal methods are deployed in this entire thesis. 
 
 
VI. Structure of this Dissertation305 
 
Chapter Two, entitled Toward an Anti-Stereotyping Approach for the European Court of Human Rights, 
introduces the concept of stereotyping as a novel way of interpreting the ECtHR’s case law on equality 
and non-discrimination. The central tenet of this chapter is that stereotypes are both cause and 
manifestation of the structural disadvantage and discrimination of certain groups of people. Focusing on 
the gender case law of the Strasbourg Court, this chapter explores what conception of equality the 
Court should embrace to adequately address the harmfulness of stereotypes. Since stereotypes are 
often the mechanisms that underlie discrimination, this chapter proposes ways in which the Strasbourg 
Court can integrate an anti-stereotyping approach in its legal reasoning. The proposed analysis consists 
of two phases; ‘naming’ and ‘contesting’ stereotypes. The whole argument is illustrated by Konstantin 
Markin v. Russia and Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, two recent cases in the area of gender equality. The 
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chapter concludes by reflecting on the feasibility of adopting an anti-stereotyping approach in light of 
the institutional position of the Court. 
Chapter Three, entitled Judging Stereotypes: What the European Court of Human Rights Can 
Borrow from American and Canadian Equal Protection Law, builds on Chapter Two by offering a 
comparative analysis of the ways in which the concept of stereotype is used by the ECtHR, the U.S. 
Supreme Court and the Canadian Supreme Court. It argues that the Strasbourg Court can learn a great 
deal about the conceptualization of stereotypes and about the connections between stereotyping and 
discrimination from American and Canadian equal protection doctrine. Nevertheless, the comparison 
also exposes flaws in the application of the concept in all three jurisdictions under review. Contrary to 
what some critical legal scholars argue, the comparison shows that, at its best, anti-stereotyping 
reasoning goes beyond formal equality. A focus on stereotypes can expose and target the often hidden 
structures of inequality and discrimination. The Chapter ends by exploring what concrete lessons 
regarding stereotypes American and Canadian equal protection law holds for the Strasbourg Court.  
Chapter Four, entitled Vulnerable Groups: the Promise of an Emergent Concept in European 
Human Rights Convention Law, shifts the inquiry to the concept of vulnerability. It draws attention to 
the fact that, without so far awakening scholarly attention, the concept of “vulnerable groups” is gaining 
momentum in the case law of the Strasbourg Court. The Chapter shows that the Court has thus far used 
this concept in cases concerning Roma, people with mental disabilities, people living with HIV and 
asylum seekers. Drawing on theoretical debates on vulnerability as well as on the Court’s case law, this 
Chapter offers a critical assessment of the concept. Reasoning in terms of vulnerable groups opens a 
number of possibilities, most notably, the opportunity to move closer to a more robust idea of equality. 
However, the concept also has some inherent difficulties. This Chapter argues for a reflective use of the 
concept and points out ways in which the Court can avoid its pitfalls. The Chapter finishes by reflecting 
on the institutional concerns associated with the Court’s use of group vulnerability. 
Chapter Five, entitled A Quiet Revolution: Vulnerability in the European Court of Human Rights, 
widens the vulnerability inquiry. It examines the concept of vulnerability more broadly in the case law of 
the ECtHR, with the aim of discovering what potential the concept has to more fully and consistently 
include the specific concerns of marginalized people into the Court’s legal reasoning. To that end, this 
chapter deploys Martha Fineman’s vulnerability thesis as a central theoretical framework within which 
the qualities of the Strasbourg Court’s case law are assessed. After explicating the central tenets of this 
framework and exploring why the relationship between vulnerability and human rights law is complex, 
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this Chapter charts and critiques the ways in which the ECtHR reasons in terms of vulnerability. It then 
identifies vulnerability’s effects in the Strasbourg case law and proceeds to take an institutional 
perspective to show that the Court is also vulnerable itself. The Chapter concludes with some reflections 
about the extent to which the ECtHR, in effect, adopts an approach consistent with the vulnerability 
thesis – and to what extent it has the possibility to do so. 
Chapter Six forms the conclusion of this PhD thesis. It discusses the key findings as regards the 
concepts of stereotype and vulnerability separately, and reflects on how the Court can draw on these 
concepts to create a legal reasoning that is more sensitive to the demands of transformative equality. It 
then brings these concepts together and considers the tension and synergies between them. The 
conclusion closes by contemplating briefly on interesting topics for future research. 
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Preface Chapters Two and Three 
The next two chapters contain two articles on the concept of stereotyping. The first article (Chapter 
Two), entitled “Toward an Anti-Stereotyping Approach for the European Court of Human Rights”, has 
been published in the Human Rights Law Review of December 2011. The research for this article was 
completed in September 2011. The text as it is reproduced here is the same text as was published in the 
Human Rights Law Review. 
 Since finishing and publishing this article, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR has delivered two 
important judgments concerning stereotyping. These are Aksu v. Turkey (15 March 2012) and Konstantin 
Markin v. Russia (22 March 2012). Especially the Konstantin Markin case, concerning the refusal of the 
Russian authorities to grant extended parental leave to military servicemen while such leave is available 
for servicewomen, is relevant for Chapter Two as this chapter concerns gender stereotyping specifically. 
Indeed, Chapter Two contains an extensive discussion of the chamber judgment in this case, which had 
been delivered on 7 October 2010 (see infra Chapter 2.V.A).   
I have opted to leave the Human Rights Law Review article intact and not re-write it for the 
present manuscript. This is not only for reasons of expediency. I have been able to discuss both the Aksu 
and the Konstantin Markin Grand Chamber judgments in Chapter Three, as the research for this chapter 
– which has been submitted to the American Journal of Comparative Law – was completed in May 2013. 
Furthermore, I have reflected extensively on the Konstantin Markin case elsewhere. In the first place, as 
was mentioned above in the Introduction, the Human Rights Centre of Ghent University submitted a 
third party intervention when the Konstantin Markin case went to the Grand Chamber. 1 Secondly, I 
wrote a chapter in Konstantin Markin for a volume on “rewriting judgments of the ECtHR” edited by Eva 
Brems.2 As a result, I would not add anything original compared to my other work if I were to rewrite 
Chapter Two. What is more, although the Grand Chamber judgment is more sensitive to the 
stereotyping issue – of course I would like to think that the third party intervention of the Ghent Human 
Rights Centre made a difference in this respect! – the Grand Chamber judgment is not so different from 
the earlier judgment as to make the analysis in Chapter Two lose its bite. 
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 The third party intervention is available at: http://www.ugent.be/re/publiekrecht/en/department/human-
rights/publications/amicus.pdf 
2
 Alexandra Timmer, From Inclusion to Transformation: Rewriting Konstantin Markin v. Russia, in DIVERSITY AND 
EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS: REWRITING JUDGMENTS OF THE ECHR (Eva Brems, ed., 2012), p. 148-170. 
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As regards Chapter Three; the text that is reproduced here is the revised and re-submitted 
version which I have sent to the American Journal of Comparative Law.
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Abstract 
The central tenet of this article is that stereotypes are both cause and manifestation of the structural 
disadvantage and discrimination of certain groups of people. Focusing on the gender case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights, this article explores what conception of equality the Court should 
embrace to adequately address the harmfulness of stereotypes. Since stereotypes are often the 
mechanisms that underlie discrimination, this article advances an anti-stereotyping approach that the 
Court could employ in its rulings. The proposed analysis consists of two phases; ‘naming’ and ‘contesting’ 
stereotypes. The whole argument is illustrated by Konstantin Markin v Russia and Rantsev v Cyprus and 
Russia, two recent cases in the area of gender equality. 
 
 
I. Introduction 
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There are ‘no grounds for complacency’ as regards the protection of human rights in Europe.1 With 
these words Thomas Hammerberg, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, calls 
attention to the persisting discrimination and marginalization of – among others –women, minorities 
and people with a disability. The question is how to tackle these systemic equality- and discrimination-
problems within the European legal framework. Part of the answer lies with the European Court of 
Human Rights (‘ECtHR’ or ‘the Court’) – which is, after all, widely celebrated as the most advanced 
human rights protection body.2 This article explores the potential of the case law of that Court to tackle 
structural equality problems. 
 My point of departure is that the Court and its commentators should now focus on contesting 
the mechanisms that underlie inequality and discrimination, as legally mandated overt discrimination 
has largely disappeared in Europe. These mechanisms are often hidden from view and are connected to 
our unconscious mental processes.3 Those elusive mechanisms are called stereotypes. The central tenet 
of this article is that stereotypes are both cause and manifestation of the structural disadvantage and 
discrimination of certain groups of people. From this basis I develop the argument that the Strasbourg 
Court needs to recognise and address stereotyping as a structural cause of discrimination. This general 
argument is illustrated and substantiated with a specific focus on gender stereotypes. Thus, I draw 
mainly on the Court’s gender case law, but at times I use examples from other areas of its discrimination 
case law. 
 Stereotypes are, in short, widely accepted beliefs about groups of people. The case law of the 
ECtHR provides us with plenty of examples, like: women have ‘a special social role associated with 
motherhood’;4 Muslim women are oppressed;5 and homosexuals have only cursory relationships.6 
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 Hammarberg, Human rights in Europe: no grounds for complacency. Viewpoints by Thomas Hammarberg Council 
of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2011). 
2
 Goldhaber, A People’s History of the European Court of Human Rights (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 
2007) at 189-90 (and the literature quoted there). 
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 There is a rich body of American scholarship devoted to unconscious bias and its implications for equal protection 
law. Seminal articles include Lawrence, ‘The Id the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism’, 
(1987) 39 Stanford Law Review 317; Hamilton Krieger, ‘The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach 
to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity’, (1995) 47 Stanford Law Review 1161. 
4
 Konstantin Markin v Russia Application No 30078/06, Merits, 7 October 2010, at para 19 (this stereotype was 
advocated by the Russian Constitutional Court in their judgment in the Konstantin Markin case). 
5
 Compare Dahlab v Switzerland 2001-V; and Leyla Şahin v Turkey 2005-XI; 41 EHRR 8.The stereotype that Muslim 
women are oppressed is implicitly advocated by the Court in these judgments; see on this topic, e.g., Evans, ‘The 
“Islamic Scarf” in the European Court of Human Rights’ (2006) 7 Melbourne Journal of International Law 52. 
6
 This stereotype was refuted by the Court in Schalk and Kopf v Austria Application No 30141/04, Merits, 24 June 
2010, at para 99: ‘the Court would start from the premise that same-sex couples are just as capable as different-
sex couples of entering into stable committed relationships. Consequently, they are in a relevantly similar situation 
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Stereotypes such as these should be contested because they restrict people to supposed group 
characteristics, thus impairing their dignity and personal autonomy, as well as denying them certain 
rights on this basis. Gender stereotypes form the ‘fortress of our tradition’ that women all too often 
cannot escape.7 If we want to realise women’s human rights, we must challenge gender stereotypes.8 
 Unfortunately the Court’s approach to stereotyping has been rather piecemeal so far. Only 
recently has the Court started to recognize stereotypes as one of the structural causes holding back the 
emancipation of disadvantaged groups.9 Various other legal systems, however, have recognized that 
structural change requires combating stereotypes.10 It is not the purpose of this article to offer a 
comparative perspective on the case law of the ECtHR, yet it will become clear that this project is 
grounded in the judicial and scholarly work on gender stereotyping that has been done elsewhere. 
Specifically, my project is inspired by the work of the CEDAW Committee and by American, Canadian 
and South African case law and scholarship. In those jurisdictions, in varying ways, stereotyping has 
been a central harm that equal protection law has sought to address.  
 Briefly put, this article seeks to advance a legal methodology – drawing on U.S. legal literature, I 
call it an ‘anti-stereotyping approach’11 – that uncovers and contests the patterns that lead to structural 
discrimination. This anti-stereotyping approach is a first attempt at creating a tool that the ECtHR could 
use to improve its reasoning to more fully protect specifically disadvantaged groups against stereotyping 
and other forms of structural discrimination. After this introduction, Part II describes the state of affairs 
in the Court’s discrimination jurisprudence and places this article in a wider set of developments 
concerning the judicial approach to equality. Part III gives an account of stereotypes and their harm and 
elucidates the legal significance of stereotypes. Part IV sets forth my anti-stereotyping analysis, which is 
specifically aimed at the ECtHR. The analysis will consist of two phases: namely ‘naming’ and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
to a different-sex couple as regards their need for legal recognition and protection of their relationship.’ Of course, 
stereotypes do not only surface in the gender context. Think of the case of Aksu v Turkey concerning a Turkish 
government-sponsored dictionary and another government-sponsored book that included suggestions that Roma 
are stingy, fraudulent and aggressive. Aksu v Turkey Application No 4149/04 and 41029/04, Merits, 27 July 2010.  
7
 Lippmann, Public Opinion (BN Publishing, 2007 (first published 1922)) at 36. 
8
 This is also the central massage of Cook and Cusack, Gender Stereotyping: Transnational Legal Perspectives 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010). 
9
 See infra Part 2. 
10
 Examples are the Inter-American, the South African and the Canadian legal systems. Paradigmatic cases include 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Case 11.625,  Morales de Sierra v Guatemala Report No 4/01 (2001); 
9 IHRR 190 (2002); South African Constitutional Court, Minister  of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another 
[2005], CCT 06/04; and Canadian Supreme Court, R v Ewanchuk [1999] 1 SCR 330 (L’Heureux-Dubé J. concurring). 
For a discussion of these and other cases, see Cook and Cusack, supra note 8. 
11
 Franklin, ‘The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law’, (2010) 85 New York 
University Law Review 83. 
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‘contesting’. This analysis is meant to be suggestive rather than definitive: the aim is to raise the kinds of 
questions that the Court needs to ask in order to dismantle harmful gender stereotypes and to show 
how the Court could incorporate an anti-stereotyping approach in its legal reasoning. Part V illustrates 
this analysis with two recent gender cases: Konstantin Markin v Russia and Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia, 
12 and puts forward some suggestions concerning other areas of the Court’s gender case law that would 
benefit in particular from the approach this article advocates.  
 
 
II. Developing equality 
 
There have been significant developments within the legal approach to equality and discrimination in 
the past decades. Increasingly, equality is approached holistically. The focus in this article lies on the 
developments in the case law of the ECtHR, nonetheless these developments are reflective of a broader 
legal trend. The purpose of this part is to locate my anti-stereotyping argument within a broader set of 
developments and, by quickly taking the reader through the anti-discrimination case law of the Court, to 
lay the groundwork for the anti-stereotyping analysis outlined in Part IV. 
 During the first decades of its existence, the ECtHR saw discrimination solely through a lens of 
formal equality. The hallmark of such an approach, sometimes called de jure equality, is that persons 
placed in similar situations must be treated in an equal manner and that no distinction can be made on a 
number of grounds of discrimination such as race and sex, without reasonable justification. In brief: 
women have the same rights as men. A landmark case in this context was Abdulaziz, Cabales and 
Balkandi v the United Kingdom (the ‘ABC-case’) from 1985.13 The case concerned the immigration rules 
of the United Kingdom which made a distinction between male and female immigrants: women whose 
spouses were legally resident in the UK were allowed to join their partner, while the reverse was not 
allowed. The United Kingdom submitted that this rule was intended to protect the domestic labour 
market: men would have a greater impact on the labour market than women.14 The Court judged that 
this amounted to discrimination on the ground of sex and concluded that this was a violation of the 
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 Abdulaziz, Cabales, and Balkandali v United Kingdom A 94 (1985); 7 EHRR 471. 
14
 Ibid. at 75. The idea that men have a greater impact on the labour market is of course also based on a 
stereotype. In this case the Court solves the issue with a call upon formal equality. 
78 
 
Convention. Importantly, this was the first case in which the Court laid down the rule that when a State 
makes a distinction on the grounds of sex, the rule or practice in question must be subjected to an 
intensive scrutiny: the State must be able to advance ‘very weighty reasons’ for the distinction.15 
 Although formal equality serves its purposes, from a gender perspective it has serious 
shortcomings. These shortcomings are well documented in feminist legal literature. Feminists have 
pointed out that when the aim is to give women the same rights as men, the frame of reference is still 
masculine. This is problematic in several ways. What to do with issues in which women and men are not 
the same, like pregnancy? Why would women actually have to adapt to a masculine norm?16 And what 
to do with intersectional discrimination; meaning discrimination that cannot be reduced to just one 
ground but which is based on a combination of identities?17 In the end, formal equality is often too 
formalistic: such an approach puts too much emphasis on technical-legal concepts and does not take the 
historical and social reality of women and other non-dominant or vulnerable groups enough into 
account.18 
 Undoubtedly influenced by all the critique on formal equality, the Court has started to develop a 
substantive conception of equality.19 This approach, also called de facto equality, takes as its starting 
point the reality of a rule or practice as it is experienced by a disadvantaged group. The question then 
becomes whether the effect of a rule is discriminatory, not whether a distinction has been made 
between different groups. The Court has slowly become aware that neutrally formulated rules can have 
a disproportionally burdening effect on vulnerable social groups. In other words; in the real world, 
neutral rules can be discriminatory. A discriminatory intent is not a pre-condition for a finding of 
discrimination: discrimination can arise from a de facto situation. This understanding has gradually been 
embraced by the Court, but is most clearly articulated by the Grand Chamber in D.H. and Others v Czech 
Republic in 2007, incidentally a case which did not concern gender discrimination but segregation of 
Roma children in Czech schools. In that case the Court even suggested that, sometimes, positive action 
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is expected from the authorities, in order to correct factual inequalities.20 Another aspect of a more 
substantive interpretation of equality is the awareness that different situations should not be treated 
equally, if the goal is to achieve a fair result.21 
 However valuable an approach is that embraces substantive equality; even this approach has its 
limits. By emphasizing the effects of a particular rule, the underlying structural causes of exclusion are 
not necessarily addressed and are often left untouched. The struggle against structural forms of 
discrimination is referred to as transformative equality by certain authors.22 Equality as transformation is 
an ambitious project: it challenges the deeply ingrained gender roles and gendered ideology on which 
society is based. States are expected to make a radical reconsideration of those aspects of their legal, 
social and economic culture that hamper the equality and human dignity of women.23 The aim is to 
disrupt the hierarchical legal and social status quo.24 For the sake of terminological clarity, let me explain 
that this article recognizes that what is labelled here as transformative equality, many scholars would 
actually classify as substantive equality.25 The reason this article employs a rather narrow conception of 
substantive equality and makes a distinction between substantive and transformative equality in this 
way, is that this corresponds better with the Court’s current equality jurisprudence. The Court’s 
approach to substantive equality is characterized by an emphasis on (and an increasing willingness to 
embrace) positive equality duties.26 This approach is a step in the right direction, but it does not 
necessarily ensure that the root causes of gendered disadvantage are addressed. If the Court wants to 
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go to the roots of structural gender discrimination it should dismantle gender stereotypes, as well as be 
willing to go into the issue of States’ positive obligations on the terrain of equality. 
 There are a few indications in the recent case law of the ECtHR that the Court is willing to 
embrace a conception of transformative equality based on an anti-stereotyping approach, though let it 
be noted that the Court has not yet applied this idea in a gender case (at least not expressly27). None of 
the cases that are about to be mentioned concern gender. In Alajos Kiss v Hungary (2010) the Court 
speaks for the first time explicitly about the stereotypes from which people with intellectual disabilities 
suffer.28 In that judgment, the Court shows itself conscious of the impact of historical discrimination. It 
seems that the Court suggests a general framework within which the ‘very weighty reasons’-test needs 
to be applied: a distinction requires very weighty reasons, says the Court, if it concerns certain groups in 
society that are particularly vulnerable due to significant past discrimination.29 This approach to 
disability-based discrimination is confirmed in Kiyutin v Russia, a case concerning a HIV-positive 
applicant.30 In this case the Court makes a real effort to address the sources of prejudice against people 
living with HIV. The Court acknowledges that, as a result of ignorance of how the disease spreads and 
links to already existing racism, homophobia and misogyny, people living with HIV are subject to 
intensely harmful stigmatization and therefore a particularly vulnerable social group.31 The dissenters in 
Aksu v Turkey (incidentally the same Chamber that decided Alajos Kiss) continue this line in a case that 
concerns discrimination of Roma.32 This is the first time that (part of) the Court expands on the concept 
of stereotypes: ‘Stereotypes are ready-made opinions that focus on peculiarities, and prejudices are 
preconceived ideas that lead to bias: they are dangerous because they reflect or even induce an implicit 
discrimination.’33  
 Promising as these cases are, a lot of work remains to be done before the ECtHR will take 
transformative equality on board. This is where this project is positioned. However, it is important to 
stress that the anti-stereotyping approach is not meant to substitute all other approaches to equality 
and discrimination. Exclusion on the basis of gender can affect both men and women, takes place in 
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many different situations, and may take many different forms. Different methods are therefore required 
to combat gender exclusion and disadvantage. The three forms of equality (formal, substantial and 
transformative equality) are all useful, depending on the situation, and must coexist.34 In order to 
address all aspects of inequality based on gender, we need a holistic approach.35 
 
 
III. (Gender) Stereotypes: meaning and adjudication  
 
In this part, the basics of stereotypes will be briefly set forward. Unfortunately, this will by force be a 
superficial account, as it is nearly impossible to do justice to the vast deal of (empirical) research that 
has been done into stereotypes by psychologists. To start, here are some remarks about stereotypes in 
general.  
 The most basic definition of stereotypes is that they are beliefs about the characteristics of 
groups of people.36 According to standard psychology-texts, stereotypes can be both negative (‘women 
are weak’) and positive (‘women are caring’), but they are predominantly negative.37 However, Zanita 
Fenton argues that ‘positive’ stereotypes also have negative consequences, because what is constructed 
as positive depends on the point of view of the observer. Besides, while a stereotype does not have to 
be correct for a particular person, it does force that individual in a particular role or position, either 
ideologically or in reality.38  
 Individuals employ stereotypes to simplify and make understandable the world around them, 
and as such stereotypes play an important and legitimate role in our lives.39 But at the same time 
stereotypes are not neutral; they are not merely a short cut to reality.40 They are cultural phenomena: 
they are the social ideas and preconceptions that exist about a particular group. Stereotypes create ‘in’ - 
                                                          
34
 Holtmaat and Naber, supra n 22 at 27. 
35
 Ibid.  
36
 Stangor, ‘Volume Overview’ in Stangor (ed), Stereotypes and Prejudice: Essential Readings (Philadelphia: 
Psychology Press, 2000) 1 at 5. 
37
 See, e.g., Stangor, ‘The Study of Stereotyping, Prejudice and Discrimination Within Social Psychology: A Quick 
History of Theory and Research’, in Nelson (ed), Handbook of Prejudice, Stereotyping and Discrimination (New 
York: Psychology Press, 2009) 1 at 2. 
38
 Fenton, ‘Domestic Violence in Black and White: Racialized Gender Stereotypes in Gender Violence’, (1998-1999) 
8 Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 1 at 13.  
39
 Stangor and Schaller, ‘Stereotypes as Individual and Collective Representations’, in Stangor (ed) Stereotypes and 
Prejudice: Essential Readings (Philadelphia: Psychology Press, 2000) 64 at 73-5. It was Walter Lippmann who first 
found the reason we stereotype in ‘economy of effort’. Lippmann, supra n 7 at 34-5. 
40
 Lippmann, supra n 7 at 36. 
82 
 
and ‘out-groups’: us versus them. This also serves a function, as this way we feel better about ourselves 
because we feel like we belong.41  
 The rest of this paragraph will address gender stereotypes in particular. Gender stereotypes are 
often rooted in our subconscious. In that case, we are not aware that we base our actions on them. In 
the words of Rikki Holtmaat: ‘Stereotypes tend to fixate gender identities and gender roles and make 
them appear as real, universal, eternal, natural, essential and/or unchangeable.’42 To put it differently: 
when there is a stereotype at play, people tend not to ask further questions, because stereotypes make 
gender patterns seem self-evident. Stereotypes make us lazy and blind us to gender inequality. 
 The harm of gender stereotypes is that they tie both men and women down to a particular 
identity. They place a certain mould on individuals, independent of what they are capable of, experience 
or desire. By means of gender stereotypes, men and women are not seen not as individuals, but are by 
default judged on the basis of a gender-group membership. It is important to emphasise that 
stereotypes often serve to maintain existing power relationships; they are control mechanisms. 
Stereotypes uphold a symbolic and real hierarchy between ‘us’ and ‘them’.43  
 Thus, stereotypes have important tangible and intangible effects. Based on the work of Nancy 
Fraser, Rebecca Cook and Simone Cusack call these recognition and distribution-effects.44 Fraser 
considers misrecognition to be a cultural injustice. Misrecognition is a status injury, it is social 
subordination: ‘to be denied the status of a full partner in social interaction, as a consequence of 
institutionalized patterns of cultural value that constitute one as comparatively unworthy of respect and 
esteem.’45 In this context, Cook and Cusack observe that gender stereotypes can harm women by 
degrading them, diminishing their human dignity or otherwise marginalizing them.46 Distribution-effects 
concern the distribution of resources. It refers to socio-economic justice; the question is whether public 
goods are fairly allocated. Cook and Cusack identify two sorts of distribution-effects: women can be 
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denied a benefit on the basis of a gender stereotype,47 or saddled with a burden.48 Recognition and 
distribution are closely linked. Sometimes that link is causal, as when the lack of the one leads to a lack 
of the other. But that is not necessarily the case.  
 However, an important category of harm is still lacking here which deserves to be mentioned 
separately: psychological effects. People who belong to groups who are stereotyped are usually aware 
of the bad reputation of their group, and this creates diverse problems. They report psychological 
distress, unhappiness and depression.49 In addition, stereotypes can constrain behaviour and make 
people underachieve. This occurs when people experience ‘stereotype threat’: the pressure that people 
feel not to conform to a certain (negative) stereotype for fear that they will be judged or treated in 
terms of it.50 Stereotype threat causes anxiety, which in turn causes underperformance. Another effect 
of stereotypes is that people feel obliged to ‘cover’, conceptualized by Kenji Yoshino as a demand to 
hide a certain disfavoured identity.51  
 To enumerate all the harmful effects of stereotypes is clearly beyond the scope of this Article. 
What will be clear from the foregoing is that the Court will have to make a careful case by case 
assessment of the gender stereotypes that are at play, and their effects. 
 
States’ international commitment to gender equality cannot be reached without addressing the 
persistence of harmful gender stereotyping. This is explicitly recognized in the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). The legal basis for the obligation to 
address gender stereotypes is found in several binding international documents,52 but is perhaps most 
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prominent in CEDAW’s Articles 2(f) and 5. Article 5(a) CEDAW stipulates that States take all appropriate 
measures to: ‘modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to 
achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the 
idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and 
women.’ The CEDAW Committee has clarified the link between the obligation to address gender 
stereotypes and the problem of structural discrimination. In General Recommendation No. 25 the 
Committee observes: ‘States parties’ obligation is to address prevailing gender relations and the 
persistence of gender-based stereotypes that affect women not only through individual acts by 
individuals but also in law, and legal and societal structures and institutions.’53 
That this is also important within the context of the ECtHR is clear: all States of the Council of 
Europe are party to CEDAW and none have made a reservation to Article 5(a).54 The ECtHR stressed the 
importance of CEDAW in a recent ruling, Opuz v Turkey: ‘when considering the definition and scope of 
discrimination against women, in addition to the more general meaning of discrimination as determined 
in its case-law . . . the Court has to have regard to the provisions of more specialised legal instruments’, 
such as CEDAW.55 
 This brings me to the crucial question of the role of the Court. What can the ECtHR do to 
address, and ultimately help to eliminate, harmful gender stereotypes? It is suggested that the Court’s 
role is twofold: in the first place the Court should not rely on harmful (gender) stereotypes in its own 
reasoning and,56 secondly, the Court should name gender stereotyping whenever it occurs on a national 
level and proceed against it as a particularly damaging form of discrimination. The rest of this article 
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focuses on that second aspect of the Court’s role. To be clear: this article does not propose that judges 
should try to eradicate all stereotypes from society. That would be neither feasible nor desirable, since 
some stereotypes do fulfil a legitimate function (namely making the countless amount of information 
we have to process in day-to-day life manageable) and, moreover, since it is inevitable that law relies on 
generalizations. However, there is a line between permissible generalizations and harmful stereotypes. 
When a gender stereotype halts the emancipation process States are under an obligation to address it 
on the basis of arts 2(f), 5(a) CEDAW, and then, this article argues, the Court should not let the use of 
such a gender stereotype pass by. 57 
 What does that mean that the Court can do concretely? On a practical level, the key role for 
judges seems to be to ensure that individuals, companies or States do not act on harmful stereotypes.58 
Thus, the ECtHR can oblige States to individualize rules or practices, rather than to categorize and 
exclude on the basis of group membership by applying so-called ‘blanket restrictions’ on fundamental 
rights.59 On a more conceptual level, the Court can play a role in changing the way we speak – and 
thereby influence the way we think60 – about stereotypes and gender ideology. The following Part 
explicates how the Court can make sure that States do not discriminate on the basis of harmful gender 
stereotypes. 
 
 
IV. Analysis: towards an anti-stereotyping approach for the ECtHR 
 
A) Setting the stage 
 
What could a judicial analysis that revolves around the anti-stereotyping principle look like in gender 
equality cases? This part will propose an anti-stereotyping analysis in two stages: in the first place 
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gender stereotypes should be named,61 and subsequently they must be contested. By ‘naming’ I mean 
that the Court must determine the actual role of gender stereotypes in the context of a particular case. 
It will become clear that this analysis interprets factual context broadly. Under the header of 
‘contesting’ I describe how the Court should proceed against gender stereotypes in its legal reasoning. 
 Before covering the actual analysis, let me clarify that in the second stage of the analysis I utilize 
the model of judicial review that Janneke Gerards has developed for equal treatment cases, based on 
the case law of the ECtHR and several other courts.62 She has created a beautifully condensed account of 
how judges can apply the equality norm, which can be applied in cases of both de jure and de facto 
unequal treatment. To avoid repetitive scholarship and in order to make my anti-stereotyping analysis 
as concise as possible, it is expedient to utilize Gerards’ model as a springboard.  
 Gerards suggests that the judicial review of the equality norm must be carried out in three 
phases. First there is a pre-phase in which the intensity of the review must be determined: strict scrutiny 
(the very weighty reasons-test), intermediate review or marginal review? Theoretically,63 this step is of 
less importance for gender cases at the ECtHR because the Court has already ruled that distinctions 
based on sex require an intensive review.64 Then in the next phase the Court must determine whether 
there is a sufficient cause of action; whether there has actually been an instance of unequal treatment 
that requires justification.65 To assess this, the official line of the ECtHR is that a comparability test 
should be carried out: ‘discrimination means treating differently, without an objective and reasonable 
justification, persons in relevantly similar situations’.66 The comparability test seems to have become 
less important now that the Court adjudicates indirect discrimination cases increasingly often and, 
anyway, the Court almost never pays explicit attention to the comparability in cases that concern 
‘suspect’ classifications (such as sex).67 Instead of a comparability test, Gerards argues for a 
‘disadvantage test’, which argument this article supports. The disadvantage test means that the 
complainant must prove that a rule or practice disadvantaged her compared to another person or group 
of persons.68 If it has been proven that the applicant suffered a genuine disadvantage, then the State 
must be able to justify this. This brings us to the final phase of Gerards’ test, when the Court must 
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determine whether there is a justification for the distinction. The ECtHR does so on the basis of two 
questions: does the distinction pursue a legitimate aim and is there proportionality between the means 
employed and the aim sought to be realized? 
 Now that Gerards’ model of judicial review in equal treatment cases is briefly set forward, it is 
time to introduce my anti-stereotyping analysis. 
 
B) First phase: naming 
 
The main question that the Court has to consider is whether a rule or practice is based on harmful 
gender stereotypes.69 Cook and Cusack argue that ‘[n]aming wrongful gender stereotyping . . . is central 
to the effectiveness of efforts to eliminate this practice. Unless wrongful gender stereotyping is 
diagnosed as a social harm, it will not be possible to determine its treatment and bring about its 
elimination.’70 In response to discrimination case law of the Supreme Court of Canada, Margot Young 
has made the point that the more entrenched a (gender) stereotype is the less likely judges are to 
detect it.71 More generally, many scholars have pointed out that judges bring their own 
unacknowledged biases to bear on a case, which is all the more problematic since judges will often form 
part of the dominant group and will ‘therefore have the luxury of seeing their perspectives mirrored and 
reinforced in major social and political institutions’.72 In order to avoid these pitfalls as much as possible, 
a rigorous judicial assessment of context is needed. Moreover, such an assessment not only serves to 
detect and name stereotypes, but also to appraise whether and, if so, to what extent they are harmful. 
Below is a discussion of some of the various contextual factors that the ECtHR should take into account. 
 
ii. Historical context 
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Whether a stereotype is harmful depends to a large extent on the historical context in which it is used. 
In Andrle v Czech Republic the Court showed itself well aware of this.73 The case concerned the Czech 
pension scheme which provides for lower pensionable ages for women who have raised children than 
for men who have raised children. The rule was clearly based on the woman-homemaker/man-
breadwinner stereotype. The Court held that it ‘cannot overlook the fact that the measure at stake is 
rooted in specific historical circumstances’, namely the expectation that existed in then socialist 
Czechoslovakia that women worked full-time as well as fulfilling the ‘traditional mothering role’. 74 In 
light of this historical context, the Court judged that the rule was not harmful, because the aim was ‘to 
compensate for the factual inequality between men and women’.75 
 To place a gender stereotype in its historical context and thus assess its harmfulness, the Court 
can ask itself various questions. Is there a history of gender discrimination vis-à-vis a particular right?76 
Or is there a history of discrimination in a specific sort of situation? Has the group concerned (be that 
women, homosexuals, women with a particular ethnic or religious background, or transsexuals, etc.) 
been excluded from a particular right in the past? Is there a conceivable analogy between the current 
regulation and historical rules or practices that were discriminatory?77 One way in which these kinds of 
questions have come up in the judgments of the Strasbourg Court – though not necessarily in the 
stereotype-context – is in cases where an abundance of international rapports and other materials 
indicate a widespread equality-problem in a certain State. Examples include cases concerning 
discrimination of Roma in Romania78 and domestic violence against women in Turkey.79 
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iii.  Current effects 
An anti-stereotyping approach also requires an awareness of the effects of a rule or practice – that is, 
judges need to perform a reality check. What are the effects of the challenged rule or practice on 
individual men and women? To make sure that it takes an intersectional approach to discrimination, the 
Court should ask what the effects are on particular groups of men and women, like women from a 
particular ethnic or religious background, or of a particular age and (dis)ability. The anti-stereotyping 
approach is not based on rigid-discrimination grounds, and invites research into the more complex 
reality in which human beings find themselves. 
 What kind of harm is caused to whom? Note that the Court has to investigate material 
(distribution) and social status (recognition) effects, as well as psychological effects, where appropriate. 
To find out the recognition effects the Court may ask what a particular rule implies about the status of a 
certain group. To get a sense of psychological effects, the Court might use materials submitted by third 
party interveners and the materials submitted by the applicants themselves. This points to the fact that 
the Court cannot do the hard work of combating gender stereotypes alone. The Court is dependent on 
others (the parties and third-party interveners) to gather sufficient information about the case and on 
that basis to create good law. Through an exploration of the historical context of a rule or practice, and 
its current effects, the Court must determine whether harmful gender stereotypes play a role in a case.  
 
iv. Unmasking the stereotype 
In the final step of this first phase the Court will have to unmask the harmful stereotypes, in the sense 
that the Court has to make clear what the adverse consequences of these stereotypes are and what the 
State’s international obligations are to combat gender stereotypes. 
 
C) Second phase: contesting 
 
Whenever the Court identifies a harmful gender stereotype, the Court should take a number of steps to 
combat it. 
 
i. Declaring Article 14 ECHR or Protocol 12 applicable 
90 
 
To trigger the analysis outlined below, a preliminary necessity is to declare Article 14 or Protocol 12 
ECHR applicable. My argument is that if a given issue is deeply imbued with harmful stereotypes about 
certain vulnerable groups, this constitutes a presumption that the prohibition of discrimination (Article 
14 or Protocol 12) applies.80  
 
The next steps are all developed with the model of judicial review as developed by Janneke Gerards in 
mind.81  
 
ii.  Applying the very weighty reasons test: 
The general rule should be that when a regulation or practice is based on harmful gender stereotypes, 
the Court will automatically do an intensive review. This means that the very weighty reasons test ought 
to be applied and, consequently, the State should be left a very small, if any, margin of appreciation.82 
 The rule that is proposed here ought not to make a lot of difference with the present case law, 
since the Court has to apply the very weighty reasons test anyway when the State makes a distinction on 
the basis of sex or sexual orientation.83 However, the practice of the Court has been less clear cut.84 The 
Court has on several occasions watered down the very weighty reasons test by granting a margin of 
appreciation to the State in cases of gender discrimination. In Andrle v Czech Republic, for example, the 
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Court pays lip service to the idea of the very weighty reasons test,85 but then goes on to grant the State 
a decisively wide margin of appreciation because the case concerns an issue of social and economic 
strategy.86 
 From an anti-stereotyping perspective, it is imperative that the Court consistently applies the 
very weighty reasons-test in all cases. When a case is based on harmful gender stereotypes, not only the 
discrimination ground (sex) is suspect, but also the form (stereotypes) is suspect. This should lead the 
Court to be extremely critical in the third step of the contesting phase; the assessment of justifications 
(see below). 
 
iii. Drop the comparator and instead apply the disadvantage-test 
The comparability-test should, as Gerards suggests, be exchanged for the more appropriate focus on 
disadvantage. The comparability-test is not well suited to cases that revolve around stereotypes,87 
because the way that gender stereotypes affect the autonomy of certain women and men is a harm that 
stands on its own: the disadvantage is not dependent on a comparison with another group of people. 
Sophia Moreau writes: ‘the reason this treatment amounts to a wrong . . . depends only on the fact that, 
considered in and of themselves, these individuals have been treated in an unacceptable way by the 
government: they have been denied a benefit in a manner that lessens their autonomy’.88 Let me 
elucidate this point with an example from the case law of the ECtHR. In Aksu v Turkey one of the 
complaints concerned a Turkish State-sponsored dictionary that defined ‘gypsy’ as, among other things, 
‘stingy’.89 This constitutes a recognition-harm towards Roma. The harm lies in the fact that the 
dictionary includes derogatory stereotypes, and one cannot define the harm with an appeal to a 
comparator as there is no suitable comparator present. The same applies to cases of intersectional 
discrimination.90 While in some cases there might be an appropriate comparator available, this makes 
that – on the whole – the comparability-test is not appropriate for stereotype-cases.  
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The disadvantage-test is not difficult to pass in stereotype-cases. If during the first phase of an 
anti-stereotyping analysis, as outlined above, it turns out that a gender stereotype is harmful to the 
applicant and the group that she belongs to and that a rule or State practice is based on such a harmful 
stereotype, then that in itself is proof of disadvantage. When a case is based on harmful gender 
stereotypes, the Court can almost automatically decide that there is a disadvantage.  
 
iv. Harmful gender stereotypes cannot constitute a justification 
I have just argued that when a case is based on harmful gender stereotypes the Court should always 
apply the very weighty reasons test and decide automatically that there is a disadvantage. This means 
that the first and second steps of the decision model in this anti-stereotyping analysis are nearly taken 
mechanically; therefore, the core of the judicial assessment of the anti-discrimination provision will 
concern the issue of justifications.91 
 The goal of a stereotype-analysis is exposing and contesting the patterns that lead to structural 
discrimination. Such an analysis aims to render explicit and problematic what society experiences as 
‘natural’. This article argues that the Strasbourg Court should adopt a critical attitude towards the 
reasons and justifications States put forward for their actions. This is what Kenji Yoshino terms a 
‘reason-forcing conversation’.92 States ought to base their regulations and actions on rationally 
defensible grounds, not on gender stereotypes and prejudices.93 This also means that the Court should 
keep asking questions; vague arguments, such as we need to preserve our ‘culture’94 or ‘tradition’,95 are 
not sufficient as justifications. From an anti-stereotyping perspective, such arguments are even suspect: 
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appeals to tradition and culture are often appeals to the popularity of stereotypes.96 Gender stereotypes 
are articulated and validated in cultural practices and images.97 The CEDAW Committee has 
acknowledged the link between culture and gender stereotypes explicitly in Article 5(a) CEDAW and 
commented in General Recommendation 23, on women in political and public life: ‘In all nations, 
cultural traditions and religious beliefs have played a part in confining women to the private spheres of 
activity and excluding them from active participation in public life.’98 
 For these reasons, an appeal to a stereotype cannot form a justification. Strong support for this 
assertion can be found in the existing case law. In the recent case of Konstantin Markin v Russia the 
Court states:  ‘To the extent that the difference was founded on the traditional gender roles, that is on 
the perception of women as primary child-carers and men as primary breadwinners, these gender 
prejudices cannot, by themselves, be considered by the Court to amount to sufficient justification for 
the difference in treatment, any more than similar prejudices based on race, origin, colour or sexual 
orientation.’99 If you substitute the word ‘prejudices’ here for the more accurate ‘stereotypes’, this is 
exactly the approach this article is pleading for. Older cases should not be overlooked either: the Court 
has already determined that ‘negative attitudes’ towards a particular group cannot form a 
justification,100 nor can arguments that only reflect ‘the traditional outlook’,101 nor can an appeal to 
‘cultural reasons’.102  
 
V. By way of illustration: Konstantin Markin v Russia, Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia, and 
beyond 
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To illustrate the approach that I am arguing for, this part will think through two major recent gender 
discrimination cases from an anti-stereotyping perspective: Konstantin Markin and Rantsev. One 
difference between these cases is that the Court recognized Konstantin Markin as a gender 
discrimination case, but did not recognize Rantsev as such. What these cases have in common is that 
both are on the face of it ‘successful’ gender equality cases, in the sense that the Court ruled in favour of 
the victim of discrimination, but that both leave something to be desired in the application of a gender 
analysis.103 It is rewarding to discuss them together as these cases complement each other; Konstantin 
Markin concerns a question of formal discrimination and Rantsev concerns questions of positive 
obligations. Most important, though, is that both of these cases offer very promising transformative 
potential, but both fall short of realizing this potential to the fullest. Focusing on the problem of 
stereotypes shows why. After these two case studies, to conclude, this part puts forward a few 
suggestions concerning other areas of gender case law that would benefit in particular from the 
approach this article advocates. 
 
A) Konstantin Markin v Russia  
 
This case concerns Konstantin Markin who is a military serviceman and father of three children.104 He 
and his wife divorced and decided that he would be the caretaker of their children, who were very 
young at the time, and that she would pay child support. Markin subsequently asked the relevant 
authority for three years parental leave allowance but his request was denied because according to the 
law leave of such duration could only be granted to military servicewomen. The Russian courts rejected 
Markin’s complaint that this constituted discrimination. What makes this case particularly interesting in 
the context of an anti-stereotyping approach is the Russian Constitutional Court’s justification for the 
rule that excludes military servicemen from parental leave. The Constitutional Court observed in its 
judgment: ‘By granting, on an exceptional basis, the right to parental leave to servicewomen only, the 
legislature took into account, firstly, the limited participation of women in military service and, secondly, 
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the special social role of women associated with motherhood.’105 Relying on Article 14 taken in 
conjunction with Article 8 (the right to private and family life), Markin subsequently complained to the 
ECtHR that the refusal to grant him parental leave amounted to discrimination on account of sex. The 
First Section of the Court handed down its judgment in October 2010. However, Russia successfully 
appealed to the Grand Chamber and we are currently awaiting its decision.  
 From a gender perspective, some of the Chamber’s judgment is worth applauding. First of all, 
the outcome is good: the Court finds a violation of the Convention. Also, the Court acknowledges that in 
most countries in Europe, both mothers and fathers can take parental leave, and the Court emphasizes 
that ‘men’s caring role has gained recognition’.106 Most significant from the point of view of this article is 
the fact that the Court dismantles an important stereotype on which the ruling against Markin by the 
Russian Constitutional Court was based, namely the woman-homemaker/man-breadwinner idea. The 
relevant paragraph is already quoted in Part IV, but it bears repeating that the Court held that ‘the 
perception of women as primary child-carers and men as primary breadwinners’ cannot ‘amount to 
sufficient justification for the difference in treatment, any more than similar prejudices based on race, 
origin, colour or sexual orientation’.107 
 However, an anti-stereotyping approach reveals that the judgment also has serious 
shortcomings. Naturally we will have to await the judgment by the Grand Chamber, but what the Court 
achieves with this judgment – assuming Russia will comply with its obligations under the Convention108 – 
is greater inclusion of men, but no amelioration of the situation of women in the Russian army. The Court 
overlooks the fact that not only (service)men are affected and burdened with stereotypes in this case, 
and that the woman-homemaker/man-breadwinner idea is not the only stereotype at issue here. The 
Russian Court based its finding on several interrelated stereotypes concerning military servicewomen, 
like military servicewomen do not play a crucial part in the army, and military servicewomen are less 
important than military serviceman. The Strasbourg Court should have named these stereotypes as well.  
 The Court fails to name and dislodge these other gender stereotypes, because it does not make 
an adequate context-assessment in Konstantin Markin. In order to name these stereotypes, the Court 
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could have engaged in the kind of context assessment that is set out above, in Part IV.B. Obviously, this 
case is set within the context of gender norms and practices in the Russian military. While it is difficult to 
obtain comprehensive information regarding the position of women in the Russian army, the picture 
that emerges from the sources that are available is one of a thoroughly male-dominated institution in 
which female soldiers are kept in the ‘carefully-labeled compartments’ that are deemed fit for women 
by the Defense Ministry.109 Since the early 1990’s, when contract service was introduced in Russia  as a 
supplement to the system of conscription that was becoming increasingly unpopular among young men, 
the number of women in the Russian military has risen to more than 110,000.110 Women now constitute 
approximately 10 percent of the armed forces in Russia.111 However, even while their number has 
grown, the situation of servicewomen has not very noticeably ameliorated.112 Military servicewomen are 
grossly underrepresented in leadership positions,113 they report extensive violations of their socio-
economic rights,114 and they are frequently victim of sexual harassment.115 Women’s limited prospects 
of promotion are partly the result of their supervisors’ conviction that women’s place, especially women 
with children, is in the family and that their ‘family concerns would prevent them from carrying out their 
professional duties.’116 Political scientist Jennifer Mathers has observed that the ‘sharp distinction 
between men's and women's work and the apparent ban on women performing a wide range of military 
duties has caused one officer to comment that there is a limit to the proportion of servicewomen which 
the Russian armed forces is able to employ’.117 
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 All of this demonstrates that the argument used by the Russian Constitutional Court, namely 
that the rules regarding parental leave are justified because of women’s special role as mothers and 
their limited participation in the military, is unsound. This context assessment exposes the harm of that 
argument: gender stereotypes are precisely what limit women’s participation in the military. As the 
Strasbourg Court acknowledges, the rules that are based on these gender stereotypes have the effect of 
putting military men who are also fathers with primary caretaking responsibilities in the intolerable 
position of having to choose between their profession and their family life, while servicewomen face ‘no 
such choice’.118 Unfortunately, the Court neglects the other side of the coin, namely that, at the same 
time, these stereotypes restrict women’s access to professional careers in the military, diminish the 
quality of these careers, and put the burden of domestic work on women.119  
  
So how would this case have turned out differently using an anti-stereotyping approach?  The focus on 
stereotypes necessarily brings with it a contextual analysis and, with that, an awareness of the larger 
societal issues that are at stake. Because the Court neglects the context of this case – it does not make 
the link between the position of Konstantin Markin and the structural problems that women in the 
Russian army face – the Court fails to dislodge the underlying structures that are male-defined and 
excluding of women. In other words, the lack of a contextual analysis limits the transformative potential 
of this case.  
 In a rather unusual move, which suggests that the Court does aim for transformation, the Court 
suggests Russia adopt general measures to amend the Military Service Act.120 If the majority had placed 
Mr Markin’s complaint in the context of the systemic gender problems in the military, they might have 
pre-empted the criticism by dissenting Judge Kovler that ‘this isolated case does not impose on the 
respondent State a legal obligation to implement appropriate general measures’.121 The Court should 
have shown that the predicament in which Mr. Markin found himself was no ‘isolated case’, but, on the 
contrary, symptomatic of the structural problems that both men and women face in the army due to 
deeply embedded gender stereotypes. That way, the Court could have made a stronger case in favour of 
the much needed general measures that should not only entail legislative change to ameliorate the 
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position of male military personnel, but more comprehensive measures aimed at improving the 
situation of women in the military. 
 
B)  Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia  
 
The Rantsev case concerns a 20-year old Russian woman, Oxana Rantseva, who was the victim of sex 
trafficking and who eventually died under suspicious circumstances.122 Rantseva was admitted to Cyprus 
on a so-called ‘artiste visa’. The visa was procured for her by an owner of a ‘cabaret’, and allowed 
Rantseva to work in that cabaret. It is general knowledge in Cyprus that these artiste visas are in practice 
a gateway into prostitution, even to the degree that the word ‘artiste’ has become synonymous with the 
word ‘prostitute’.123 The sequence of events is as follows: after working for a few days at the cabaret, 
Rantseva left her apartment, leaving a note saying that she was going back to Russia. A few days later 
she was found by somebody who contacted the brother of the owner of Rantseva’s cabaret. That 
brother brought her to the police, alleging that Rantseva was illegally in Cyprus and that the police 
should hold her in the cell. He then left. The person in charge at the police station gave the order that 
the owner of the cabaret should be contacted and ordered to ‘collect’ Rantseva.124 The brother of the 
owner came back to the station, picked up Rantseva and brought her to the apartment of one of his 
employees. They put Rantseva in a room on the sixth floor and allegedly left her alone. Sometime later 
she was found lying dead on the street below the apartment. The Cypriot authorities started an 
investigation into her death which, as the Strasbourg Court later concluded, was conducted in an 
unsatisfactory manner. 
 In many ways, Rantsev is a more complicated case than Konstantin Markin. The case concerns 
various private perpetrators, numerous authorities and several Articles of the Convention. The Court 
handed down a very thorough judgment on human trafficking in general, holding that trafficking as such 
falls under Article 4 (the prohibition of slavery, servitude and forced labour) of the Convention and that 
Cyprus and Russia violated this provision. The Court considers that: 
 
Trafficking in human beings, by its very nature and aim of exploitation, is based on the exercise of 
powers attaching to the right of ownership. It treats human beings as commodities to be bought 
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and sold and put to forced labour, often for little or no payment, usually in the sex industry but 
also elsewhere . . . There can be no doubt that trafficking threatens the human dignity and 
fundamental freedoms of its victims and cannot be considered compatible with a democratic 
society and the values expounded in the Convention.
125
   
 
In addition, the Court followed international human rights treaties to determine the obligations that rest 
on State Parties’ to prevent and punish trafficking. The Court referred extensively to the United Nations 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children126 and 
the Anti-Trafficking Convention of the Council of Europe.127 The present analysis will focus on those 
aspects of the case that are linked to gender stereotypes and will not encompass all facets of the case. 
  
As for the first part of the anti-stereotyping approach, the naming stage, the crux of the problem in 
Rantsev is different from the one in Konstantin Markin. In Konstantin Markin the problem lies in the lack 
of contextual framing; in Rantsev, on the other hand, the Court does an impressive job of collecting 
background data and assessing the wider context of this case, namely the highly problematic ‘artiste 
visa’-regime in place at that time in Cyprus, the appalling conditions in which the foreign women 
workers live and the exploitation that the women are subjected to. The Court uses an extensive amount 
of materials to establish that ‘artistes’ are often trafficked, exploited and abused and that the Cypriot 
government is well aware of these facts.  
 Despite this impressive context assessment, the shortcomings of the Rantsev-judgment are in a 
sense more far-reaching than the ones of Konstantin Markin. Whereas in the latter case the Court fails 
to name many of the gender stereotypes at issue; in Rantsev the Court ignores the gender-dimension to 
the case completely.128 Having collected all the evidence, the Court could have made a relatively easy 
case for indirect discrimination as the grand majority of the victims of the exploitative ‘artiste visa’-
regime are women.129 It is actually puzzling why the Court has not applied Article 14 in conjunction with 
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Article 4, as it has determined in previous cases that ‘a general policy or measure that has 
disproportionately prejudicial effects on a particular group may be considered discriminatory 
notwithstanding that it is not specifically aimed at that group . . . and that discrimination potentially 
contrary to the Convention may result from a de facto situation’.130 
 The Court names ‘exploitation’ as the central harm of trafficking, but does not explore how this 
exploitation is gendered.131 In other words, it neglects to ask what has been termed ‘the woman 
question’.132 What does the Cypriot legislation and the actions of the Cypriot authorities imply about the 
status of women with an artiste visa? The Court overlooks the gender stereotypes that play a role in this 
case, possibly because the Cypriot and Russian authorities do not directly invoke stereotypes – as was 
the case in Konstantin Markin.  
 In Rantsev, exposing the operative gender stereotypes requires probing the artiste visa-regime. 
The rule that stipulates that the artiste visa is to be procured by the ‘artistic agents’ corresponds with 
the conduct by the Cypriot police in demanding that the owner of the cabaret collect Rantseva at the 
police station: both imply that the agents in this system are the (male) cabaret owners and not the 
women themselves – with the effect that women are made dependant on their exploiters.133 Women 
with an artiste visa are seen as the (sexual) property of their employers. One report on trafficking in 
Cyprus refers to the ‘patriarchal social attitudes according to which a man’s desire for sex is considered 
a primal need that needs to be satisfied, and it is a woman’s responsibility to provide this satisfaction.’134 
The behaviour of the Cypriot police (in not letting Rantseva leave by herself even though she had done 
nothing illegal) is also in accordance with what one researcher of Cypriot stereotypes writes:  ‘Russian 
and Rumanian women are seen as a source of disorder and danger’.135 In Cyprus, women are often 
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stereotyped as either mothers136 or sex symbols.137 These gender stereotypes exist at the highest level 
of Cypriot society and authority: the former Minister of Justice of Cyprus purportedly said in 2003 that 
‘[t]he dream of 45% of women is to become prostitutes.’138 Thus, quite apart from the considerable 
economic interest that Cyprus has in the sex industry, it becomes apparent why sex trafficking is not 
seen as a ‘real’ problem. This is deeply troubling, as the effects of these gender stereotypes are as 
damaging as they are wide-ranging.139 Oxana Rantseva did not survive her stay in Cyprus as an ‘artiste’. 
 
Which raises the question: what difference would adopting the anti-stereotyping approach make? If the 
Court manages to uncover the reasons that make women, more than men, vulnerable to sex trafficking, 
it can be more specific regarding the positive obligations that lay on the States to prevent trafficking, 
punish the perpetrators and protect the victims.140 In other words, these positive obligations can be 
more narrowly tailored to address the specific needs of the female victims. If the Court neglects the 
underlying gender stereotypes that affect the supply and demand side of sex trafficking, it is treating the 
symptoms but not the disease. 
  To conclude, Rantsev sheds light on a number of important issues with regards to the anti-
stereotyping approach. First, one might say that this case reminds us of the limits to this approach. 
Rantsev illustrates that gender stereotypes are pernicious not least because they blind us to human 
rights abuses, but at the same time the facts of the case demonstrate that gender stereotyping is not 
the supreme and only problem affecting women’s position in society. Economic exploitation, for 
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example, is closely linked to gender stereotypes but should not be conflated with the problem of 
stereotyping. Society has a powerful interest in exploiting women, as witnessed by the decade’s long 
resistance to the plans to change the Cypriot artiste regime. The anti-stereotyping approach is an 
attempt at transforming the status quo, but is no cure-all. It bears that repeating that we need a holistic 
approach to gender equality. Second, Rantsev makes clear that in cases which do not concern direct 
discrimination, gender stereotypes are often implicit. Gender stereotypes played a role in Rantsev not so 
much at the level of justifications but at the level of motives, and while justifications are explicit by 
definition, motives often remain hidden from view. Therefore, uncovering gender stereotypes requires 
an active stand by the Court. This is a lot to ask, especially considering the Court’s workload, but in cases 
such as this, where a large group of women is systematically exploited, the Court should do no less. 
 
C) The advantages of an anti-stereotyping approach in other gender cases 
 
Above I have described the application of an anti-stereotyping approach vis-à-vis two case studies. In 
what other types of gender cases could my anti-stereotyping approach provide purchase? Although I do 
not have the requisite space here for a detailed analysis of more case law, I wish to describe two types 
of cases that would benefit in particular from the approach suggested by this article. The first strand of 
cases involves women from sexual, cultural and religious minority backgrounds. In recent years, the 
Court has been called upon to judge on a wide array of issues that fall under the umbrella of gender and 
diversity:  whether a single lesbian mother should be allowed to adopt a child (E.B. v France),141 whether 
Muslim women should be able to wear a headscarf in state educational institutions if they so chose 
(Dahlab v Switzerland and Leyla Şahin v Turkey),142 and whether forced sterilization of Roma women 
constitutes discrimination (V.C. v Slovakia and I.G., M.K. and R.H. v Slovakia),143 are but a few examples. 
These are complex cases in which the judges of the Court face the challenge to move beyond their own 
prejudices about ‘the other’ as well as beyond the traditional principles of discrimination law. Many 
commentators are of the opinion that the Court has failed herein.144 If the Court were to view these 
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cases through an anti-stereotyping lens, what would surface during the first phase of the analysis – 
‘naming’ stereotypes – is the intersectionality of these discrimination cases: they all concern 
discrimination on the ground of gender in combination with some other identity trait (sexual 
orientation, religion or ethnicity). At issue in the examples that I just mentioned are what Cook and 
Cusack term ‘compounded stereotypes’, which means ‘gender stereotypes that interact with other 
stereotypes, which ascribe attributes, characteristics or roles to different subgroups of women.’145 Thus 
in E.B. the stereotype that lesbian women cannot be good mothers plays a role;146 in Dahlab and Leyla 
Şahin the stereotype that Muslim women who wear headscarves are victims of oppression;147 and in 
V.C. and I.G., M.K. and R.H. the stereotype that Roma women are not good mothers.148 Recognition of 
the harm that these compounded stereotypes cause, would lead to a different kind of judicial discourse 
that goes to the core of the problem of structural gender inequality. 
Another area of jurisprudence that could benefit from my anti-stereotyping approach is formed 
of cases that revolve around State regulations which are effectively stereotypes translated into law. 
Emblematic are the many cases wherein the Court is confronted with allegations of sex discrimination 
with respect to the distribution of social benefits. Apart from Konstantin Markin, examples from the 
Strasbourg Court’s docket include Petrovic v Austria,149 Wessels-Bergervoet v Netherlands,150 Willis v 
United Kingdom, 151 Stec v United Kingdom,152 Runkee and White v United Kingdom,153 and Andrle v 
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Czech Republic.154 In these cases the Court typically faces the dilemma of what kind of margin of 
appreciation it should afford to Contracting States: the subject matter (social benefits) warrants a wide 
margin, but distinctions on the ground of sex demand strict scrutiny and therefore a narrow margin. 
Application of the anti-stereotyping approach could bring recourse, as in one way or another all these 
cases turn on the woman-homemaker/man-breadwinner stereotype. Unfortunately, the Court has 
consistently failed to take such a perspective into account, resulting in an uneven application of the 
margin of appreciation; as well as an one-dimensional perspective of the problem (as the Court often 
only looks at the case from the perspective of the men/husbands, but fails to see the wider implications 
that these social benefits regulations have for women155); and, finally, a failure to address the urgency of 
underlying discriminatory patterns, as equality is solely viewed as sameness (formal equality).156 In the 
most recent of this string of cases, for example, the Court observed: ‘changes in the perceptions of the 
roles of the sexes are by their nature gradual . . . the State cannot be criticized . . .  for not having pushed 
for complete equalisation at a faster pace’.157 With this kind of reasoning, the Court legitimizes harmful 
gender stereotypes and shies away from fostering rapid transformation. I would be keen to see what 
dividend an anti-stereotyping approach brings to this area of the Court’s case law.  
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
The judicial approach to equality should be rethought if we want to tackle the structural causes of 
gender discrimination and oppression. This article has argued that stereotypes are at the heart of the 
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structural problem of gender inequality, and that the European Court of Human Rights should view 
equality as a process of transformation in order to address this structural problem. Accordingly, this 
article is a first effort at creating an anti-stereotyping approach. This analysis is an attempt at radicalism; 
radical in the sense that it seeks to address the roots of the problem of gender discrimination. 
 A likely objection will be that an anti-stereotyping approach is incompatible with the valid desire 
of the Court not to lose legitimacy by appearing ‘activistic’. The Court – so the argument runs – cannot 
afford to be too far ahead of its time. The Court’s political legitimacy depends upon the manner in which 
the Court copes with the specific circumstances in which it operates, especially with its supranational 
position.158 I acknowledge that, since stereotypes sometimes correspond to deeply held moral or 
religious beliefs – such as for example the stereotype that women should be mothers – an anti-
stereotyping approach can run afoul of Member States’ wishes in sensitive cases such as the ones that 
concern abortion or same-sex marriage. In those kinds of cases the Court, mindful of its supranational 
position, usually prefers to show constraint, rather than oblige Member States down a path they are not 
ready for.159 
 How, then, can the Court uphold an anti-stereotyping approach within a jurisdiction that is 
characterized by a diversity of legal systems and social traditions, without being seen as compromising 
its legitimacy? I want to suggest two answers to that question, which are related to each other. To start 
with, my anti-stereotyping approach can initially be seen as a procedural instrument. This does not 
entail letting go of the fundamental premise of this approach – namely that stereotypes are both cause 
and manifestation of the structural inequality that non-dominant groups suffer from, and that, 
therefore, States have an obligation to combat stereotypes. Rather, it means that my approach focuses 
primarily on the adjudicative process itself (the reasoning of the Court), and only secondarily on the 
outcome. At its most basic, my article is a plea that the Court should be continuously critical; the Court 
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should be interrogative of the underlying social patterns and beliefs that have spawned the cases lodged 
before it. This brings me to my second point. I argue that the Court should problematize the 
‘naturalness’ of stereotypes and I also argue for reason-forcing conversations: this means that the Court 
should require domestic authorities to justify their actions and regulations on some other grounds than 
easy but harmful stereotypes.160  The Court’s active participation in such reason-forcing conversations 
will surely add to its legitimacy rather than erode it, as by adopting this approach the Court fosters 
transparency and accountability.  
 In conclusion, perhaps the most challenging question of all: is this not expecting too much from 
law? Can we expect our judges to change the status quo? For sure, eradicating the roots of gender 
discrimination is a project that is larger than law. Adopting an anti-stereotyping approach will not work 
miracles, but it will bring the judges of the European Court of Human Rights to the core of the problem 
of persisting gender inequality and discrimination. Through dismantling gender stereotypes, the Court 
can promote new and more equal lifeworlds. 
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Abstract 
 
The concept of stereotype is novel in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. In contrast, 
anti-stereotyping has long been a central feature of both American and Canadian equal protection law. It 
is hard to develop a proper legal response to stereotyping, as not all stereotypes are bad and, moreover, 
laws are inevitably based on generalizations. At a minimum, courts should name stereotypes well and 
carefully examine their harm. This comparative analysis shows that, at its best, legal reasoning can 
expose and target the invidious cycle wherein stereotyping and discrimination perpetuate each other. 
This article first charts and critiques the emergent ECtHR case law on stereotypes. It then offers a 
fresh analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the U.S. and Canadian Supreme Courts’ treatment of 
stereotypes. It concludes by exploring what the ECtHR can borrow from American and Canadian equal 
protection analysis. 
                                                          
 PhD Candidate, Faculty of Law, Ghent University. I thank Eva Brems, Rebecca Cook, Simone Cusack, Rikki 
Holtmaat, Sophia Moreau, Saïla Ouald Chaib, Lourdes Peroni, Frederick Schauer, David Schneiderman, Stijn Smet 
and Tjarda van der Vijver for generous and thoughtful comments on this project. All errors are of course my own. 
The research for this paper was conducted within the framework of the ERC Starting Grant project ‘Strengthening 
the European Court of Human Rights: More Accountability Through Better Legal Reasoning’. Email: 
alexandra.timmer@ugent.be. 
108 
 
 
 
I. Introduction  
 
The concept of stereotyping is novel in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR” or 
“Strasbourg Court”). The Strasbourg Court has started to refer to stereotypes in several recent 
judgments concerning, notably, race and gender equality.1 In contrast, “stereotype” has long been part 
of the constitutional vocabulary in the U.S. and Canada. Anti-stereotyping is a central tenet of equal 
protection law in both these countries. Especially in the U.S. “the anti-stereotyping principle” has a 
distinguished pedigree, dating back to the early 1970s.2 It comes as no surprise then that the American 
and Canadian Supreme Courts have developed much richer legal reasoning about stereotypes than the 
ECtHR. That is why this article seeks insights from their reasoning for the Strasbourg Court.3  
Briefly put, stereotypes are beliefs about the characteristics of groups of people. They are, in 
other words, “attributions of specific characteristics to a group”.4 Misconceptions about stereotypes 
abound.5 Contrary to what is often assumed, stereotypes are neither necessarily statistically inaccurate 
generalizations6 (think of notions like “professional basketball players are tall”), nor are they necessarily 
negative (witness stereotypes such as “Italians are passionate”). Psychologists have done extensive 
research into the ways in which stereotypes shape judgment and behavior.7 Psychologists have also 
established that stereotypes fulfill several functions. On the one hand, as “cognitive schemas” these 
beliefs allow us to process information quickly.8 Also, stereotyping allows people to differentiate 
between in- and out-groups and thus to maintain a positive image of oneself and one’s in-group. To a 
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certain extent, therefore, stereotypes perform necessary functions in our lives, namely those of 
simplifier and of self-image booster.9 On the other hand, stereotypes also constrain. They put people in 
a box by providing a normative template of what is expected or accepted behavior. Thus, for instance, 
women are expected to be pretty and men are expected to be tough. In this way, stereotypes reinforce 
inequality by justifying existing hierarchies and perpetuating discrimination.10  
In legal scholarship, specifically feminist legal scholarship, the connection between the 
stereotype concept and equality is contested. There is no agreement to what extent a focus on 
stereotypes helps judges to conceptualize equality in a more meaningful manner. There are three 
positions on the topic. First, several commentators have maintained that an anti-stereotyping focus has 
only delivered formal equality to the American and Canadian courts, meaning equality as sameness.11 
Then there are other commentators, notably recently from the U.S., who have argued that the anti-
stereotyping principle is grounded in a substantive conception of equality that is not per se about 
sameness, but is rather aimed at rectifying the kind of subordination that arises from the enforcement 
of traditional roles.12 Lastly, there is a body of scholarship, mainly from human rights scholars, which 
connects a focus on stereotypes to a transformative conception of equality.13 Transformative equality 
jurisprudence contests and seeks to transform the root-causes of inequality and discrimination. These 
last commentators assert that stereotypes lie at the roots of social and cultural patterns that privilege 
some groups over others, and that equality entails transforming these deeply engrained patterns.   
This article takes the third approach. Through a comparative analysis, it seeks to uncover both 
the pitfalls and the potential of the stereotype concept to advance transformative equality. This article 
envisages a more pedagogical role for the Strasbourg Court in the field of non-discrimination than the 
Court has played so far. One of the central claims of this article is that the Strasbourg Court should name 
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TEMPORARY SPECIAL MEASURES: ACCELERATING DE FACTO EQUALITY OF WOMEN UNDER ARTICLE 4(1) UN CONVENTION ON THE 
ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN 111 (Ineke Boerefijn et al. eds., 2003); RIKKI HOLTMAAT & 
JONNEKE NABER, WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS AND CULTURE: FROM DEADLOCK TO DIALOGUE (2011); Alexandra Timmer, Toward 
an Anti-Stereotyping Approach for the European Court of Human Rights, 11 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 707 (2011). 
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and contest the forces that underlie structural inequality. These forces often consist of stereotypes. The 
ECtHR cannot eradicate harmful stereotypes from society all by itself, obviously.14 However, the Court is 
part of a larger conversation about equality and about the emancipation of oppressed groups. It matters 
how the Court’s discusses these issues. The Court’s legal reasoning, which is studied by lawmakers, 
judges and legal scholars around the world, should show what the problems are with stereotyping.  
With a few notable exceptions,15 not many commentators have taken a transnational or 
comparative legal perspective on stereotyping. The bulk of the literature focuses exclusively on the U.S. 
That is a pity. Seeing through the eyes of others is particularly valuable in this area of law, because, as 
former Canadian Justice L’Heureux-Dubé has pointed out, that can “provide a much-needed external 
perspective on the myths and stereotypes that may continue to permeate the values and laws of our 
own communities and cultures.”16 This article adds to the existing comparative literature by taking the 
case law of the ECtHR as its starting point and by making suggestions for judicial borrowing. The 
Strasbourg Court frequently seeks inspiration and guidance from other jurisdictions (both outside and 
within the Council of Europe).17 Hopefully the Court is also open to such borrowing when it comes to the 
concept of stereotype. 
This article starts by critically assessing the ways in which the ECtHR has reasoned when 
confronted by stereotypes (Part II). Next, it analyses the anti-stereotyping reasoning of the U.S. Supreme 
Court (Part III) and its Canadian counterpart (Part IV). Two deceptively simple questions will form the 
leitmotiv throughout the comparison: (i) how do these courts conceive of stereotypes; and (ii) given that 
stereotyping is not necessarily always negative or problematic, how do these courts determine whether 
the application of a stereotype is invidious? Parts III and IV conclude by critiquing respectively the 
American and Canadian jurisprudence, in the belief that the Strasbourg Court can also learn a great deal 
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 Changing stereotypes is a complicated and often long process. Psychologists do a lot of research on this topic. 
See, e.g., THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING AND DISCRIMINATION, supra note 4, at 491-595. 
15
 COOK & CUSACK, supra note 13; Mark S. Kende, Gender Stereotypes in South African and American Constitutional 
Law: The Advantages of a Pragmatic Approach to Equality and Transformation, 117 S. AFRICAN L. J. 745 (2000); Suk, 
supra note 11; Julie C. Suk, From Antidiscrimination to Equality: Stereotypes and the Life Cycle in the United States 
and Europe, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 75 (2012). 
16
 The Honourable Madame Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, Beyond the Myths: Equality, Impartiality, and Justice, 10 
JOURNAL OF SOCIAL DISTRESS AND THE HOMELESS 87, 101 (2001). 
17
 See, e.g., Council of Europe/ECtHR, Research Report: References to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 
the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights, available at: 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Research_report_inter_american_court_ENG.pdf. However, the Strasbourg 
Court’s use of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence has so far been “frugal”. See Antenor Hallo de Wolf & Donald H. 
Wallace, The Overseas Exchange of Human Rights Jurisprudence: The U.S. Supreme Court in the European Court of 
Human Rights, 19 INT’L CRIM. JUSTICE REV. 287, 303 (2009). See also Erik Voeten, Borrowing and Nonborrowing 
Among International Courts, 39 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 547 (2010). 
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from their less successful features. The last part reflects on what insights the ECtHR can borrow from the 
other side of the Atlantic (Part V). 
Before proceeding some preliminary remarks are in order. First, the premise of this article is that 
legal reasoning matters, not just the end verdict. Fine verdicts can be based on flawed reasoning. Such is 
the case with many of the ECtHR judgments that will be discussed in this article. Second, the focus of 
this article is on the stereotyping concept in equal protection law generally. Many of the examples, 
however, will come from gender equality cases, because this is the area where the concept has gained 
most traction through the years.18 
 
II.  Stereotyping in Strasbourg – Analyzing the Achievements, Identifying the Issues 
 
A) Introduction: Historical Development of the Stereotype Concept 
 
Several of the Strasbourg Court’s landmark discrimination cases concerned stereotyping. In Marckx v. 
Belgium (1979), for example, a case concerning the legal bond between a mother and her illegitimate 
child and the inheritance rights of that child, the Belgian authorities relied on the argument that 
unmarried mothers are often unwilling to take care of their offspring.19 Another example is Abdulaziz, 
Cabales and Balkandali v. the UK (1985), which concerned an immigration law that applied stricter rules 
to husbands who wanted to join their legally resident wives than to wives who wanted to join their 
husbands. The UK Government attempted to justify this rule by arguing that “men were more likely to 
seek work than women” and would therefore have a greater impact on the domestic labour market.20 
And in Karlheinz Schmidt v. Germany (1994), a case about fire brigade duty that was compulsory for men 
only, the German Government argued that “the legislature had taken account of the specific 
requirements of service in the fire brigade and the physical and mental characteristics of women. The 
sole aim which it had pursued in this respect was the protection of women.”21 
 Although the Court found a violation of the non-discrimination provision (Article 14 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights; “ECHR”22) in all three cases, it did not recognize stereotyping as 
                                                          
18
 That seems true for the legal literature and for the U.S. case law. The Canadian case law on stereotypes, 
however, is less gender-oriented. 
19
 Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 39 (1979). 
20
 Abdulaziz, Cabales, and Balkandali v. United Kingdom A 94 (1985); 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 471, ¶ 75. 
21
 Karlheinz Schmidt v. Germany, 291 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 27 (1994).  
22
 Article 14 ECHR provides that: 
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part of the dynamics that caused the discriminatory conduct. In Marckx the Court did reject the idea 
that unmarried women are less likely to want to take care of their child; it held that “such an attitude is 
not a general feature of the relationship between unmarried mothers and their children”.23 But that is it. 
Stereotyping was not often seen as a problem.24 In fact, individual judges sometimes made a point of 
agreeing with the stereotypes put forward by the Government.25 The stereotype concept certainly 
played no role in the Court’s discrimination analysis. This is slowly starting to change. The Strasbourg 
Court seems increasingly aware that stereotyping can affect human rights. Nevertheless, the Court still 
has a long way to go. The following three paragraphs will examine and critique the relevant ECtHR case 
law.  
 
B) How Does the Strasbourg Court Conceive of Stereotypes? 
 
The Strasbourg Court defines discrimination as a difference in treatment that has no “objective and 
reasonable justification.”26 When the Court uses anti-stereotyping reasoning in Article 14 analysis, it 
usually does so in its review of justifications. This choice makes sense if one takes a look at the Court’s 
archives, which includes many cases wherein Governments tried to justify discrimination on the basis of 
stereotypes.27 Examples include Ünal Tekeli v. Turkey (2004), a case in which an applicant complained 
that, as a married woman, she was not allowed to use her maiden name on official documents.28 The 
Turkish Government argued that women, who “are of a more delicate nature than men”, need to have 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without 
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other 
status. 
23
 Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 39 (1979). 
24
 A well-known exception is the dissent in Petrovic v. Austria (1998), a case about parental leave: the Austrian 
government made such leave only available to mothers. The dissenters held: “The discrimination against fathers 
perpetuates this traditional distribution of roles and can also have negative consequences for the mother . . . 
traditional practices and roles in family life alone do not justify a difference in treatment of men and women.” 
Petrovic v. Austria 1998-II; (2001) 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 14 (Bernhardt J. and Spielmann J., dissenting). 
25
 See, e.g., Karlheinz Schmidt v. Germany, 291 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994) (Morenilla J. concurring: “I think that the 
physical difference between the two sexes is a ‘weighty’ consideration justifying a difference of treatment by 
reason of the fact that certain tasks which require extreme physical efforts are ordinarily more easily accomplished 
by men than women, whilst the risk to health is greater for women.”).  
26
 See, e.g., Chassagnou and Others v. France [GC], App. Nos. 25088/94, 28331/95 and 28443/95, ECHR 1999-III, ¶ 
91. 
27
 See, e.g., Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)(1979); Abdulaziz, Cabales, and Balkandali v. United Kingdom 
A 94 (1985); 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 471; Inze v. Austria A 126 (1987); 10 Eur. H.R. Rep 394 (1988);  Karlheinz Schmidt v. 
Germany, 291 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)(1994); Kiyutin v. Russia, App. No. 2700/10, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 26 (2011). 
28
 Ünal Tekeli v. Turkey, App. No. No.29865/96, 16 November 2004, 42 Eur. H.R. Rep. 53 (2006). 
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their position in the family protected and that it is therefore necessary that they take on the surname of 
their husband.29 Another example is Alajos Kiss v. Hungary (2010), a case concerning the automatic 
disenfranchisement of people who have a guardian appointed to them.30 The Hungarian Government 
claimed that adults who have been placed under guardianship lack the capacity to exercise their right to 
vote, and that they should therefore be deprived of this right.31  
 Thus far, the judgment that boasts the richest anti-stereotyping reasoning is Konstantin Markin 
v. Russia (2012).32 The case concerned a military serviceman who complained that he was not able to 
take extended parental leave, while such leave is available to servicewomen. The Grand Chamber 
unequivocally announces that it will not accept stereotype-based justifications for discriminatory 
conduct. It holds that “gender stereotypes, such as the perception of women as primary child-carers and 
men as primary breadwinners, cannot, by themselves, be considered to amount to sufficient 
justification for a difference in treatment, any more than similar stereotypes based on race, origin, 
colour or sexual orientation.”33 From an anti-stereotyping perspective, it is a major victory that the 
Grand Chamber puts this so clearly.34 In this case, the Strasbourg Court names what is arguably the most 
prevalent gender-role stereotype, namely “the perception of women as primary child-carers and men as 
primary breadwinners”.35 The Court holds that States “may not impose traditional gender roles and 
gender stereotypes.”36 Konstantin Markin is a male applicant, but the Court emphasizes that gender-role 
stereotyping hurts both men and women, as these stereotypes are “disadvantageous both to women’s 
careers and to men’s family life.”37 Article 14 ECHR is an accessory right, meaning that it has no 
independent existence and is applicable only in relation to the rights set forth in the Convention. Thus, 
in Markin, the Grand Chamber found a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 ECHR (the 
right to respect for private and family life).38 
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 Id. at ¶ 16. See also ¶ 46. 
30
 Alajos Kiss v. Hungary, App. No. 38832/06, 20 May 2010. Alajos Kiss is technically not a discrimination case (the 
Court only found a violation of Article 3 Protocol 1), but it was reasoned as such. 
31
 Id. at ¶ 26.  
32
 Konstantin Markin v. Russia (GC), App. No. 30078/06, 56 Eur. H.R. Rep. 8 (2013). 
33
 Id. at ¶ 143.  
34
 Moreover, since the Court also mentions race, color, origin and sexual orientation, this holding will surely be 
invoked by applicants in a wide range of cases. 
35
 Konstantin Markin v. Russia (GC), App. No. 30078/06, 56 Eur. H.R. Rep. 8, ¶ 143 (2013). 
36
 Id. at ¶ 142; Ünal Tekeli v. Turkey, App. No. No.29865/96, 16 November 2004, 42 Eur. H.R. Rep. 53, ¶ 63 (2006); 
Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij v. Netherlands (Inadm.), App. No. 58369/10, 10 July 2012, ¶ 73. 
37
 Konstantin Markin v. Russia (GC), App. No. 30078/06, 56 Eur. H.R. Rep. 8, ¶ 141 (2013). 
38
 Article 8(1) states: “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence.” 
114 
 
However, much of the Court’s anti-stereotyping reasoning appears in Article 8 analysis (Article 8 
alone, not in conjunction with Article 14). In Aksu v. Turkey (2012) the Grand Chamber says explicitly 
that stereotyping can infringe on the right to private life:  
 
[A]ny negative stereotyping of a group, when it reaches a certain level, is capable of impacting 
on the group’s sense of identity and the feelings of self-worth and self-confidence of members 
of the group. It is in this sense that it can be seen as affecting the private life of members of 
the group.
39
 
 
Aksu concerns two State-sponsored publications: a dictionary and a book entitled “The Gypsies of 
Turkey”, written by an associate professor. Both of these publications contained derogatory stereotypes 
of Roma. The dictionary contained entries such as “Gypsiness - (metaphorically) being miserly or 
greedy”40 and more of the same. The other book contained passages that suggested that Roma make 
their living by stealing.41 Mr. Aksu, a Roma, complained that such remarks and expressions debased the 
Roma community. The Court recognizes that what is at stake here is “negative stereotyping” (see the 
quote above), but it makes no effort to unpack what these stereotypes are exactly and why they should 
be considered injurious.  
The same picture emerges in other cases: when the Court names stereotypes, it often does so in 
the context of Article 8, but only very cursorily. In V.C. v. Slovakia, for example,42 a case about the 
involuntary sterilization of a Roma woman, the Court notes the Council of Europe Commissioner for 
Human Rights’ view that Roma women are particularly at risk of suffering involuntary sterilization “due, 
inter alia, to the widespread negative attitudes towards the relatively high birth rate among the Roma 
compared to other parts of the population, often expressed as worries of an increased proportion of the 
population living on social benefits.”43 The Court mentions the Commissioner’s view, but does not 
further discuss these “negative attitudes”. Underlying such attitudes is a widely held stereotype that 
Roma are parasitic and that they therefore want to live on social benefits.44 In the examination of the 
merits there is no discussion of the historical roots of these attitudes, nor is there a discussion of the 
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 Aksu v. Turkey (GC), App. Nos. 4149/04; 41029/04, 15 March 2012, ¶ 58. 
40
 Id. at ¶ 28. 
41
 Id. at ¶ 12. 
42
 Another example where this occurred to some extent is Yordanova v. Bulgaria, App. No. 25446/06, 24 April 
2012, ¶ 142 (a case about the forced eviction of a Roma settlement).  
43
 V.C. v. Slovakia, App. No. 18968/07, 8 November 2011, ¶ 146. 
44
 Dimitrina Petrova, The Roma: Between a Myth and the Future, 70 SOCIAL RESEARCH 111, 130 (2003). 
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ways in which the Government has in the past actively promoted such negative stereotypes about 
Roma. It falls to the only dissenting Judge, namely Judge Mijović, to point out that “there was a general 
State policy of sterilisation of Roma women under the communist regime (governed by the 1972 
Sterilisation Regulation), the effects of which continued to be felt up to the time of the facts giving rise 
to the present case.”45 
 
C) When Does the ECtHR Consider Stereotypes Invidious? 
 
A close reading of the ECtHR’s scant reasoning on stereotypes reveals that the Court considers 
stereotypes invidious when they are either untrue or based on prejudice (or a combination of both). In 
order to make that assessment, the Court regularly relies on a broader European consensus or on 
international human rights law materials.46 For example, in the case about a Roma woman who was 
forcibly sterilized, V.C. v. Slovakia, the Court refers to a report by the Council of Europe Commissioner 
for Human Rights,47 to establish that the negative attitudes concerning high birth rates among the Roma 
are worrisome.48  
The Court has several times been confronted with untrue stereotypes. When this happened, the 
Court usually said so (without necessarily using the word “stereotype”). Examples include the above-
mentioned Marckx case, wherein the Court pointed out that unmarried mothers are not less likely to 
care for their child than married mothers.49 Another example is Kiyutin v. Russia (2011), the case of a 
man who was refused a Russian residence permit solely because he was HIV-positive.50 The Court names 
the stereotype that HIV-positive people will engage in unsafe sex and denounces it as false: 
 
Excluding HIV-positive non-nationals from entry and/or residence in order to prevent HIV 
transmission is based on the assumption that they will engage in specific unsafe behaviour and 
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 V.C. v. Slovakia, App. No. 18968/07, 8 November 2011 (Mijović, J., dissenting). 
46
 See, e.g., id at. ¶ 64-65; Ünal Tekeli v. Turkey, App. No. No.29865/96, 16 November 2004, 42 Eur. H.R. Rep. 53, ¶ 
59-61 (2006); Konstantin Markin v. Russia (GC) , App. No. 30078/06, 56 Eur. H.R. Rep. 8, ¶ 140 (2013); Vejdeland 
and Others v. Sweden, App. No. 1813/07, 9 February 2012 (Spielmann J. and Nussberger J. concurring, ¶ 6). 
47
 CommDH(2003)12, ¶ 37. 
48
 V.C. v. Slovakia, App. No. 18968/07, 8 November 2011, ¶ 146. 
49
 Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 39 (1979). See supra text accompanying note 23. 
50
 Kiyutin v. Russia, App. No. 2700/10, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 26 ¶ 63 (2011).  
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that the national will also fail to protect himself or herself. This assumption amounts to a 
generalisation which is not founded in fact.
51
 
 
Similarly, in Konstantin Markin the Court does not accept the stereotype that women ought to be 
caregivers and the inference that is drawn from this stereotype, namely that the caring role of fathers is 
less important than that of mothers in the period of a child’s life in which parents are eligible for 
parental leave.52 The Court implies that this stereotype is untrue.53 
 When the Court is confronted with stereotypes that are based on prejudice, it has used the term 
“negative attitudes”. For example, negative attitudes in the form of “a predisposed bias on the part of a 
heterosexual majority against a homosexual minority” cannot justify restricting the rights of gay 
people.54 The Court has used this reasoning with great effect in cases about the participation of 
homosexuals in the military55 and in cases about the criminalization of sexual conduct between men.56 In 
Kiyutin, the Court explores how stereotypes can arise from a mixture of ignorance and prejudice – 
resulting in beliefs that are harmful both because they are untrue and because they create stigma and 
discrimination: 
 
HIV infection has been traced back to behaviours – such as same-sex intercourse, drug injection, 
prostitution or promiscuity – that were already stigmatised in many societies, creating a false 
nexus between the infection and personal irresponsibility and reinforcing other forms of stigma 
and discrimination, such as racism, homophobia or misogyny.
57
 
 
Importantly, however, the Court always performs a proportionality analysis – whether the Court 
addresses stereotypes under Article 8 or under Article 14 (in conjunction with another provision from 
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 Id. at ¶ 68. 
52
 Konstantin Markin v. Russia (GC), App. No. 30078/06, 56 Eur. H.R. Rep. 8, ¶ 132 (2013). 
53
 Id. 
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 Lustig-Prean and Becket v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 1417/96 and 32377/96, 27 September 1999, 29 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 548, ¶ 90 (2000); Smith and Grady v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96, 27 September 
1999, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 493, ¶ 97 (2000). 
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 Id. For an insightful discussion of these cases see Michael Kavey, The Public Faces of Privacy: Rewriting Lustig-
Prean and Beckett v. United Kingdom, in DIVERSITY AND EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS: REWRITING JUDGMENTS OF THE ECHR 293 
(Eva Brems ed., 2012). 
56
 L. and V. v. Austria, App. Nos. 39392/98 and 39829/98, 9 January 2003, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 55, ¶ 52 (2003). 
57
 Kiyutin v. Russia, App. No. 2700/10, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 26 ¶ 64 (2011). See also about HIV-based prejudice I.B. v. 
Greece, App. No. 552/10, 3 October 2013, ¶ 81. 
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the Convention).58 This means that even (prima facie) invidious stereotyping can be justified in the eyes 
of the Court; provided it is proportional to the legitimate aim sought to be realized. The proportionality 
analysis is where the Court deploys its margin of appreciation doctrine.59 Put briefly, the margin of 
appreciation is a “doctrine of judicial deference”;60 the width of the margin of appreciation determines 
how strictly the Court will scrutinize a Government’s conduct. 
 The Strasbourg Court has accepted two types of justifications for stereotypes. Firstly, 
stereotyping can be justified by an important countervailing public interest. In Aksu, the Grand Chamber 
countenanced the State’s lack of interference in the publication of a book and a dictionary that 
contained derogatory stereotypes of Roma because it held that the rights and interests of others (in 
being provided with information and in academic freedom of expression) weighed more heavily.61 
Secondly, stereotyping can be justified when it serves to correct factual inequalities. For example, in 
several cases concerning the provision of social benefits the Court has in essence held that gender role 
stereotyping can be allowed if it serves to correct a factual inequality between men and women.62 Take 
Runkee and White v. UK, a case that was brought by applicants who complained that, as men, they were 
not eligible for “widow’s benefits” upon the deaths of their wives.63 The Strasbourg Court notes in this 
judgment that the British widow’s pension “was first introduced in 1925, in recognition of the fact that 
older widows, as a group, faced financial hardship and inequality because of the married woman's 
traditional role of caring for husband and family in the home rather than earning money in the 
workplace.”64 The Court therefore considers that this pension “was intended to correct ‘factual 
inequalities’ between older widows, as a group, and the rest of the population”; as such, “this difference 
in treatment was reasonably and objectively justified.”65 Social benefits cases such as these illustrate 
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 For a more general analysis of the Court’s analysis of justifications under Article 14 ECHR, see, e.g., Aaron Baker, 
Proportional, Not Strict, Scrutiny: Against a U.S. “Suspect Classifications” Model Under Article 14 ECHR in the UK, 56 
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 Aksu v. Turkey (GC), App. Nos. 4149/04; 41029/04, 15 March 2012, ¶ 69-71 and 82-84. 
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 Id. at ¶ 37. 
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that the ECtHR is quite tolerant of paternalistic stereotypes – much more so than the U.S. Supreme 
Court, as the next part will discuss.66  
 
D) Critique of the ECtHR’s Treatment of Stereotypes 
 
The Court’s treatment of stereotypes includes two serious flaws. The first and most basic problem is that 
the Court often neglects to name stereotypes. This is a problem because the Court’s ability to address 
invidious stereotyping depends on its willingness to identify stereotypes.67 You cannot change a reality 
without naming it.68 Both in cases wherein stereotyping implicitly played a part,69 and in cases where the 
Government explicitly referred to stereotypes,70 the Court has generally kept quiet. True, in several 
Article 14 cases the Court has withheld its consent to differences in treatment based on invidious 
stereotypes. But it has usually done so without naming the stereotypes in question. In Salgueiro da Silva 
Mouta v. Portugal (1999), for example, the Lisbon Court of Appeal withheld child custody from a father 
who was living together with another man, because he “had definitively left the marital home to go and 
live with a boyfriend, a decision which is not normal according to common criteria”; and the child should 
live in “a traditional Portuguese family, which is certainly not the set-up her father has decided to enter 
into”.71 The Court of Appeal thus imprinted the false stereotype that homosexuals cannot be good 
fathers and simultaneously the prescriptive stereotype that proper fathers should not live with their 
male partners. The Strasbourg Court subsequently found a violation of Article 8 in conjunction with 
Article 14, but it did not explain what was wrong with the reasoning of the Lisbon Court. Similarly, in 
other stereotyping cases the sum of the ECtHR’s reasoning consisted in the remark that the 
Governments in question did not bring forward valid reasons.72 The result of such sparse reasoning is 
that Council of Europe Member States learn nothing about the harm that stereotyping does. The Court 
eschews its pedagogical role.  
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 See infra Part III.D. 
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 COOK & CUSACK, supra note  13, at 39-70; Timmer, supra note 13, at 720-722. 
68
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 See, e.g., Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, App. No. 25965/04, 7 January 2010, 51 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (2010) (a sex 
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Cyprus are the (sexual) property of their employers). For discussion see Timmer, supra note 13, at 730-734. 
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 This leads to the second problem with the Court’s treatment of stereotypes, namely that the 
Court but seldom analyzes stereotyping as a discrimination issue. Essentially, the harm of stereotyping is 
that it justifies and reinforces discrimination: stereotypes anchor structural inequality. The Court’s legal 
reasoning should capture this. In order to release the potential of the stereotype concept, the Court will 
have to start recognizing that stereotyping can be a form of wrongful unequal treatment.73 It is only by 
framing invidious stereotyping as a discrimination issue, that the Court can transcend the level of the 
individual claimant and address the wider harmful implications of such stereotyping.74 To be sure, the 
Grand Chamber justly holds in Aksu that negative stereotyping can impact on an individual’s private 
life.75 But only by analyzing such stereotyping from an anti-discrimination perspective can the Court 
address the wider impact it has on groups (such as Roma, people with a mental disability, or women). 
Stereotyping is not just a private experience; it is chiefly a social experience.76 It is that social 
experience/problem that the Court can address and contest with an Article 14 analysis.  
Specifically worrisome is that anti-stereotyping reasoning has no place (yet) in the Court’s 
review of whether an impugned measure falls under the scope of Article 14. While it is a positive 
development that the Court has now recognized that gender stereotypes cannot justify differential 
treatment,77 a focus on stereotypes should not remain confined to the second stage of the Court’s 
Article 14 analysis. Otherwise many stereotyping cases will not be able to pass the gates of Article 14. 
The most salient example of a case that clearly concerns invidious stereotyping, but which the Court 
refused to examine under Article 14, is Aksu v. Turkey (the judgment about derogatory stereotypes of 
Roma in a Government-sponsored book and dictionary).78 The Grand Chamber’s reasoning is as follows: 
“the Court observes that the case does not concern a difference in treatment, and in particular ethnic 
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discrimination, as the applicant has not succeeded in producing prima facie evidence that the impugned 
publications had a discriminatory intent or effect.”79 
This interpretation of discrimination is too narrow.80 By equating discrimination with differential 
treatment, the Court misses the point here. The wrongs of stereotyping are not comparative in nature: 
they do not derive from a comparison with another group which has been treated better.81 The wrong in 
Aksu is not that the Roma have been treated differently than other groups, but that the remarks in these 
books are stigmatizing and demeaning in and of themselves. Especially the contested dictionary is a 
striking (and literal!) example of Catherine MacKinnon’s insight that “subordination is ‘doing somebody 
else’s language.’”82 It is highly problematic that the Court is unable to “see” this as an instance of 
discrimination. That is not to say that the Convention was violated in the Aksu case: the State’s interest 
in protecting freedom of expression provides a strong justification for its conduct. But the discussion 
about justifications properly belongs to the second stage of the analysis: the complaint of Mr Aksu 
should first be recognized under the scope of Article 14. 
In contrast with the case law of the ECtHR, the next parts will show that the American and 
Canadian Supreme Courts do analyze stereotypes under their respective constitutional equal treatment 
provisions. Across the Atlantic, stereotyping is definitely – arguably even paradigmatically – considered a 
discrimination issue. 
 
 
III.  Stereotype as a Concept in American Equal Protection Law  
 
A) Introduction: Historical Development of the Stereotype Concept 
 
The anti-stereotyping principle has a long history in U.S. Constitutional equal protection law. During the 
civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s, lawyers advocating for racial equality drew on the 
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concept of stereotyping to show what was wrong with segregation.83 By the end of the 1960s, people in 
the women’s rights movement applied the concept in the domain of gender equality.84 Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, then professor and head of the Women’s Rights Project at the American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU), convinced the Supreme Court to include the anti-stereotyping principle in its sex-based 
equal protection law in the 1970s.85 The way Ginsburg formulated it, the anti-stereotyping principle 
combats gender roles: she argued that the law had no business in enforcing the traditional separate 
spheres ideology, where men are expected to be breadwinners and women to be caregivers.86 This 
theme strikes a deep chord in American legal consciousness because of the widely known and (by now) 
infamous separate opinion of Justice Bradley in Bradwell v. Illinois (1873).87 Lawyer Mira Bradwell was 
refused a license to practice law because she was a woman. In a passage that most U.S.-trained lawyers 
will be familiar with, Justice Bradley justified this restriction because: 
 
The civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in the 
respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man is, or should be, woman's 
protector and defender. . . . The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the 
noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.
88
 
 
In the past few decades, the Supreme Court has regularly cited this opinion to illustrate what modern 
Constitutional equal protection law is all about: providing protection against measures based on this 
kind of ideology.89 It has been argued that “[s]tereotyping is the central evil that the Court's equal 
protection doctrine seeks to prevent.”90   
The anti-stereotyping principle is, however, by no means limited to U.S. Constitutional law. 
Jurisprudence about specific anti-discrimination legislation – notably Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (‘Title 
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VII’),91 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (‘ADEA’)92 and Americans with Disabilities Act (‘ADA’)93 
– also regularly includes anti-stereotyping reasoning.94 Nowadays, the front line of the anti-stereotyping 
principle seems to lie in the domain of sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination.95 All 
combined, the U.S. case law on stereotyping is vast. This article will therefore restrict its focus to the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of Constitutional equal protection law. It does not aim to give a 
comprehensive overview of the case law. Instead, the following paragraphs offer a conceptual analysis 
of the Supreme Court’s anti-stereotyping reasoning. 
 
B) How Does the U.S. Supreme Court Conceive of Stereotypes? 
 
Building on the work of other commentators, notably K. Anthony Appiah, it is submitted that there are 
four types of stereotype in U.S. anti-discrimination law.96 First, there are role-typing stereotypes:97 these 
are assumptions about the proper roles or behavior of people who belong to a certain group (e.g., 
women are homemakers).98 Second are false stereotypes: they include stereotypes that are based on 
prejudice, whether consciously or unconsciously held (e.g., African-Americans lack intelligence), as well 
as stereotypes that are less clearly negative but are empirically/statistically unsound (e.g., women will 
regret having an abortion). Third are statistical stereotypes: this is the kind of stereotype that reflects a 
statistical truth about the group as a whole, but which does not accurately reflect the situation of the 
individual. They are thus largely accurate but overbroad assumptions (e.g., men have more physical 
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strength than women). And finally the case law includes prescriptive stereotypes: these require a certain 
form of behavior or standard of appearance from certain groups of people (e.g., women should dress 
femininely). This section will discuss these forms of stereotype one by one, with the emphatic caveat 
that many stereotypes will fall under multiple headings at the same time.  
Role-typing stereotypes are the most prevalent form of stereotype in the U.S. case law.99 In fact, 
anti-role-typing reasoning is foundational for the whole anti-stereotyping jurisprudence. This article has 
elected to label role-typing as one of the four forms of stereotype, but concerns over role-typing actually 
seem to animate the whole jurisprudence. Especially gender-role stereotyping has often been 
condemned by the Court, following Justice Ginsburg’s campaign in the 1970s. Gender-based 
classifications are not allowed when they are based upon “assumptions about the proper roles of men 
and women.”100 For example, the Court has identified as stereotypical the ideas that wives are 
dependent on the income of their husbands;101 that nursing is a female job;102 and that caring for family 
members is women’s work.103 “No longer”, the Court has held, “is the female destined solely for the 
home and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas.”104 
Sex roles have the effect of putting men and women in separate spheres and keeping them there: when 
they are instantiated into law, the Court recognizes, stereotypes become a “self-fulfilling prophecy”105 or 
a “self-fulfilling cycle of discrimination.”106  
But not only role-typing on the ground of gender is forbidden: a similar distrust of role-typing 
informs the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on age discrimination and disability discrimination. One 
example is the well-known disability case of Olmstead v. Zimring, which concerned the question 
whether the ADA requires placing mentally disabled people, whenever this is possible, in community-
based programs rather than in institutions. Here, Justice Ginsburg wrote for the majority: “institutional 
placement of persons who can handle and benefit from community settings perpetuates unwarranted 
assumptions that persons so isolated are incapable or unworthy of participating in community life.”107 
The stereotype that Justice Ginsburg refers to is simultaneously false and a role-type. 
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Next are false stereotypes. Firstly, stereotypes can be false because they lack empirical support. 
Take Gonzales v. Carhart (2007); the case that upheld the ban on late-term abortions known as “partial 
birth abortion”.108 Without actually using the term “stereotype”, Justice Ginsburg said there is no 
“reliable evidence” for the idea that “[w]omen who have abortions come to regret their choices, and 
consequently suffer from ‘[s]evere depression and loss of esteem.’”109 This idea was part of the 
majority’s justification for upholding the statute, which restricted access to abortion.110 Justice Ginsburg 
includes a long list of references to psychological and medical literature that contests the idea that 
“having an abortion is any more dangerous to a woman's long-term mental health than delivering and 
parenting a child that she did not intend to have.”111 Another example is found in Hazen Paper v. 
Biggens, a case about age discrimination, where the Supreme Court held: “It is the very essence of age 
discrimination for an older employee to be fired because the employer believes that productivity and 
competence decline with old age.”112 Age discrimination, it continued, is “based in large part on 
stereotypes unsupported by objective fact.”113 Secondly, stereotypes can also be false in the sense that 
they are grounded in prejudice. The paradigmatic example in the U.S. is race-based stereotypes.114 
Stereotypes that are overtly based on prejudice are nowadays by and large excised from the law, but 
they have occasionally surfaced in recent decades, for example in cases about jury selection.115  
Third are statistical stereotypes. These are the kinds of stereotype that are statistically true for 
the group as a whole, but not for a specific individual. The Supreme Court has long recognized that 
beliefs about groups of people can be stereotypes even if there is statistical truth to them.116 The Court 
often invalidates statistical stereotypes when they are simultaneously a form of role-typing. Take, for 
example, the case of Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld (1975), a case that concerned a man who had earned 
significantly less than his wife. When his wife died Wiesenfeld tried to claim survivor’s benefits, which 
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were denied him because he was a man (and therefore supposed to be the breadwinner). The Court 
held that:  
 
Obviously, the notion that men are more likely than women to be the primary supporters of their 
spouses and children is not entirely without empirical support. . . . But such a gender-based 
generalization cannot suffice to justify the denigration of the efforts of women who do work and 
whose earnings contribute significantly to their families' support.
117
 
 
Moreover, the case of U.S. v. Virginia Military Institute (1996) (“VMI”) shows that the Court is 
capable of seeing and dismantling statistical stereotypes even when they are based on 
“inherent”/physical differences.118 VMI concerned the exclusion of women from a State-run military 
college. The State justified this by claiming that women were by their nature unsuited to the 
“adversative model” reigning at the institute.119 The majority of the Court, in an opinion authored by 
Justice Ginsburg, agreed that it might be true that – because of natural differences – most women are 
unsuited to VMI’s method of education. But this is not true of all women. Therefore, the Court held:  
 
‘Inherent differences’ between men and women, we have come to appreciate, remain cause for 
celebration, but not for denigration of the members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an 
individual's opportunity. . . [Sex] classifications may not be used, as they once were . . . to create 
or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.
120
  
 
VMI was consequently ordered to admit women. Part III.C will discuss when the Court considers 
statistical stereotypes invidious: clearly, not all statistical stereotypes are impermissible. 
Fourth, and last, are the prescriptive stereotypes. These are stereotypes that stipulate a certain 
form of behavior or standard of appearance from individuals in order to conform to the norms 
associated with their group,121 or to conform to the norms of the dominant group (assimilation).122 This 
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is a topic that has been extensively analyzed.123 There are many examples in U.S. case law of such 
stereotypes, though mainly in the lower courts.124 Most of these cases concern workplace discrimination 
and are litigated under Title VII. The major Supreme Court case on prescriptive gender stereotyping is 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.125 Despite her impressive work record, Hopkins was denied partnership in 
the accounting firm Price Waterhouse. Hopkins was thought to be too aggressive and not enough 
charming. The Court held that gender played a motivating part in Price Waterhouse’s decision not to 
promote her. Several partners at the firm counseled Hopkins to "walk more femininely, talk more 
femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry"126 and take “a course in charm 
school”.127 The Court held that “stereotypical notions about women’s proper deportment” influenced 
the employment decision.128 “As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping”, the Court said, “we are 
beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they 
matched the stereotype associated with their group.”129 
 
C) When Does the U.S. Supreme Court Consider Stereotypes Invidious? 
 
The U.S. anti-stereotyping principle has been called an “empty” heuristic.130 Meredith Render claims 
that: “the term ‘stereotype’ only parrots back the justice principle we impose upon it. Our concept of 
‘stereotype’ is simply too thin to do more.”131 This article takes a different view. In American equal 
protection law, stereotyping is a broad and versatile concept. There is no one-size-fits-all answer to the 
question when stereotyping is invidious. What the case law shows is that it depends on the kind of 
stereotype (role-typing, false, prescriptive, or statistical), the ground of the stereotype (gender, race, 
disability, age etc) and the context in which it is deployed (e.g., employment). But that does not make 
the anti-stereotyping principle an empty vessel: the Supreme Court has developed several guidelines 
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that predict the permissibility of a stereotype. To be clear: this article does not seek to develop a 
normative theory about the question when stereotyping ought to be considered invidious.132 Rather, it 
descriptively explores what makes stereotypes invidious according to the Supreme Court.   
Key to the Supreme Court’s approach to stereotypes is its concern with role-typing. As the last 
section noted, this concern seems to animate all parts of the anti-stereotyping jurisprudence. What is so 
harmful about role-typing? Throughout recent decades, the Supreme Court has provided several angles 
on the wrongs of role-typing. One of these angles is autonomy: role-typing infringes on the freedom of 
every individual to carve their own path in life and, in doing so, prove their mettle.133 This is why women 
should be allowed access to Virginia’s Military Institute134 and why men should be allowed access to a 
State-run School of Nursing.135 The Court recognizes that role-types exercise control over people.136 In 
Frontiero, the Court puts this powerfully: traditionally, the Court held, different roles for men and 
women were “rationalized by an attitude of "romantic paternalism" which, in practical effect, put 
women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage.”137 Another important angle on the wrongs of role-typing is 
subordination: by assigning different roles to men and women, women end up in an inferior “legal, 
social, and economic” position.138 The Court has repeated again and again that women may not be 
denied rights or opportunities because they are assumed to fulfill a different role in life than men.139  
Ultimately, the Court recognizes that role-typing creates discrimination in subtle and self-
sustaining ways. Take this powerful passage from Hibbs (2003), a case about a male employee who 
sought leave from work under the Family and Medical Leave Act:140 
 
Stereotypes about women's domestic roles are reinforced by parallel stereotypes presuming a lack 
of domestic responsibilities for men. Because employers continued to regard the family as the 
woman's domain, they often denied men similar accommodations or discouraged them from 
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taking leave. These mutually reinforcing stereotypes created a self-fulfilling cycle of discrimination 
that forced women to continue to assume the role of primary family caregiver, and fostered 
employers' stereotypical views about women's commitment to work and their value as 
employees. Those perceptions, in turn, Congress reasoned, lead to subtle discrimination that may 
be difficult to detect on a case-by-case basis.
141
  
 
In Glenn Loury’s words, by acting on their stereotypes, observers (in this case employers) “set in motion 
a sequence of events that has the effect of reinforcing their initial judgment.”142 The Hibbs quote shows 
that the Supreme Court understands this problematic circularity of stereotypes perfectly.  
The Court refers to these wrongs of role-typing in cases that concern the other three sorts of 
stereotype: false, statistical and prescriptive. To start with false stereotypes: it is not surprising that, 
once it started on the anti-stereotyping path, the Supreme Court has had least difficulty determining 
that these are invidious. False stereotypes are always invidious because, in Appiah’s words, “they 
burden people for no good reason.”143 What is distinctive about false stereotyping is that it often affixes 
a stigma.144 The Court has on several occasions named this connection between false stereotypes and 
stigmatization. For example, in a case about jury selection, J.E.B. v. Alabama (1994), the Court held: 
“Striking individual jurors on the assumption that they hold particular views simply because of their 
gender is ‘practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority.’ . . . It 
denigrates the dignity of the excluded juror”.145 The Court reasons that acting on an erroneous 
stereotype leads to the stigmatization of certain jurors, and that this in turn is an offense to their 
dignity. 
 As regards statistical stereotypes, the question when they are invidious is exceedingly tricky. The 
U.S. Supreme Court has often seemed to suggest that the State cannot rely on such a stereotype vis-à-
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vis an individual who does not have the characteristic that is associated with her group.146 It is tempting 
to assume that the Court’s objection to statistical stereotypes lies in their “overbreadth”, or, in other 
words, their lack of accuracy.147 Indeed, the Court uses the term “overbroad” a lot when it refers to 
stereotypes.148 But on further reflection, the sole fact of overbreadth does not do much analytical 
work.149 Frederick Schauer has pointed out that rules, which are based on overbroad generalizations 
about classes of people, are made all the time  without being struck down by anti-discrimination law.150 
In fact, as John Hart Ely noted, stereotypes “are the inevitable stuff of legislation.”151 Take, for example, 
the rule that in order to get a driver’s license one must be at least 16 years old (18 in much of Europe). 
This rule is based on the assumption that children who are younger than that will not be safe drivers. 
This assumption is, in turn, based on the stereotype that children are likely to be reckless. This is an 
example of a statistically sound stereotype that will without any difficulty pass the test of equal 
protection law.  
Subsequently, only certain sorts of statistical stereotypes will be considered problematic. This is 
much more a matter of content than of accuracy.152 The invidiousness of statistical stereotypes largely 
depends on their grounds, such as disability, gender or race. U.S. equal protection law does not offer a 
comprehensive or unified theory in this respect: statistical gender stereotypes are not necessarily 
invidious for the same reason that statistical disability stereotypes may be. Again the gender equality 
case law provides the clearest guidance on why the Supreme Court considers some statistical 
stereotypes wrong: it is because today’s statistical reality is often the product of past disadvantage. In 
other words, many statistically sound stereotypes are actually the result of cultural contingency; their 
soundness is a product of past discrimination and that is why the Court is suspicious of them.153 This is 
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where the Court’s concern with role-typing often comes in again. It is statistically correct, for example, 
to say that women are more likely than men to be homemakers. But this is because women have 
historically been expected to fulfill this role and because they have been excluded from roles in the 
public sphere.154 This is also why the Court speaks of “a self-fulfilling cycle of discrimination” in the Hibbs 
case.155  
 What makes prescriptive stereotypes invidious is again a complex issue. Obviously, like statistical 
stereotypes, not all stereotypes that envisage a certain form of behavior by certain groups of people are 
wrong.156 Take, for example, family law provisions that require parents to take care of their children and 
ensure that their basic necessities are met. These legal provisions are not a form of discrimination, even 
though they are based on a prescriptive stereotype, namely that parents should assume responsibility 
for their children. The case law is clear that prescriptive stereotypes that dictate a role division between 
men and women are unacceptable. However, especially in the employment context, it is unclear 
precisely when prescriptive role-typing is problematic.157 Thus, lower courts have frequently failed to 
apply the Supreme Court’s broad holding in Hopkins, that “we are beyond the day when an employer 
could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with 
their group”,158 to complaints of sexual orientation or gender identity discrimination (as these are not 
explicitly covered by Title VII).159  
 
D) Critiques of the American Anti-Stereotyping Doctrine 
 
Domestic scholars have extensively criticized the Supreme Court’s usage of the anti-stereotyping 
principle. This article will not be able to do justice to all these critiques. Some of the most pressing issues 
require mention, however, in order to caution the ECtHR against the pitfalls of the stereotype concept.  
First of all, some judges160 and many scholars161 have complained about the opacity of the 
concept. Much of the confusion stems from the fact that the Supreme Court often conflates the 
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meaning of the term stereotype with the harms associated with the concept. Thus, the Supreme Court 
regularly uses the term “stereotype” pejoratively, namely as meaning an unfair generalization.162 The 
next part will show that the Canadian Supreme Court creates a similar confusion. 163 The ECtHR ought to 
avoid such misunderstandings and stay closer to a neutral definition: as beliefs about groups of people, 
stereotypes are not necessarily unfair or negative. Stereotypes first need to be named and then their 
harms need to be assessed in context.164  
Another important critique is that the Supreme Court has been unreceptive to the ways in which 
stereotyping might be justified when it is done to ameliorate the position of a disadvantaged group. In 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, the well-known case concerning affirmative action in 
higher education, Justice Powell (writing for the majority) observed that “preferential programs may 
only reinforce common stereotypes holding that certain groups are unable to achieve success without 
special protection based on a factor having no relationship to individual worth.”165 This is turning the 
argument around: on this account, affirmative action can hardly be justified, because it would create 
further stereotypes. The suspicious attitude of the Supreme Court towards ameliorative measures is 
possibly partly due to a deep-seated cultural emphasis on liberty. But it also has specific jurisprudential 
roots in the 1970s, when, in (in)famous cases such as Geduldig v. Aiello (1974) and General Electric 
Company v. Gilbert (1975),166 the Supreme Court “declined to apply the anti-stereotyping principle in 
domains where it had identified “real” differences between the sexes”, such as pregnancy and 
abortion.167 When a distinction was made on the grounds of “real”, physical, difference, the Court did 
not see the generalization at issue as a stereotype. To be sure, since then, in cases like VMI the Supreme 
Court has recognized that “[i]n limited circumstances, a gender-based classification favoring one sex can 
be justified if it intentionally and directly assists members of the sex that is disproportionately 
burdened.”168 Still, however, the Court does not see room for the compensatory use of stereotypes 
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when they concern physical differences. Mandatory retirement for employees who have reached a 
certain age, for example, is not an option,169 and neither is mandatory maternity leave.170 The Supreme 
Court continues to look askance at protective measures. Julie Suk has argued that this has significantly 
inhibited the Court’s ability to achieve substantive equality. She writes: “The American antistereotyping 
approach attempts to give women the same chance as men to prove their mettle, but fails miserably by 
ignoring the gendered barriers to their ability to do so.”171 Part V.A will continue the issue of protective 
stereotyping, as this is a topic on which the American, Canadian and Strasbourg jurisprudence widely 
diverge. 
 
 
IV. Stereotype as a Concept in Canadian Charter Equal Protection Law  
 
A) Introduction: Historical Development of the Stereotype Concept 
 
The concept of stereotyping has gained great prominence in Canadian equality jurisprudence, but it is 
difficult to retrace its precise origins. Very likely, the concept is partly a doctrinal transplant or a 
“migrant idea” from the U.S., 172 where, as was just discussed, the concept has a long pedigree.173 The 
first time the Supreme Court of Canada referred to stereotyping as a problem of discrimination was in 
the case of C.N.R. v. Canada (Human Rights Commission) (1987).174 This case, concerning the 
disadvantaged position of women in the hiring policies of the Canadian National Railway Co., was 
litigated under the Canadian Human Rights Act.175 Next, the concept was present in the very first 
Supreme Court case litigated under s.15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (“the 
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Charter”),176 namely Andrews v. Law Society (1989).177 Andrews raised the question whether the rule 
that Canadian citizenship was required for admittance to the bar of British Columbia violated s.15. The 
majority of the Supreme Court ruled that it did. Though the Court used the term stereotype only 
fleetingly in Andrews, the essence of the idea was there.178 Later came Law v. Canada (1999), a case 
that concerned the question whether in granting survivor’s benefits the Canadian Pension Plan could 
set a threshold age of 35, or whether this constituted age discrimination.179 The judgment in this case 
defined the frame in which the Supreme Court would interpret s.15 during the next decade. The Court 
held: “The purpose of s. 15(1) is to prevent the violation of essential human dignity and freedom 
through the imposition of disadvantage, stereotyping, or political or social prejudice.”180 
In R. v. Kapp (2008), the Court built on Law and formulated “a two-part test for showing 
discrimination under s. 15(1)”, namely “1) Does the law create a distinction based on an enumerated 
or analogous ground?; 2) Does the distinction create a disadvantage by perpetuating prejudice or 
stereotyping?”181 The applicants in Kapp, who were commercial fishers, complained that an exclusive 
24-hour fishing license that was given to three aboriginal bands constituted race discrimination. The 
Supreme Court disagreed and concluded that the measure, which was aimed at ameliorating the 
position of the aboriginal bands, did not breach s.15.  
The Kapp test is the current test under s.15.182 It shows that the concept of stereotyping is 
crucial to the Supreme Court’s understanding of discrimination, as stereotyping is one of just two 
ways (the other being the perpetuation of prejudice) in which a distinction can be held discriminatory 
under the Canadian Charter.183 Indeed, several authors have held the view that stereotyping is too 
dominant as a concept in s.15 jurisprudence, in the sense that the emphasis on stereotyping has 
impeded the Court from recognizing forms of discrimination that cannot be captured by this 
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heuristic.184 The critics make a valid point: many s.15 claims have stranded because the claimant could 
not prove that a rule was based on a stereotype.185 The Supreme Court acknowledged this critique in 
Quebec (Attorney General) v. A. (2013), which concerns the question whether it is valid to exclude de 
facto spouses from the patrimonial and support rights granted to married and civil union spouses.186 
This judgment reveals that while the concept of stereotyping is undoubtedly crucial in s.15 
jurisprudence, it is also still being further developed.  
The next sections will analyze how the Supreme Court of Canada conceptualizes stereotyping 
and its wrongs. The focus is on the Court’s interpretation of the Charter, which is part of the Canadian 
Constitution. In Canada, each province also has separate anti-discrimination legislation (such as, for 
example, the Ontario Human Rights Code), but as space is limited this article will not discuss the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of that type of legislation. These provincial laws concern 
discrimination in horizontal relations and that makes them less directly relevant for a comparison with 
the case law of the ECtHR.187 Neither will this article discuss criminal law jurisprudence, where the 
issue of stereotyping also has come up occasionally.188 The exceptional criminal law case that will be 
discussed, R. v. Ewanchuk, is a case that also raised an s.15 claim.189  
 
B) How Does the Canadian Supreme Court Conceive of Stereotypes? 
 
Given the centrality of the concept of stereotyping, especially since R. v. Kapp, the Canadian Supreme 
Court has made surprisingly little effort to explicate its understanding of stereotypes.190 Nor has it made 
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any real effort to explain how it understands the difference between prejudice and stereotypes, while a 
distinction between these two concepts is clearly made in the second part of the Kapp-test.191  
Similar to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Canadian Supreme Court blends its definition of 
stereotyping with the question when stereotyping is invidious. The Court namely reasons that the 
requirement of substantive equality is violated when stereotyping occurs.192 The Court reflexively talks 
about stereotyping and discrimination together. Oversimplified, the Court seems to say: stereotyping = 
invidious = discrimination.  
Trying to disentangle that reasoning, one finds the clearest definition of stereotypes in the Law 
case. In Law the Court observes: “A stereotype may be described as a misconception whereby a person 
or, more often, a group is unfairly portrayed as possessing undesirable traits, or traits which the group, 
or at least some of its members, do not possess.”193 This definition actually holds three forms of 
stereotype: 
1) Negative stereotypes (a belief that a group possesses “undesirable traits”); 
2) Statistically unsound stereotypes (a belief that a group possesses traits which, in fact, it does 
not possess); and 
3) Statistically sound stereotypes that are incorrect for the individual applicant (a statistically 
sound but overbroad belief about the traits of certain groups).194  
These three kinds of stereotype are indeed found throughout the s.15 case law. The Court does not 
often uncover explicitly negative stereotypes, but there are some examples. In Vriend v. Alberta, for 
instance, a case that concerned a man whose employment was terminated on the basis of his 
homosexuality, the Court condemned “the stereotype that homosexuals are less deserving of protection 
and therefore less worthy of value as human beings.”195 The majority of stereotypes in the jurisprudence 
concern the second and third varieties, however. Most of the time, though, the Court does not 
determine whether a stereotype is actually statistically sound or not, but just confines itself to saying 
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that the belief in question “does not correspond to the actual circumstances and characteristics of the 
claimant or claimant group.”196 Thus, the Court commonly talks of stereotypes as “attributed rather than 
actual characteristics.”197  
 The Court’s understanding of stereotypes as inaccurate characterizations runs up against the 
fact that laws are inevitably based on generalizations.198 In practice, therefore, the Court has tolerated 
many inaccurate/overbroad stereotypes. The prime examples are the Court’s numerous judgments that 
concern age-based restrictions in benefit schemes.199 Take, for instance, Gosselin v. Quebec, a case 
concerning a Quebec social assistance scheme that set the rate for adults under 30 at one-third the rate 
for those over 30.200 McLachlin C.J., writing for the majority, held: “The legislator is entitled to proceed 
on informed general assumptions without running afoul of s. 15, . . . provided these assumptions are not 
based on arbitrary and demeaning stereotypes.”201 Turning to the facts of the case at hand, however, 
and to the argument that the selection of the age of 30 as a cut-off point failed to correspond to the 
actual situation of young adults requiring social assistance, she held: “[A]ll age-based legislative 
distinctions have an element of this literal kind of ‘arbitrariness’. That does not invalidate them.”202 In 
one breath, the Chief Justice says that rules may not be based on arbitrary stereotypes, yet that some 
measure of arbitrariness is inevitable in age-based restrictions. Denise Réaume points out that: “[t]he 
degree of inaccuracy, it seems, must pass some unspoken threshold before it counts as a stereotype.”203  
 What lacks in the Canadian jurisprudence are role-typing stereotypes and prescriptive 
stereotypes. Compared to the U.S., the Canadian Supreme Court does not have a strong judicial 
discourse about role-typing and prescriptive stereotyping. One notable exception is Justice L’Heureux-
Dubé’s separate opinion in the case of R. v. Ewanchuck (1999).204 Ewanchuck was not litigated under 
s.15, but as a criminal law case. The complainant was sexually assaulted as a 17-year-old girl by the 
much older Ewanchuck in his van. At issue was whether the trial judge had erred in thinking that the 
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defense of “implied consent” existed in Canadian law. Justice L’Heureux-Dubé chose to recast the 
essence of the case as follows: “This case is not about consent, since none was given. It is about myths 
and stereotypes.”205 According to her, both the trial judge and the Court of Appeal judge relied on 
“mythical assumptions that when a woman says ‘no’ she is really saying ‘yes’, ‘try again’, or ‘persuade 
me.’”206 Furthermore, in response to the Court of Appeal judge’s suggestion that the applicant could 
have dealt better with the assault by using “a well-chosen expletive, a slap in the face or, if necessary, a 
well-directed knee”, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé also condemned the prescriptive stereotype that “women 
should use physical force, not resort to courts to ‘deal with’ sexual assaults.”207 Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s 
opinion skillfully uncovers simultaneously the essence of this particular case and its wider implications 
for women’s equality.  
 
C) When Does the Canadian Supreme Court Consider Stereotypes Invidious? 
 
The Canadian s.15 jurisprudence is much richer on the topic of how discriminatory distinctions can be 
distinguished from non-discriminatory ones than it is on the topic of how to conceptualize stereotypes. 
Ever since Andrews, the Canadian Supreme Court has expressed its commitment to substantive or 
“true” equality (as opposed to formal equality).208 The Court couples substantive equality to a contextual 
approach: whether discrimination exists depends on context.209 According to the Court, “the main 
consideration must be the impact of the law on the individual or the group concerned.”210 Thus “the 
analysis involves looking at the circumstances of members of the group and the negative impact of the 
law on them. The analysis is contextual, not formalistic, grounded in the actual situation of the group 
and the potential of the impugned law to worsen their situation.”211 
However, the Court’s thinking has evolved noticeably over the years on the question of how 
impact is to be assessed. In Law v. Canada, the Court famously “turned towards dignity” to distinguish 
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permissible from impermissible distinctions:212 differential treatment is discriminatory, the Court held, 
when it demeans a person’s dignity. In order to assess whether a person’s dignity is demeaned, the 
Court proposed four contextual factors in Law: 
 
1) pre-existing disadvantage, vulnerability, stereotyping, or prejudice experienced by the 
individual or claimant group; 
2) degree of correspondence between the “ground on which the claim is based and the actual 
need, capacity or circumstances of the applicant”;213 
3) whether the law or program has an ameliorative purpose or effect; and  
4) the nature of the interest affected.214 
 
Although the dignity test received a lot of criticism from academic circles – which the Court explicitly 
acknowledged in R. v. Kapp215 – the four Law factors have been used ever since.  
In Kapp, the Court proposed to interpret these four contextual factors as going to the question 
of whether the claimant suffered disadvantage or stereotyping, “rather than to the Law question of 
whether the claimant's dignity has been demeaned.”216 This is what the Court says: 
 
The four factors cited in Law are based on and relate to the identification in Andrews of 
perpetuation of disadvantage and stereotyping as the primary indicators of discrimination. 
Pre-existing disadvantage and the nature of the interest affected (factors one and four in 
Law) go to perpetuation of disadvantage and prejudice, while the second factor deals with 
stereotyping. The ameliorative purpose or effect of a law or program (the third factor in 
Law) goes to whether the purpose is remedial within the meaning of s. 15(2).
217
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So, according to the Supreme Court, the correspondence factor218 (factor number two) deals with 
stereotyping.219 The Court confirmed this in Withler (2011), a case concerning widows whose federal 
supplementary death benefits were reduced because of the age of their husbands at the time of death: 
“Where the claim is that a law is based on stereotyped views of the claimant group, the issue will be 
whether there is correspondence with the claimants' actual characteristics or circumstances.”220 If there 
is no such correspondence, the Court considers the stereotype invidious. 
 The third factor – whether the law or program has an ameliorative purpose or effect – is also 
interesting in the context of the topic of this article. A significant part of the Supreme Court’s s.15 
equality jurisprudence concerns ameliorative measures. The Canadian Charter explicitly allows for 
affirmative action, in s.15(2).221 The relationship between s.15(1) and s.15(2) is intensively debated both 
by the Court itself222 and by academic commentators.223 In R. v. Kapp, the Court held that s.15(1) is 
aimed at preventing discrimination and that s.15(2) is aimed at enabling governments to proactively 
combat discrimination.224 If the Government can demonstrate that a measure meets the criteria of 
s.15(2) then this measure is insulated from challenges under s.15(1).225  
Remarkably, the Court’s approach to stereotypes under s.15(2) is very different from its 
approach under s.15(1): when a stereotype is deployed for a “good” purpose, the requirement of “fit” 
(which is of such paramount importance under s.15(1)) is interpreted leniently.226 This can be deduced 
from several of the Court’s remarks in the Kapp case, notably that “[n]ot all members of the group need 
to be disadvantaged, as long as the group as a whole has experienced discrimination”227 and “[t]he fact 
that some individual members of the bands may not experience personal disadvantage does not negate 
the group disadvantage suffered by band members.”228 Ameliorative measures can suffer from both 
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over- and under-inclusiveness,229 but this does not seem to be of much concern to the Court. If the 
authorities employ a statistical stereotype for benign purposes, the Court will be extremely lenient. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, this confirms that the Canadian Supreme Court’s approach to benign/good 
stereotyping is the opposite of the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach. It is, in fact, much more in line with 
the ECtHR’s views on stereotypes that serve a benevolent purpose.230 
 
D) Critiques of the Canadian Anti-Stereotyping Doctrine 
 
There are several issues regarding the Canadian jurisprudence that are particularly relevant in the ECtHR 
context. To start there are three problems with the Canadian legal reasoning that the ECtHR should take 
care not to replicate. In the first place, the definition of stereotypes from the Law judgment is 
misconceived.231 In Law the Supreme Court refers to stereotypes as “misconceptions”, but stereotypes 
are not necessarily misconceptions. Stereotypes can be statistically accurate or prescriptive (as the U.S. 
case law acknowledges) and, moreover, to a certain extent stereotypes can fulfill useful functions in 
human interaction (as psychologists have established).232 In other words, the Supreme Court unduly 
narrows the concept. 
The second problem is that by associating stereotyping exclusively with the second of the four 
Law-factors, namely the correspondence factor, the Supreme Court in effect reduces the inquiry into 
stereotypes into a question of accuracy or fit. This does not work well because it takes more to 
determine whether a stereotype is invidious, as the work of John Hart Ely, Frederick Schauer, and others 
– as well as the U.S. experience with statistical stereotypes – has shown.233 The Strasbourg Court can, 
however, rather easily avoid this mistake by using all four Law-factors to determine whether the 
application of a stereotype is harmful in a given situation, not just the second factor of fit. Part V will 
elaborate on this suggestion. 
The third concern is related to this. The issue is that, since Law, the Supreme Court’s equality 
analysis has become very formal and abstracted from the individual claimant. This is because the 
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correspondence factor has become the dominant one in the Court’s reasoning,234 at the expense of the 
other contextual factors such as pre-existing disadvantage.235 The emphasis on the second Law-factor, 
so the argument runs, directs the Supreme Court’s s.15 analysis to the “reasonableness of government 
policy choices” instead of to the effects of the impugned action on disadvantaged groups.236 In other 
words, the claimants disappear from the picture and in their place the Court puts policy analysis.237 
Thus, in Gosselin the majority but slightly remarks on the extreme stress and hardship that Louise 
Gosselin had to endure because she did not qualify for social assistance and was destitute. The majority 
does not mention the fact that she tried to commit suicide or that she had been forced to exchange sex 
for food and shelter, in order to survive.238 Rather, the majority elaborates on the Government’s 
purpose in enacting the benefits scheme that restricted assistance to adults over 30 and remarks that 
the legislator is entitled to enact laws on the basis of “everyday experience and common sense”.239 
Largely ignoring the perspective of the claimant, the Court takes the perspective of the legislator and 
assesses whether that is reasonable.240 The ECtHR can avoid this problem by carrying out a careful 
proportionality analysis that takes both the applicant’s and the state’s perspective into account.  
Finally, it appears that the Canadian Supreme Court has difficulty recognizing stereotypes, 
especially when they are “imposed for the claimant’s ‘own good.’”241 Margot Young has suggested that 
the judiciary cannot be trusted to smoke out stereotypes. Where “systemic discrimination is the norm”, 
she writes, “it is hard to pick out stereotyping as false.”242 The Supreme Court may especially have a 
hard time recognizing harmful stereotypes when these relate to situations that are far removed from 
the privileged world of the judges themselves.243 Young’s point is well taken.244 Especially when 
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stereotypes are so deeply entrenched that they seem like “common sense”, they are difficult to detect 
by judges. This is a challenge that, inevitably, the ECtHR faces as well. The Canadian experience should 
put the ECtHR on its guard against too easily accepting stereotypes that accord with the judges’ own 
preconceptions and views of the world. 
 
 
V. What Strasbourg Can Borrow From the Other Side of the Atlantic 
 
This part will highlight the positive lessons from both the American and Canadian jurisprudence and on 
this basis make recommendations for the ECtHR. 
 
A) Preliminary Note on How the Tensions between U.S. and Canadian Equal 
Protection Doctrine Impact the Strasbourg Borrowing  
 
There are deep tensions between American and Canadian equal protection law.245 Indeed, in the 
Canadian legal imagination U.S. equal protection law has repeatedly figured as an “anti-model”.246 The 
Canadian concept of equality is often held to be “substantive”, whereas American equality is regularly 
characterized as “formal.”247 In this article one element of difference between these two equal 
protection doctrines has surfaced in particular, namely that the Supreme Court of Canada is much more 
tolerant of protective measures and positive discrimination than the U.S. Supreme Court. Which raises 
the question how that affects the suggested borrowing: can the Strasbourg Court productively borrow 
from two such widely different equal protection doctrines? 
On a methodological level it bears emphasizing that it is not the purpose of this article to reconcile 
these tensions. Rather, the aim is to select the features of both the American and the Canadian 
approaches to stereotyping that are most likely to benefit the equality analysis of the Strasbourg 
Court.248 As was explained in the Introduction, this article takes the position that the Strasbourg Court 
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should develop a more transformative equality analysis, meaning that it should name, contest and seek 
to transform the root-causes of inequality and discrimination. It is submitted that the Strasbourg Court 
can borrow from both Supreme Courts without conceptual inconsistency if it takes care to appropriate 
only those elements of their legal reasoning that have transformative potential. What follows from the 
analyses of Parts III and IV is that – despite their weaknesses – both the American and Canadian case law 
contain seeds of a transformative approach to stereotypes. The U.S. Supreme Court is especially strong 
in naming the different forms of stereotyping (with a special emphasis on role-types), and in uncovering 
the invidious circular connection between discrimination and stereotypes. The Canadian Supreme Court, 
on the other hand, has richly elaborated on the elements of a contextual analysis. The next sections will 
discuss how the Strasbourg Court can benefit from these insights.249  
Returning to the question how the differences between U.S. and Canadian equal protection doctrine 
impact the borrowing, it should be noted that as a result of these differences the Canadian Supreme 
Court is more likely than its American counterpart to approve of stereotyping that forms the basis for 
ameliorative measures. This means that where the two Supreme Courts diverge, is in their assessment 
of the invidiousness of stereotypes. The American Supreme Court is inclined to consider protective 
stereotyping invidious, whereas in the Canadian jurisprudence it depends on the impact of such 
stereotyping. The question in Canada then becomes whether the impugned stereotyping actually 
disadvantages a vulnerable or protected group. 
The difficulty lies in the fact that when stereotyping occurs to improve the position of a 
disadvantaged group, the invidiousness of such stereotyping is usually ambiguous. Andrle v. Czech 
Republic (2011) forms a good illustration of this ambiguity.250 This case concerned the Czech pension 
scheme, which assigns different pensionable ages for men and women. In the Czech Republic, women 
with children are entitled to an earlier retirement than men, depending on the number of children they 
have raised. The scheme leaves no room for individual assessments: even when, in a concrete case, it 
was the father who took care of the family he will not be entitled to an earlier pension. The Czech 
Government argued that this rule was created under the former Communist regime, when women were 
expected to work full-time and to be responsible for the household, thus carrying a heavy burden.251 The 
Government claimed that: “the differentiated pensionable age for women depending on the number of 
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children raised would continue to be justified until social conditions changed enough for women to 
cease to be disadvantaged as a consequence of the existing family model.”252 The ECtHR agreed with the 
Government and did not invalidate the pension rule under the prohibition of discrimination, because: 
 
“changes in perceptions of the roles of the sexes are by their nature gradual . . . the State cannot be 
criticised for progressively modifying its pension system to reflect these gradual changes . . . and for 
not having pushed for complete equalisation at a faster pace . . . the Court finds that the original aim 
of the differentiated pensionable ages based on the number of children women raised was to 
compensate for the factual inequality between men and women . . . this approach continues to be 
reasonably and objectively justified on this ground until social and economic changes remove the 
need for special treatment for women.”
253
 
 
Obviously, the stereotype at issue in Andrle is that women are responsible for child-care. In this instance 
the application of this stereotype is ambiguous because the pension scheme comparatively benefited 
women – the disadvantaged group. In that sense the effect of this instance of stereotyping can be said 
to be positive. On the other hand, the gender-role at issue is precisely what has cabined women so long 
in a disadvantaged position. The Czech Government – and in extension the Strasbourg Court – reinforce 
the gender role-type by leaving the pension scheme as it is.  
The problem with Andrle (and many cases like it254), is the Strasbourg Court’s legal reasoning. 
Precisely because the stereotyping is ambiguous, the verdict – no discrimination – is not per se 
problematic. But the Court did not properly explain what was at stake in this case: it did not name the 
stereotype and its harm. It did not explain that the damage of the Czech pension scheme is that it 
perpetuates stereotypes that have historically ensured women’s subordinated position. Nor did it 
explain that these kinds of benefits schemes encourage fathers and mothers to assume traditional roles 
when it comes to the work-family balance. Moreover, the Czech Government had argued in Andrle that 
“changes in the organisation of family life were evolving only very slowly in the Czech Republic”.255 The 
Government suggests that it plays no role in either changing or reinforcing gender role-types, and that 
its laws are only a reaction to social circumstances, instead of a shaping force in society. The 
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Government basically denies that it can have a catalytic role in changing traditional stereotypes. The 
Strasbourg Court erred in going along with this argument. 
What follows from the ambiguousness of this kind of well-meant stereotyping, is that the Strasbourg 
Court cannot productively look to the U.S. or Canadian Supreme Courts to see what way it should decide 
in cases that concern protective or ameliorative measures. The Strasbourg Court will have to decide on 
the invidiousness of stereotypes on a case by case basis. The point is, however, that the ECtHR can and 
should gain insights from across the Atlantic on how better to address stereotyping in its legal 
reasoning.   
 
B) Stereotypes Take Different Shapes; Statistical and Prescriptive Stereotypes Can 
Also Be Invidious 
 
The first transatlantic message for the ECtHR is that stereotypes come in several forms. This article has 
shown that the American jurisprudence contains a fuller account of these forms than the Canadian 
jurisprudence. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized role-typing, false, statistical, and prescriptive 
stereotypes.256 So far, the ECtHR has only acknowledged the first two of these four, the most prominent 
example of a role-typing case being Konstantin Markin v. Russia, and a good example of a false 
stereotyping case being Aksu v. Turkey.257 This means that the ECtHR still lacks a strong record on the 
wrongs of statistical and prescriptive stereotypes – despite the fact that both these types have surfaced 
repeatedly in the Strasbourg case law. Examples of statistical stereotypes can be found in British cases 
that concern the unavailability of widow’s benefits for widowers: the widow’s benefits scheme is based 
on the (statistically correct) assumption that older widows face particular financial hardship.258 This is a 
statistical stereotype that is a result of a role-type, namely the male breadwinner model.259 Prescriptive 
stereotypes, on the other hand, have surfaced for example in cases concerning abortion. The 
prescriptive stereotype “a (prospective) mother should sacrifice herself for her child” is at the core of 
several Polish abortion cases, such as P. and S. v. Poland (2012), in which the applicant – a fourteen-
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year-old girl who was pregnant as a result of rape – was told by several health care professionals that 
she should carry the pregnancy to term even though she did not want to.260 
It is not necessary that the Strasbourg Court explicates, every time it is confronted with a 
stereotype, exactly what form the stereotype takes. What the Court should name is the content of a 
stereotype, not so much its form. In order to be able to do that, however, the Court should be aware 
that stereotypes come in different guises and that all forms of stereotype – including statistical and 
prescriptive ones – can be harmful.  
 
C) To Distinguish Whether a Stereotype is Invidious Requires a Contextual Analysis 
 
What the ECtHR should take on board from the Canadian jurisprudence is the emphasis on contextual 
analysis. The Canadian approach to stereotyping is unduly formalistic because the Supreme Court 
associates the stereotype concept too strongly with the question of fit.261 But in the wider Canadian 
equal protection doctrine there are certainly elements that can give the stereotype concept a more 
transformative direction. Especially the four contextual factors of the Law case – pre-existing 
disadvantage, fit/correspondence, ameliorative purpose, and the nature of the interest – are useful to 
distinguish acceptable from invidious stereotyping. All four, not just the correspondence factor, can help 
to determine whether or not the impact of a stereotype on an applicant is such that the Strasbourg 
Court should be suspicious of the stereotype. The words “impact on an applicant” are highlighted to 
emphasize what is important: the ECtHR should not, like the Canadian Supreme Court is prone to do, 
dilute the stereotyping enquiry into one-sided policy analysis.262  
It is especially crucial to involve the first factor, pre-existing disadvantage, in the analysis.263 If a 
stereotype concerns a group that has historically suffered from disadvantage, there is a strong likelihood 
that the stereotype in question is invidious. This emphasis on pre-existing disadvantage should not be 
difficult for the ECtHR to adopt in stereotyping cases, as it accords well with the existing Strasbourg case 
law on “vulnerable groups.”264 In judgments concerning people living with HIV and people with a mental 
disability, for example, the Court has announced that it will carefully scrutinize restrictions on 
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fundamental rights that are applied to groups which have “suffered considerable discrimination in the 
past.”265 “The reason for this approach”, says the Court, “is that such groups were historically subject to 
prejudice with lasting consequences, resulting in their social exclusion. Such prejudice may entail 
legislative stereotyping which prohibits the individualised evaluation of their capacities and need”.266  
In light of all the criticism of the Law judgment and the Canadian Supreme Court’s use of the 
four factors in its subsequent case law, this article does not intend to reify these factors. It is merely 
suggested that they can provide useful guidance for the ECtHR’s inquiry into stereotypes: which factors 
will be helpful will depend on the facts of the case.267 In relatively easy cases all contextual factors will 
point the same way. For example, in Alajos Kiss v. Hungary, the ECtHR case about the automatic 
disenfranchisement of people under guardianship, all factors would point towards the application of the 
stereotype that people who have been appointed a guardian are incapable of voting as having a harmful 
effect on the people affected.268 The people affected are mostly mentally disabled adults, who have 
historically suffered many disadvantages (factor one); the fit between the blanket disenfranchisement 
and the actual capacities of people under guardianship is very tenuous (factor two); the rule serves no 
ameliorative purpose (factor three); and the interest affected is the applicant’s ability to vote, which is a 
fundamental right that ensures full membership of society (factor four).  
In the harder cases, however, notably those concerning ameliorative programs, the four 
contextual factors will not all point in the same direction. As was noted above, whether a stereotype is 
harmful is then ambiguous.269 Examples include the ECtHR’s social benefits cases that concern 
differential treatment on the ground of sex, such as Andrle v. Czech Republic270 and Runkee and White v. 
UK, where the Governments could argue that their scheme was devised so as to benefit women (the 
third contextual factor).271 In these harder cases the ECtHR will have to balance the several contextual 
factors. In this respect, the ECtHR can draw on the case law of the Canadian Supreme Court, which has 
                                                          
265
 Alajos Kiss v. Hungary, App. No. 38832/06, 20 May 2010 ¶ 42; Kiyutin v. Russia, App. No. 2700/10, 53 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 26 ¶ 63 (2011). 
266
 Id. 
267
 The Canadian Supreme Court itself also emphasizes that which factors need to be canvassed depends on the 
nature of the case and that flexibility is important in this respect. See Withler v. Canada, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 396, ¶ 66 
(Can.). 
268
 Alajos Kiss v. Hungary, App. No. 38832/06, 20 May 2010. 
269
 See supra Part V.A. 
270
 Andrle v. Czech Republic, App. No. 6268/08, 17 February 2011. See supra Part V.A.  
271
 Runkee and White, App. Nos. 42949/98 and 53134/99, 10 May 2007. See supra text accompanying notes 63-65. 
For more discussion of these social benefits cases, see Timmer, supra note 13, at 735-736. 
148 
 
decided that when a stereotype is deployed for a “good” purpose, the requirement of “fit” (the second 
contextual factor) can be interpreted more leniently. 
 
D) Stereotyping is Connected to Discrimination in a Self-Reinforcing Circle 
 
This article has claimed that it is problematic that the ECtHR often fails to see stereotyping as a 
discrimination issue.272 However, the precise connections and distinctions between stereotyping and 
discrimination are notoriously difficult to fathom. Indeed, social psychologists have analyzed these 
connections extensively.273 Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court has managed to create a rich account 
of the connections between stereotyping and discrimination, which the ECtHR would do well to take 
notice of. 
 The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that stereotyping and discrimination are connected in a 
self-reinforcing invidious cycle. In essence, that Court describes this circle in three steps: stereotypes can 
form a manifestation of discrimination, as well as a rationalization and a cause of discrimination. The 
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Hibbs (quoted in Part III.C) exposes this cycle brilliantly.274 First, 
stereotypes are manifested as discrimination: in the Hibbs case the Court notes that there are 
differential leave-taking policies for male workers and female workers (employers often “discouraged 
[men] from taking leave”).275 This situation of discrimination is rationalized, or justified, by the idea that 
“women are mothers first, and workers second”, and that the family is “the woman's domain.”276 These 
stereotypes, in turn, create further discrimination by “forc[ing] women to continue to assume the role of 
primary family caregiver, and foster[ing] employers' stereotypical views about women's commitment to 
work and their value as employees.”277 On a case-by-case basis this cycle may be difficult to detect, the 
Supreme Court notes.278 But, through its reasoning in cases like Hibbs, the Supreme Court succeeds in 
showing the structural nature of inequality – the Court unveils the patterns of discrimination that result 
from invidious stereotyping. 
 So far, the ECtHR has only recognized one part of the circle: that stereotypes can be wrongfully 
used by the State as a rationalization (or in other words: a justification) of discrimination. Konstantin 
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Markin v. Russia is, as discussed, the clearest instance where the ECtHR makes this point.279 The 
Strasbourg Court does not yet seem to acknowledge the other connections between stereotyping and 
discrimination, namely that stereotyping can also be a manifestation as well as a cause of (further) 
discrimination. Thus, in the Markin case, the self-sustaining cycle goes as follows. The two major 
stereotypes on which the Russian Constitutional Court relied in Markin are that women do not play an 
important role in the military and that women have a special social role associated with motherhood.280 
To begin, the stereotype that women do not play major roles in the military is statistically correct: 
women only constitute approximately 10% in the Russian military and are extremely underrepresented 
in its leadership positions.281 In the eyes of the Government, this fact then justifies giving parental leave 
to servicewomen but not servicemen (as giving it too servicemen would have too much of impact on the 
operational effectiveness of the military). This rule then forces servicewomen to assume care for their 
children and forces servicemen to continue working; which then has the effect of reinforcing the initial 
gender stereotypes.  
The idea that stereotyping causes discrimination is especially important. As a human rights 
court, the ECtHR should not only treat the symptoms but also attack the disease. The Court should seek 
to weed out the roots of discrimination. 
 
E) Two Ways of Using Article 14 ECHR and Integrating the Margin of Appreciation 
 
Because of this invidious cycle the Strasbourg Court should consistently frame stereotyping as an Article 
14 issue. This entails that the Court recognize that stereotyping falls within the scope of Article 14.282 
Subsequently, the Court will be faced with two questions: at which point in its analysis should the Court 
assess the invidiousness of stereotypes; and how does the margin of appreciation fit into the analysis? 
These questions are interrelated.  
There are two alternative routes that the Strasbourg Court could take in order to integrate an 
anti-stereotyping approach into its legal analysis. The first option is that the ECtHR assesses the 
invidiousness of stereotypes under the scope of Article 14 (in conjunction with Article 8 or another 
Convention provision). As this article argued, the ECtHR could make this assessment on the basis of the 
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four contextual factors from the Canadian Law case.283 Up to this point, this is the Canadian route. In the 
event that the ECtHR determines that a stereotype is invidious, it should then narrow the margin of 
appreciation in its analysis of justifications. This is where this route diverges from the Canadian model: 
the Canadian Supreme Court rarely proceeds to inquire whether an s.15 violation can be justified.284 In 
other words, practically the whole of the Canadian analysis occurs under the scope of the right to 
equality.  
The ECtHR’s second option would be to assess the invidiousness of stereotypes during the 
second stage of the analysis: as part of the analysis of proportionality. The four Law factors (pre-existing 
disadvantage, fit/correspondence, ameliorative purpose, and the nature of the interest) lend 
themselves well to the analysis of proportionality in the strict sense, namely balancing.285 On one side of 
the balance, the ECtHR could assess what kind of impact a stereotype has on the applicant and her 
group, and on the other side the Court could weigh the countervailing public interests. As long as the 
Court makes a careful analysis of what is on the applicant’s side of the balance – in other words, a 
careful analysis of the impact of a stereotype – it could apply the margin of appreciation doctrine as 
usual (in so far as there is a “usual” when it comes to this doctrine). 
Either of these routes could deliver fine anti-stereotyping reasoning. The second route, where 
the crux of the stereotyping assessment would fall under the proportionality analysis, is probably more 
palatable to the Strasbourg Court, given its habitual emphasis on proportionality. The important point is 
that the ECtHR recognizes that stereotyping gives rise to an Article 14 claim and then examines 
stereotypes and their invidiousness carefully. 
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
Not all stereotypes are bad.286 Moreover, we cannot completely deny ourselves, or the legislator, the 
use of generalizations about groups of people. As a result, it is hard to develop a proper legal response 
to stereotyping. This comparative legal analysis has shown that the ECtHR can productively borrow from 
                                                          
283
 Law v. Canada, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 (Can.). 
284
 Section 1 of the Canadian Charter does provide for the possibility of reasonable limitations to the rights set 
forth in the Charter. The Supreme Court has been extensively criticized for not using Section 1 in equality cases, by 
doing all of the justifications analysis already under s.15. See, e.g., McIntyre, supra note 242; Moreau, supra note 
184, at 425-430. 
285
 See generally, AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS 340-370 (2012). 
286
 Cf. SCHNEIDER, supra note 5, at 19; and Suk, supra note 11. 
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both the American and the Canadian Supreme Courts in this respect. At a minimum, a proper legal 
response requires that courts name stereotypes well and carefully examine their harm. At its best, anti-
stereotyping reasoning exposes and targets the often hidden structures of inequality and discrimination. 
This is where the stereotyping concept can have real added value for the Strasbourg Court. American 
and Canadian equal protection law teaches the Strasbourg Court that stereotyping and discrimination 
are joined together in a cycle that sustains itself. That is to say: stereotypes can be a manifestation of 
discrimination, as well as a rationalization and a cause of (further) discrimination. The goal of addressing 
stereotypes through law is to break that circle open. The Strasbourg Court is not there yet. So far it has 
only recognized one part of the circle, namely that stereotypes are (often) misused to justify 
discrimination.  
The comparative analysis has also shown, however, that both the American and the Canadian 
jurisprudence have their weaknesses. Notably, both Supreme Courts sometimes equate stereotypes 
with unfair generalizations. The ECtHR should not copy such sloppy legal reasoning. Stereotypes can 
indeed be inaccurate or negative, but they can also be statistically correct, or prescriptive. When 
stereotypes are conceived of too narrowly (as only raising issues of accuracy), the concept loses its 
ability to advance transformative equality. 
To conclude, the three courts that are examined in this article all struggle and sometimes fail to 
formulate an appropriate response to stereotyping. The Grand Chamber’s recent surge of attention to 
stereotypes in the cases of Konstantin Markin and Aksu accordingly presents the ECtHR with an 
opportunity.287 Building on these cases and on the jurisprudence from the U.S. and Canada, the 
Strasbourg Court can take up the stereotyping concept and show the way forward. What started as 
borrowing might then turn into cross-fertilization.288 Now is the time for the Strasbourg Court to step up 
to the challenge of conceptualizing equality and discrimination more meaningfully.  
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 Konstantin Markin v. Russia (GC), App. No. 30078/06, 56 Eur. H.R. Rep. 8 (2013); Aksu v. Turkey (GC), App. Nos. 
4149/04; 41029/04, 15 March 2012. 
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 Provided of course that the American and Canadian Supreme Courts are open to this, which in the case of the 
U.S. Supreme Court is doubtful. See, e.g., Norman Dorsen, The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. 
Constitutional Cases: A Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 ICON 519 
(2005). 
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Preface Chapters Four and Five 
 
The next two chapters contain two articles on the concept of vulnerability. Chapter Four, entitled 
“Vulnerable Groups: the Promise of an Emergent Concept in European Human Rights Convention Law”, 
is written together with my colleague from Ghent University, Lourdes Peroni. It is difficult to say who is 
responsible for writing which part; this has truly been a joint endeavor and each part of the article has 
been discussed between ourselves and rewritten many times over. Nevertheless, here follows an 
overview of who has been the person primary responsible for each part and section of Chapter Four: 
 Lourdes Alexandra 
Part  I 
 II.A II.B and C 
 III. A and B III.C 
 IV.A IV.B 
  V 
 VI  
 
The writing and research for Chapter Four was completed in February 2013. The research for Chapter 
Five, entitled “A Quiet Revolution: Vulnerability in the European Court of Human Rights”, was in the 
main part completed in September 2012. 
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4. Vulnerable Groups: The Promise of an 
Emerging Concept in European Human 
Rights Convention Law 
 
Lourdes Peroni and Alexandra Timmer 
 
Forthcoming in : the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (ICON) 11 : 4 (2013) 
 
Abstract 
The concept of vulnerable groups is gaining momentum in the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights. The Court has so far used it in cases concerning Roma, people with mental disabilities, people 
living with HIV and asylum seekers. Yet the appearance of the vulnerable-group concept in the Court’s 
legal reasoning has so far escaped scholarly attention. Drawing on theoretical debates on vulnerability 
as well as on the Court’s case law, this Article offers a critical assessment of the concept. Reasoning in 
terms of vulnerable groups opens a number of possibilities, most notably, the opportunity to move closer 
to a more robust idea of equality. However, the concept also has some inherent difficulties. This Article 
argues for a reflective use of the concept and points out ways in which the Court can avoid its pitfalls. 
 
 
I. Introduction   
 
                                                          
 Ph.D. Researchers, Faculty of Law of Ghent University. We thank Eva Brems, Marie-Bénédicte Dembour, Anna 
Grear, Mathias Möschel, Stijn Smet and an anonymous reviewer for their valuable comments on earlier versions of 
this article. We had inspiring conversations with six judges of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, 
France in June 2011 and we wish to thank them too. We are also grateful to Martha Fineman for generously 
hosting us as Visiting Scholars at Emory Law School in Atlanta, Georgia within the framework of the Vulnerability 
and the Human Condition Initiative. The research for this paper was conducted within the framework of the 
European Research Council (ERC) Starting Grant project entitled "Strengthening the European Court of Human 
Rights: More Accountability through Better Legal Reasoning”.   
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Though each and every move of the European Court of Human Rights1 is intensely followed these days,2 
one recent development in the front lines of its reasoning has so far escaped scholarly attention: the 
emergence of the concept of vulnerable groups. The Strasbourg Court originally used this concept in 
relation to the Roma minority. “[A]s a result of their turbulent history”, the Court has held, “the Roma 
have become a specific type of disadvantaged and vulnerable minority” in need of special protection.3 In 
recent years, the concept has gained legal momentum when the Court started to regard persons with 
mental disabilities as a “particularly vulnerable group in society, who have suffered considerable 
discrimination in the past”.4 The Court has further expanded the list of vulnerable groups to asylum 
seekers5 and people living with HIV.6 
In this Article, we trace the characterization and implications of the concept of vulnerable 
groups in the Strasbourg case law. Arguing for a reflective use of group vulnerability, we offer a critical 
assessment of the concept by reference both to theoretical debates on vulnerability and to the Court’s 
case law.7  
We show that the Court’s use of the term “vulnerable groups” is not mere rhetorical flourish. 
The term does something: it allows the Court to address different aspects of inequality in a more 
substantive manner. We argue that, for this reason, the emergence of the concept represents a positive 
development in the Court’s case law. Yet, for all its power to further substantive equality, the concept 
also risks sustaining the very exclusion and inequality it aims to redress. We maintain that, if the Court 
wishes to retain the capability of “vulnerable groups” to fulfill its equality mission, it will have to attend 
to the stigmatizing, essentializing and stereotyping risks associated to the concept.  
Our analysis proceeds in four parts. We begin by locating the broader theoretical context within 
which vulnerability has been used as a critical tool and by exploring the links between vulnerability and 
                                                          
1
 Hereinafter, “the Court” or “the Strasbourg Court.” 
2
 Both the Court and its criticasters are especially closely followed in the legal blogosphere. See ECHR Blog, 
http://echrblog.blogspot.com; Strasbourg Observers, http://strasbourgobservers.com; and UK Human Rights Blog, 
http://ukhumanrightsblog.com.  
3
 See, e.g., D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic (GC), App. No. 57325/00, 47 Eur. H. R. Rep. 3, ¶ 182 (2007). 
4
 Alajos Kiss v. Hungary, App. No.  38832/06, 20 May 2010 ¶ 42. 
5
 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, App. No. 30696/09, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 2, ¶ 251 (2011). 
6
 Kiyutin v. Russia, App. No. 2700/10, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 26 ¶ 63 (2011). 
7
 We will confine ourselves to the case law in which the Court speaks of vulnerable groups. There is a considerable 
amount of case law in which the Court recognizes that the applicant is in a vulnerable position individually, notably 
in cases concerning prisoners or children. These cases, however, lack a group-centered analysis and therefore raise 
different kinds of questions than the ones we address in this Article. For an analysis of this other area of the 
Court’s vulnerability case law, see Alexandra Timmer, A Quiet Revolution: Vulnerability in the European Court of 
Human Rights, in VULNERABILITY: VALUE AND CRITIQUE (Martha Fineman & Anna Grear eds., forthcoming 2013). 
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human rights (I). We continue with an assessment of the ways in which the Court has evoked the notion 
of vulnerable groups, highlighting the pitfalls inherent in the concept and offering guidance on how the 
Court could circumvent them. (II). Then, we evaluate the consequences that the Court’s use of 
vulnerable groups has had in its case law and show how the concept has reinvigorated the Strasbourg 
antidiscrimination and equality case law. (III). Lastly, we offer some thoughts on whether the Court’s use 
of the vulnerable-group concept may lead the Court to overstep its proper subsidiary role (IV). 
 
  
II. The Concept of Vulnerability and Its Relationship to Human Rights 
 
Vulnerability is a concept fraught with paradox. To start with, the concept is in common use but its 
meaning is imprecise and contested. Confusing,8 complex,9 vague,10 ambiguous11 are but a few of the 
labels scholars across disciplines have used to refer to it. (Bio)ethics and law, in particular, are disciplines 
which have spawned an extensive literature on vulnerability. As the purpose of this Article is to analyze 
the Strasbourg Court’s deployment of the vulnerable-group concept, we will base our account of 
vulnerability primarily on legal scholarship.  
 
A) Meanings of Vulnerability  
 
A central paradox of vulnerability is that it is both universal and particular. Both of these features arise 
in the first place from our embodiment: 12 as embodied beings we are all vulnerable, but we experience 
this vulnerability uniquely through our individual bodies. The centrality of the corporeal dimension of 
vulnerability is reflected in the term’s etymology: the term stems from the Latin vulnus, which means, 
“wound.”13 Turning first to the meaning of vulnerability in the universal sense, it comes as no surprise 
                                                          
8
 Jan Helge Solbakk, Vulnerability: A Futile or Useful Principle in Healthcare Ethics?, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF HEALTH 
CARE ETHICS 228, 229 (Ruth Chadwick, Henk ten Have & Eric M. Meslin eds., 2011). 
9
 Id.  
10
 Mary C. Ruof, Vulnerability, Vulnerable Populations, and Policy, 14 KENNEDY INSTITUTE OF ETHICS JOURNAL 411, 411 
(2004). 
11
 Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 1, 9 (2008-2009). 
12
 Id. at 9. 
13
 BRYAN S. TURNER, VULNERABILITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 28 (2006). 
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that harm and suffering feature centrally in most accounts of vulnerability.14 Mary Neal neatly 
summarizes the literature:  
[V]ulnerability speaks to our universal capacity for suffering, in two ways. First, I am vulnerable 
because I depend upon the co-operation of others (including, importantly, the State) . . . Second, 
I am vulnerable because I am penetrable; I am permanently open and exposed to hurts and 
harms of various kinds.
15
 
Thus, as vulnerable subjects we are constantly susceptible to harm. Harm, of course, comes in many 
varieties that intersect and reinforce one another. Injuries can be bodily, moral,16 psychological,17 
economic and institutional,18 just to mention a few. These different forms of harm already hint at the 
ways in which vulnerability is particular (as well as universal). Our “different forms of embodiment” and 
our different positions within “webs of economic and institutional relationships”19 make that each of us 
experiences vulnerability uniquely. Martha Fineman points out that the experience of vulnerability “is 
greatly influenced by the quality and quantity of resources we possess or can command.”20  
Recently, however, theorists have moved towards an understanding of vulnerability that 
expands beyond (universal and particular) suffering, to encompass positive aspects.21 Human 
vulnerability is generative of suffering, so the argument runs, but also of empathy, pleasure, innovation, 
social institutions, intimacy and social-connectedness. Martha Fineman argues that this generative 
capacity of vulnerability “presents opportunities for innovation and growth, creativity, and fulfillment. It 
makes us reach out to others, form relationships, and build institutions.”22 Indeed, Fineman insists that 
we need to re-conceptualize vulnerability in this positive manner in order to get rid of the stigmatizing 
effects otherwise attached to the term.23 
                                                          
14
 See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, PRECARIOUS LIFE: THE POWERS AND MOURNING OF VIOLENCE xii (2006); ROBERT E. GOODIN, 
PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE: A REANALYSIS OF OUR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES 110 (1985); TURNER, supra note 13 at 27. 
15
 Mary Neal, “Not Gods but Animals”: Human Dignity and Vulnerable Subjecthood, 34 LIVERPOOL LAW REVIEW 
(forthcoming, 2013). 
16
 TURNER, supra note 13, at 28. 
17
 Id. 
18
 Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 EMORY L.J. 251, 268 (2010). 
19
 Id. at 269. 
20
 Fineman, supra note 11, at 10. 
21
 See, e.g., DEBRA BERGOFFEN, CONTESTING THE POLITICS OF GENOCIDAL RAPE: AFFIRMING THE DIGNITY OF THE VULNERABLE BODY 
101-119 (2012); Martha Albertson Fineman, “Elderly” as Vulnerable: Rethinking the Nature of Individual and 
Societal Responsibility, 20 THE ELDER LAW JOURNAL 101 (2012); and ANNA GREAR, REDIRECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: FACING THE 
CHALLENGE OF CORPORATE LEGAL HUMANITY 132-33 (2010). 
22
 Fineman, supra note 21, at 126. 
23
 Id. 
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B) Vulnerability as a Heuristic Device 
 
Fineman has described vulnerability as a heuristic device that allows us to “examine hidden assumptions 
and biases folded into legal . . . practices.”24 The fact that vulnerability can be used as a heuristic device 
points to the next paradox inherent in the concept: it can be deployed both to diagnose the ‘is’ and the 
‘ought’. In other words, vulnerability is analytically both a descriptive and prescriptive tool. The problem 
is that the bridge between the descriptive and the prescriptive powers of vulnerability is not easy to 
build. Especially ethicists struggle with the question how vulnerability can have prescriptive force, since 
embodied vulnerability is known to trigger both care and abuse.25 Scholars from different disciplines 
agree, however, that using vulnerability as a critical tool involves exploring how societal or institutional 
arrangements originate, sustain, and reinforce vulnerabilities.26 As was mentioned above, part of the 
reason why people are vulnerable is because they are inevitably dependent on the cooperation of 
others. Vulnerability is therefore inherently a “relational” concept,27 which supplements “attention to 
the individual subject by placing him/her in social context.”28 In the next Part, we will adopt a similar 
contextual approach to vulnerability in our case law analysis. 
Within the legal literature there is a tension between group-based and universality-based 
deployments of vulnerability. This seems due to the paradoxical nature of the concept. On the one hand 
vulnerability is often used to analyze specific populations29 – on the other hand Martha Fineman has 
developed a vulnerability thesis that is expressly universal in its scope and “post identity.”30 Fineman 
objects to applying the term vulnerability only to specific groups. She maintains that, as long as 
vulnerability is only associated with certain (marginalized) identities, the liberal myth that, “normally,” 
                                                          
24
 Fineman, supra note 18, at 266 n.53. 
25
 Ann V. Murphy, “Reality Check”: Rethinking the Ethics of Vulnerability, in THEORIZING SEXUAL VIOLENCE 55 (Renée J. 
Heberle & Victoria Grace eds., 2009).  
26
 See, e.g., Fineman, supra note 11; GOODIN, supra note 14, at 191; PEADAR KIRBY, VULNERABILITY AND VIOLENCE: THE 
IMPACT OF GLOBAZALISATION (2006); Florencia Luna, Elucidating the Concept of Vulnerability: Layers Not Labels, 2 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF FEMINIST APPROACHES TO BIOETHICS 121 (2009); and Wouter Vandenhole & Julie Ryngaert, 
Mainstreaming Children’s Rights in Migration Litigation: ECtHR, Muskhadzhiyeva and others v. Belgium, in DIVERSITY 
AND EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS: REWRITING JUDGMENTS OF THE ECHR 68 (Eva Brems ed., 2012).  
27
 Luna, supra note 26, at 129. 
28
 Fineman, supra note 11, at 13.  
29
 See, e.g., Audrey R. Chapman & Benjamin Carbonetti, Human Rights Protections for Vulnerable and 
Disadvantaged Groups: The Contributions of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 33 HUM. 
RTS. Q. 682 (2011). 
30
 Fineman, supra note 11, at 1. 
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people are self-sufficient, independent, and autonomous is sustained.31 This myth – which is in her view 
pervasive in American society – has led to an impoverished notion of what the function of the State is 
and has moreover legitimized rampant inequality. Instead, Fineman proposes to understand 
vulnerability as a “universal, inevitable, enduring aspect of the human condition” and posits that the 
proper role of the State is to be responsive to this.32 She presents her vulnerability thesis as an 
alternative to traditional group-based U.S. equal protection analysis.33 Fineman argues that her analysis 
is capable of delivering substantive equality (where the traditional analysis has failed) because her thesis 
turns the inquiry to the “institutional practices that produce the identities and inequalities in the first 
place.”34  
 The vulnerable-group reasoning of the Strasbourg Court seems to fit ill with Fineman’s thesis. 
While Fineman supports vulnerability for its potential of capturing the universal, the Court does it for its 
ability to capture the particular. In our view, however, there is no inherent impediment to reconciling 
these two approaches on a conceptual level – on the contrary; that would fit the concept’s paradoxical 
nature well. When we asked a Strasbourg judge about the Court’s reasoning, he replied: “All applicants 
are vulnerable, but some are more vulnerable than others.” The judge thus neatly merged the universal 
approach with the group-based approach. This reply also points to the fact that, as we will show in the 
next Part, the Court’s reasoning is a way of recognizing that people are differently vulnerable; that 
vulnerability is partially constructed depending on economic, political and social processes of inclusion 
and exclusion. Whether the Court in practice manages to handle vulnerability as a critical tool with the 
care that is required – without falling in the pitfalls that Fineman and others warn against – is also the 
subject of the next Part. 
 
C) Human Rights Law and Vulnerability 
                                                          
31
 Fineman’s vulnerability thesis builds in this respect on her earlier work that concerned autonomy and 
dependency. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY (2004). 
32
 Fineman, supra note 11, at 8. 
33
 Unfortunately, it falls outside the scope of this Article to take a comparative angle on the Strasbourg Court’s 
vulnerable-group reasoning. The American “discrete and insular minorities” approach has arguably parallels with 
the Court’s vulnerable-group approach. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, n.4 (1938). 
Moreover, American scholars in the anti-subordination tradition have linked group-based equality analysis to social 
exclusion, be it in the form of prejudice and stigmatization or in the form of material disadvantage. See, e.g., Jack 
M. Balkin & Reva Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anti-Classification or Anti-Subordination, 58 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 9 (2003-2004). Others, famously John Hart Ely, reason in terms of minorities’ exclusion from the political 
process. J.H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 103 (1980). Comparative perspectives on 
vulnerable-group reasoning would make fascinating material for another scholarly project. 
34
 Fineman, supra note 11, at 16. 
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Before moving on to the case law analysis, it bears standing still for a moment and consider what kind of 
role vulnerability has so far played in the human rights context. At first sight, human rights lawyers 
suffer less from the is/ought-dilemma precisely because they can refer to the human rights corpus, 
which in essence lays down the rule that abuse of human embodied vulnerability is prohibited. 
However, as we shall see, critically minded human rights scholars have shown that the story is not that 
straightforward. The relationship between vulnerability and human rights is a contested terrain.35 
In view of the topic of this paper the crucial question is: are human rights so construed as to 
protect the most vulnerable people? On a conceptual level, Anna Grear shows, the answer to this 
question is complex and bifurcated.36 Grear argues that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(‘UDHR’)37 paradigm contains two contradictory impulses. On the one hand, the whole human rights 
system is founded on a concern for embodied vulnerability. 38 Grear presents a genealogy of human 
rights in which she shows that this is the case both during the idea’s early articulations in the 18th 
century and when the UDHR was created as a reaction to the horrors of World War II. On the other 
hand, the liberal legal subject has been imported into the human rights structure: archetypically this is a 
rationalistic and quasi-disembodied subject.39 In many ways, this subject is conceived of as 
invulnerable.40 What flows from the dominance of the liberal quasi-disembodied subject in human rights 
law is a set of deeply troubling exclusions. Drawing on a well-known theme from feminist legal theory,41 
Grear argues that the many groups that do not fit the liberal archetype – women, dispossessed, people 
of color and (especially) asylum seekers – fall outside the scope of the purportedly universal protection 
of human rights.  
                                                          
35
 The scholarly terrain is moreover rapidly expanding. Recent publications include: BERGOFFEN, supra note 21; 
Chapman & Carbonetti, supra note 29; GREAR, supra note 21; and TURNER, supra note 13. 
36
 GREAR, supra note 21. 
37
 G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc A/819, Dec. 10, 1948. The European Convention on Human Rights is 
based on the UDHR. 
38
 Bryan Turner has also conceptualized vulnerability as the foundation of the human rights regime. TURNER, supra 
note 13. 
39
 Anna Grear, Challenging Corporate “Humanity”: Legal Disembodiment, Embodiment and Human Rights, 7 HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 511, 521-534 (2007); and GREAR, supra note 21, at 96-113. See generally Ngaire Naffine, Who are Law’s 
Persons? From Cheshire Cats to Responsible Subjects, 66 THE MODERN LAW REVIEW 346 (2003). 
40
 BERGOFFEN, supra note 21, at 109 (“current human rights paradigms take their cue from the masculine image of 
the invulnerable body.”). 
41
 See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace, 4 UCLA WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL 59 (1993-1994); 
and Dianne Otto, Lost in Translation: Re-Scripting the Sexed Subjects of International Human Rights Law, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS OTHERS 318 (Anne Orford ed., 2006). 
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Of course, many within the human rights movement are aware that the human rights universal 
fails to include marginalized subjects. In response to this problem, specific treaties have proliferated, 
such as the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities;42 the Convention on the Elimination of 
all Forms of Discrimination against Women;43 the Convention on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination;44 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.45 Grear interprets the creation of these 
specific human rights instruments as repeated critiques of “the closures of the abstract universal” and 
“the outcome of quasi-disembodiment.”46 Aside from the specific treaties, general treaty bodies – in 
their General Comments and Concluding Observations – also regularly emphasize the imperative to pay 
special attention to the needs of particularly vulnerable people.47 The same holds true for human rights 
commissioners.48 In academic scholarship, lastly, these critiques are mirrored in the writings of what 
Marie-Bénédicte Dembour has termed “protest scholars”; those who conceive of human rights as 
articulating “rightful claims made by or on behalf of the poor, the underprivileged and the oppressed.”49 
So to go back to the question whether human rights law is so construed as to protect the most 
vulnerable people: the answer is yes and no (again a paradox!). Drawing on the work of Grear, the 
subject of human rights law is arguably not an embodied vulnerable subject – let alone a highly 
vulnerable subject. We would wish that the Court is only doing its regular job by reasoning from 
vulnerability, but the Court’s reliance on the concept is more complex than that. Our diagnosis is this: in 
response to the exclusions of human rights law, the Strasbourg Court has been forced to attend to the 
constructed disadvantage of certain groups, and in so doing, has deployed the concept of group 
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 Adopted 13 Dec. 2006, G.A. Res. 61/106, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., Agenda Item 67(b), U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/106 
(2006) (entered into force 3 May 2008). 
43
 Adopted 18 Dec. 1979, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1980), 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 
(entered into force 3 Sept. 1981). 
44
 Adopted 21 Dec. 1965, G.A. Res. 2106 (XX), U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966), 660 U.N.T.S. 195 
(entered into force 4 Jan. 1969). 
45
 Adopted 20 Nov. 1989, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 
(entered into force 2 Sept. 1990). 
46
 GREAR, supra note 21, at 112 (italics removed). 
47
 For example the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; see, e.g., Chapman & Carbonetti, supra 
note 29. 
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 THOMAS HAMMERBERG, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE: NO GROUNDS FOR COMPLACENCY (2011). 
49
 Marie-Bénédicte Dembour, What Are Human Rights? Four Schools of Thought, 32 HUM. RTS. Q. 1,3 (2010). 
Examples of such scholarship are: UPENDRA BAXI, THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2002); and Colin Harvey, Protecting 
the Marginalized?, in JUDGES, TRANSITION, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 515 (John Morison, Kieran McEvoy & Gordon Anthony 
eds., 2007). 
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vulnerability.50 As we will now proceed to show, the Court’s deployment of the concept has both 
strengths and weaknesses. 
 
III. Characterization and Risks of the Concept of Vulnerable Groups in the Court’s Case Law 
 
The rapid development of the concept of vulnerable groups in recent high-profile judgments of the 
Strasbourg case law raises several basic questions. How has the Court evoked the concept of group 
vulnerability? And, are there any risks associated to the Court’s characterization and deployment of the 
concept? Based on these questions, this Part offers a critical assessment of the Court’s formulation and 
use of the concept. 
 
A) Chapman and the Origin of Group Vulnerability 
 
The concept of vulnerable groups was introduced in 2001, in Chapman v. the United Kingdom, to refer 
to the Roma minority.51 The case involved a Roma woman who was evicted from her own land because 
she stationed her caravan there without planning permission. The Court rejected the applicant’s alleged 
violation of the right to respect for her minority lifestyle (Article 8 ECHR). It also dismissed her 
discrimination complaint (Article 14 ECHR). The applicant’s argument was that the U.K. government 
prevented her from pursuing a lifestyle that she viewed as central to her cultural tradition: living and 
travelling in a caravan. The Court’s Grand Chamber held:  
 
As intimated in Buckley, the vulnerable position of Gypsies as a minority means that some special 
consideration should be given to their needs and their different lifestyle both in the relevant 
regulatory planning framework and in reaching decisions in particular cases.
52
  
                                                          
50
 We note that, within the Council of Europe, the Strasbourg Court is not alone in this approach. The European 
Committee of Social Rights, for example, regularly uses the concept of vulnerable groups in its decisions. See, e.g.,  
Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v. Italy, Complaint No. 58/2009, Merits, 25 June 2010, ¶ 76 
(concerning Roma and Sinti); Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v. Croatia, Complaint No. 52/2008, 
Merits, 22 June 2010, ¶ 88 (concerning displaced families of Serb ethnicity); and Autism – France v. France, 
Complaint No. 13/2002, Merits, 4 November 2003, ¶ 53 (concerning persons with autism). 
51
 Chapman v. United Kingdom (GC), 2001-I; 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 18, ¶ 96 (2001). 
52
 Id. The Court refers to the Buckley v. the United Kingdom judgment from 1996, but in that judgment the Court 
did not actually use the term “vulnerable” to describe Roma.  
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In this early formulation, the vulnerability of Roma seems to arise primarily from the group’s minority 
status and from the lack of consideration of its minority lifestyle in the planning and decision-making 
processes. Group vulnerability does not however play a key role in the Court’s proportionality 
reasoning.53 In fact, Ms. Chapman loses the case, mostly as a result of the large margin of appreciation 
left to States when it comes to the implementation of planning policies, in this case, environmental 
regulations. Notwithstanding this, Chapman’s articulation of vulnerability already puts in place the 
elements that will shape the Court’s later formulations of “vulnerable groups”: belonging to a group (in 
this case, the Roma minority) whose vulnerability is partly constructed by broader societal, political and 
institutional circumstances (in this case, power differentials and a planning framework unresponsive to 
the needs arising from a way of life different from that of the majority).  
 
B) Group Vulnerability in the Post-Chapman Case Law 
 
i. Characteristics of the Vulnerable-Group Concept: Relational, Particular and Harm-
based 
In the years following Chapman, the Court has broadened and refined the concept’s content and scope. 
As we will discuss, the Court has not only reaffirmed the vulnerability of Roma in different contexts and 
for a mix of other reasons; it has also extended the list of “vulnerable groups” to persons with mental 
disabilities, people living with HIV and asylum seekers. However, what exactly ties all these groups 
together is still not entirely clear, as the Court has not (yet) fully developed a coherent set of indicators 
to determine what renders a group vulnerable. To be sure, in all the cases, the Court draws on European 
or international human rights reports and resolutions to determine what it is that makes groups 
vulnerable.54 These references, however, serve to confirm rather than to establish group vulnerability.   
 Based on a close reading of the case law, our understanding is that the concept of group 
vulnerability, as used by the Court, has three characteristics: it is relational, particular, and harm-based. 
The Court’s account of group vulnerability is first of all relational. As already transpired from Chapman, 
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the Court locates vulnerability not in the individual alone but rather in her wider social circumstances. 
The Court’s notion of vulnerable groups is thus relational because it views the vulnerability of certain 
groups as shaped by social, historical and institutional forces. In other words, the Court links the 
individual applicant’s vulnerability to the social or institutional environment, which originates or sustains 
the vulnerability of the group she is (made) part of. The emphasis on context inherent in the relational 
character of the Court’s understanding of group vulnerability is in line with contemporary analyses that 
use vulnerability as a critical tool. As we have seen in Part I.B, they all insist on the need to explore the 
role of societal or institutional arrangements in originating and maintaining vulnerability.  
However, contrary to legal scholars’ efforts to theorize vulnerability in a universal way – most 
prominently, Fineman’s vulnerability thesis55 – the Court’s vulnerable subject is not the inherently 
vulnerable human being. Rather, the Court’s vulnerable subject is a particular group member. In our 
view, this understanding of vulnerability is not necessarily at odds with universal accounts of 
vulnerability. On the contrary, and as we have argued in Part I.B, this fits the concept’s paradoxical 
nature: vulnerability is at once universal and particular. In fact, the Court tends to talk of “particularly 
vulnerable groups”56 rather than just of “vulnerable groups.” The inclusion of the term “particularly” 
underlines the idea that people belonging to these groups are simply “more” vulnerable than others. 
This points to the second characteristic of the Court’s account of vulnerability: it is particular. By 
“particular,” we mean that the Court’s vulnerable subject is a group member whose vulnerability is 
shaped by specific group-based experiences. 
A third characteristic of the Court’s formulation of group vulnerability in the post-Chapman case 
law is its focus on harm. Indeed, all the indicators that the Court has employed to determine group 
vulnerability show that harm features centrally in the Court’s account of group vulnerability. This is far 
from surprising since, as we have indicated in Part I.A, harm is central to most basic accounts of 
vulnerability. Thus, one clear set of indicators that emerges from the Court’s case law is (historical) 
prejudice and stigmatization. These indicators point to the harm of misrecognition, which, according to 
Nancy Fraser, takes place when “institutionalized patterns of cultural value . . . constitute some actors as 
inferior, excluded, wholly other, or simply invisible—in other words, as less than full partners in social 
interaction . . .” 57 As we will explain below, these indicators have played out in the Court’s group-
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vulnerability analysis, most notably in the context of discrimination. Most recently, the Court has started 
to delineate more complex indicators linked to social disadvantage and material deprivation in the 
context of Articles 3 and 8 ECHR. These indicators point to what Fraser calls maldistribution, which 
results “when some actors lack the necessary resources to interact with others as peers.”58  
In what follows, we organize our analysis of the vulnerable-group case law in two parts, 
depending on which of the two kinds of harm plays out more prominently in determining group 
vulnerability. This bifurcation of our examination of the Court’s case law does not mean that there are 
no connections between the two types of harm. What it means is that, though elements of 
misrecognition and maldistribution underlie all the cases, the Court’s assessment of group vulnerability 
tends to focus more on one than on the other, often leaving the links between the two unexplored..  
 
ii. Prejudice and Stigmatization: Misrecognition Cases  
The first set of indicators that has crucially informed the Court’s assessment of group vulnerability are 
prejudice and stigma. In the post-Chapman years, the Court has preserved the original designation of 
the Roma minority as “vulnerable” but with different connotations. Indeed, in cases concerning the 
discrimination of Roma students in education (Article 14 ECHR together with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 
of the Convention), the Court acknowledges the vulnerability of Roma against a different background: 
prejudices. These are the well-known school segregation cases: D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic 
(2007), Sampanis and Others v. Greece (2008), and Oršuš and Others v. Croatia (2010).59 In all these 
cases, the Court found that the Roma children were discriminated against in the enjoyment of the right 
to education. The Grand Chamber held in D.H.:  
[A]s a result of their turbulent history and constant uprooting the Roma have become a specific 
type of disadvantaged and vulnerable minority.
60
  
The extensive reference in these judgments to Council of Europe documents reporting prejudices 
against Roma pupils in several parts of Europe indicates that such prejudices have informed the Court’s 
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understanding of Roma’s vulnerability.61 Moreover, the factual background of some of these cases 
shows non-Roma parents’ negative and hostile attitudes towards Roma children.62 Most recently, the 
Court has recognized prejudice more explicitly as a source of group vulnerability in Horváth and Kiss v. 
Hungary, a case concerning the placement of Roma children in special schools following the systematic 
misdiagnosis of mental disability.63 The Court notes that many students were misdiagnosed because of 
their socio-economic disadvantage or cultural differences and acknowledges the “bias in past placement 
procedures.”64 
 The Court has also viewed negative social attitudes as the main source of vulnerability of Roma 
in V.C. v. Slovakia (2011), a case concerning the forced sterilization of a Roma woman.65 The Court 
recognizes that forced sterilization has affected vulnerable individuals of different ethnic origins but 
admits that Roma are at particular risk “due, inter alia, to the widespread negative attitudes towards the 
relatively high birth rate among the Roma compared to other parts of the population, often expressed 
as worries of an increased proportion of the population living on social benefits.”66 The Court 
condemned Slovakia for not ensuring the applicant’s free and informed consent to sterilization, finding 
violations of both Article 3 ECHR (degrading treatment) and Article 8 ECHR (respect for private and 
family life). However, and somewhat puzzlingly, despite linking the harmful practices it condemned to 
the widespread prejudice against Roma, the Court did not examine the applicant’s discrimination 
complaint (Article 14 ECHR) separately. 
The Court has similarly grounded its vulnerability assessment on (historical) prejudice – and, 
additionally, on the resulting social exclusion – in cases concerning other non-dominant groups. One 
example is Alajos Kiss v. Hungary (2010).67 The case deals with the blanket disenfranchisement of people 
with mental disabilities in Hungary. The Court found a violation of the applicant’s right to vote (Article 3 
of Protocol 1 to the Convention). The Court’s view of people with mental disabilities as a “particularly 
vulnerable group” rests on the considerable discrimination they have experienced in the past.68 The 
group, the Court affirms, was “historically subject to prejudice with lasting consequences, resulting in 
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their social exclusion.”69 With this approach the Court takes the first steps towards embracing a “social 
model” of disability: this way of framing disability recognizes the built environment and society’s 
negative attitude towards people with impairment as the main factor disabling and excluding people.70 
Contrary to the “medical model” of disability, the hallmark of a social approach to disability emphasizes 
social prejudices and stereotypes, rather than individual impairments.71 
 The Court has continued along these lines with Kiyutin v. Russia (2011), another case concerning 
the indiscriminate exclusion of a group historically subject to prejudice.72 This time, the group in 
question is people living with HIV and the exclusion at issue the refusal of residence permit. The 
applicant, a man from Uzbekistan married to a Russian national with whom he had a daughter, was 
denied residence permit on the ground that he was HIV-positive. The Court found that the applicant was 
discriminated against in the enjoyment of his private and family life (Article 14 ECHR together with 
Article 8 ECHR). In the Kiyutin judgment, the Strasbourg Court refers to Alajos Kiss and explains in 
considerable detail how it came about that people living with HIV have suffered from widespread stigma 
and exclusion from the 1980s till the present. The Court therefore holds that “people living with HIV are 
a vulnerable group with a history of prejudice and stigmatization.”73 The Court realizes that the basis for 
excluding HIV-positive non-nationals from obtaining residence permits was the general assumption that 
they would engage in unsafe behavior.74 For the Court, such a generalization was not founded in facts 
and failed “to take into account the individual situation, such as that of the applicant”.75 
 
iii. Social Disadvantage and Material Deprivation: Maldistribution Cases 
Two indicators of group vulnerability that are less clearly but not less importantly emerging in the 
Court’s case law are social disadvantage and material deprivation. In the cases that we will discuss now, 
what the Court ultimately addresses is the harm of maldistribution. The first case in point is Yordanova 
v. Bulgaria (2012), which concerned a planned mass eviction of Roma inhabitants from their decades-old 
settlement.76 The applicants had built their homes on State land in Sofia without authorization. The 
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government, however, de facto tolerated the unlawful settlement for decades. It did not take any action 
until the matter became “urgent,” following neighbours complaints “about the Roma families’ 
behaviour.”77 Indeed, neighbours had requested that the Roma inhabitants be removed and “returned 
to their native places,” holding them responsible for littering, stealing, drug abuse and aggressive 
behaviour.78  
The Court found a violation of the applicants’ right to respect for home, private and family life 
(Article 8 ECHR). In stopping the eviction that would have rendered the applicants homeless, the Court 
held that the Bulgarian State failed to recognize “the applicants’ situation as an outcast community and 
one of the socially disadvantaged groups.”79 Yordanova differs from the other Roma cases previously 
discussed – school segregation and forced sterilization – in that the focus of the Court’s group 
vulnerability lies on poverty rather than on prejudice and discrimination. The Court holds for example 
that the authorities should have taken into account the disadvantaged position of the group to which 
the applicants belonged in assisting them with the eligibility for social housing.80 Surprisingly, the Court 
does not explore the links between the group’s disadvantaged status (maldistribution) and the social 
prejudices against them (misrecognition), even though the facts of the case clearly show that prejudices 
played a role.81 The Court dismisses the applicants’ complaint of discrimination (Article 14 ECHR).82 Like 
in V.C, and given the particular context of anti-Roma sentiment in which the removal was ordered, the 
Court should have at least acknowledged the role played by negative social views against Roma. 
The case that has significantly broadened the Court’s notion of group vulnerability is M.S.S. v. 
Belgium and Greece (2011).83 The applicant, an Afghan asylum seeker, was returned by Belgium to 
Greece under the “Dublin II Regulation” of the EU.84 One of the main questions was whether the 
detention and living conditions of M.S.S in Greece amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment 
under Article 3 ECHR. In analyzing the applicant’s conditions of detention – more precisely, in examining 
the Greek government’s argument that the duration of his detention was insignificant – the Court 
observes:  
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In the present case the Court must take into account that the applicant, being an asylum seeker, 
was particularly vulnerable because of everything he had been through during his migration and 
the traumatic experiences he was likely to have endured previously.
85
  
 
At first sight, this wording points to the specific experiences of the applicant. Thus, one might easily be 
under the impression that those individual experiences are paramount in the Court’s vulnerability 
decision. In the next paragraph, however, the Court states the particular vulnerability of asylum seekers 
in a much more sweeping manner, as though it were an inherent attribute of the entire class. The Court 
holds: “[T]he applicant's distress was accentuated by the vulnerability inherent in his situation as an 
asylum seeker.”86  
The Court’s analysis of the applicant’s living conditions is also marked by references to different 
aspects of asylum seekers’ vulnerability. In this part of the reasoning, the Court states yet more 
sweepingly:  
 
The Court attaches considerable importance to the applicant's status as an asylum seeker and, as 
such, a member of a particularly underprivileged and vulnerable population group in need of 
special protection.
87
 
In this passage, the Court refers to Oršuš and Others v. Croatia, a case that, as we have seen above, 
concerned the vulnerability of Roma in the context of school segregation. This may explain Judge Sajó’s 
reaction in his separate opinion, arguing that, unlike other “particularly vulnerable groups” in the 
Court’s case law, asylum seekers “are not a group historically subject to prejudice with lasting 
consequences, resulting in their social exclusion.”88 For him, the concept of vulnerable groups has a 
“specific meaning in the jurisprudence of the Court” and asylum seekers simply do not fit the concept.89  
Leaving aside that it is debatable whether asylum seekers have not suffered historically from 
prejudice, Judge Sajó’s concern clearly points to the problem of the open-endedness of the vulnerable-
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group concept.90 Indeed, while Judge Sajó attempts to keep the vulnerable-group formulation limited to 
a narrowly defined set of factors,91 the majority opens up the meaning of the concept by relying on a 
series of other indicators. 
For example, the majority finds M.S.S. particularly vulnerable because he was “wholly 
dependent on State support . . . unable to cater for his most basic needs.”92 The dependency argument 
rings familiar: it is taken from other Article 3 ECHR cases, concerning prisoners and detainees, although 
in this part of the M.S.S. judgment the Court reasons outside the context of detention or 
imprisonment.93 Moreover, the majority realizes that the applicant’s situation exists on a large scale due 
to a series of institutional shortcomings inherent in the Greek asylum system.94 These shortcomings 
included the lack of sufficient reception centers to accommodate asylum seekers; the administrative 
obstacles impeding their access to the job market; and the lengthy procedures to examine their asylum 
requests.95 By unveiling all these deficiencies in the Greek asylum system, the Court is ultimately 
pointing to the institutional production of vulnerability of asylum seekers in Greece.  
In sum, M.S.S. seems to show that the Court has deemed asylum seekers vulnerable on a series 
of interacting grounds, including: (i) the daily reality for asylum seekers in Greece; a reality that is 
characterized by material and psychological want; (ii) asylum seekers’ complete dependence on the 
State; (iii) an inherent vulnerability of asylum seekers due to everything they have been through during 
the process of migration and the trauma that often accompanies such migration; and (iv) the systemic 
deficiencies of the Greek asylum system. As a result, it is not quite clear whether all asylum seekers are 
to be considered vulnerable, or just the ones who arrive in Greece. What is clear, however, is that the 
Court’s analysis in M.S.S. challenges simplistic conceptions of group vulnerability, making room for more 
textured and complex formulations. 
 
iv. Blanks on the Map 
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In examining the Court’s use of the term “vulnerable groups,” we have narrowly followed the Court’s 
own terminology. This focus on the Court’s terminology has led us to discuss Roma, people with 
impaired health or abilities and asylum seekers, but not other groups who could reasonably be 
considered particularly vulnerable. Indeed, an examination of the Court’s wider case law reveals some 
blanks or inconsistencies in the application of the notion of vulnerable groups. Using prejudice and 
stigmatization, dependency on the State, and social exclusion and disadvantage as indicators of 
vulnerability, there are more groups that – according to international human rights reports and scholarly 
literature – could have fallen within the notion of vulnerable groups.96 Examples include national 
minorities,97 religious minorities98 and LGBT people.99  
More puzzlingly, sometimes the Court has been silent on group vulnerability in its case law 
concerning Roma applicants, notably in cases where the harm of misrecognition towards them is 
manifested in its most brutal form – namely in physical violence. In these cases, the Court overlooks the 
broader context of prejudice and discrimination within which vulnerability to violence originates.100 Aksu 
v. Turkey, concerning the stereotyping of Roma in government-sponsored publications, is another 
example of the Court’s failure to incorporate a vulnerable-group approach in its reasoning.101 The 
Court’s Grand Chamber refers to the vulnerability of Roma, but this seems more a matter of lip service, 
as it carries no real weight in the Court’s analysis of the case.102 What makes the Court’s omission 
particularly puzzling is that at the heart of the case was precisely stereotyping and stigmatization of a 
particularly vulnerable group.  
 
C) The Risks Inherent in the Concept of Vulnerable Groups 
 
These blanks on the map do not represent the only concern we have with regards to the Court’s 
increasing reliance on the vulnerable-group concept. The Court’s account of group vulnerability also has 
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more fundamental drawbacks. In what follows, we will show that the Court’s reasoning risks reinforcing 
the vulnerability of certain groups by essentializing, stigmatizing, victimizing and paternalizing them. 
 
i. Essentialism 
 
In the first place, the Court’s vulnerable-group reasoning is sometimes guilty of essentialism. Briefly put, 
essentializing means to reify one experience as paradigmatic, at the expense of other experiences.103 In 
fact, the Court runs a double-essentializing risk.  First, there is essentialism of the so-called vulnerable 
groups and the people belonging to these groups, i.e. Roma, asylum-seekers, and people with a 
disability. Essentializing vulnerable groups is harmful to the people from these groups. This occurs, for 
example, when “significant differences of location and concern” within one sub-group are obscured.104 
The lesson to be learned here is that, with its group-based approach, the Court should not overlook “the 
different kinds of vulnerabilities that individuals of the same subgroup may be susceptible to.”105 There 
have been cases wherein the Court did not seem to realize that it relied on a conception of a unitary 
vulnerable group. The Roma caravan cases come to mind. Marie-Bénédicte Dembour notes that the 
applicants in both Buckley and Chapman were women who were the principle caretakers of some of 
their family members.106 Dembour points out that the Court failed to consider this in the respective 
majority judgments. The ways in which Roma mothers might be differently vulnerable are left 
unexplored and unrecognized in these judgments. 
 Essentialism of vulnerable groups also occurs when the Court “polices” the boundaries of a 
group.107 A case in point is the little-known admissibility decision of Horie v. the United Kingdom 
(2011).108 We have not discussed Horie so far because the Court forecloses actual group-vulnerability 
reasoning in the admissibility phase. And that is precisely the point. Horie concerns a New Traveller who 
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had been pursuing a nomadic lifestyle for almost three decades. The Court observes that, unlike 
“Romani gypsies” and “Irish travelers,” “New Travellers live a nomadic lifestyle through personal choice 
and not on account of being born into any ethnic or cultural group.”109 The Court implies that only those 
who are gypsies by birth, and not by choice, can be considered as belonging to a vulnerable group. In 
other words, the Court applies the immutability-criterion to police the boundaries of the (vulnerable) 
group of “gypsies”.110 Ms. Horie’s experiences end up getting no recognition.  
The second type of essentialism is essentialism of the heuristic device itself: this kind concerns 
the question what is and is not allowed to fall under the vulnerable-group concept. Essentializing the 
heuristic device itself is harmful because it unduly limits the application of group-vulnerability reasoning. 
The clearest example of this kind of essentialism is found in the separate opinion of Judge Sajó in M.S.S. 
v. Belgium and Greece. As we noted in Part II.B, Judge Sajó’s attempts to keep the vulnerable-group 
formulation limited to a narrowly defined set of factors. This sort of essentialism threatens to create a 
competition among groups for recognition of their vulnerability.111 Sure enough, we see this competition 
between groups reflected in Judge Sajó’s separate opinion: 
 
In terms of vulnerability, dependence, and so on, the mentally disabled (and other vulnerable 
groups, whose members are subject to social prejudice) are in a more difficult situation than 
asylum seekers, who are not a homogeneous group subject to social categorisation and 
related discrimination.
112
 (Emphasis added) 
 
ii. Stigmatization  
In Kiyutin v. Russia, the stigmatization of people living with HIV is central to the Court’s finding that they 
constitute a vulnerable group.113 Paradoxically, however, the Court itself risks stigmatizing vulnerable 
groups, by applying the very term “vulnerable,” which – as was discussed in Part I – for many people 
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carries solely negative associations such as harm and injury.  The Court should be weary of 
stigmatization, especially as it is possible that vulnerability can take on a “master status.” This occurs 
when “the defining attribute eclipses all other aspects of stigmatized persons, their talents and 
abilities.”114 When vulnerability overshadows all other aspects of an applicant’s identity in the Court’s 
reasoning, it has taken on a master status.115 
 
iii. Paternalism: Denying Agency and Imposing Protection  
Lastly, the Court on occasion engages in misplaced paternalism with its group-vulnerability reasoning. In 
D.H., in response to the government’s objection that the Roma children would not have been placed in 
special schools had their parents not consented to it, the majority of the Grand Chamber held:  
 
In the circumstances of the present case, the Court is not satisfied that the parents of the Roma 
children, who were members of a disadvantaged community and often poorly educated, were 
capable of weighing up all the aspects of the situation and the consequences of giving their 
consent.
116
 
 
In a passionate dissent, Judge Borrego Borrego denounced this denial of the ability of Roma parents to 
make informed decisions regarding the education of their children.117 By denying the Roma parents’ 
capacity to make an informed decision about placing their children in special schools, the Court seems to 
reinforce their powerlessness. The Court should have confined itself to noting that meaningful consent 
is problematic in the specific context of the case. 
The Court does much better in assessing the particular circumstances of the case in V.C. v. 
Slovakia, concerning the forced sterilization of a Roma woman. The Court even roundly condemns the 
paternalistic behaviour of the hospital staff in performing the sterilization-procedure on V.C., without 
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first obtaining her informed consent.118 The Court notes that “in similar situations informed consent was 
required, promoting autonomy of moral choice for patients,”119 and it emphasises the need to respect a 
person’s dignity and integrity.120 This kind of language is much more empowering than the language 
used by the majority in D.H. 
iv. Ways of Lessening these Risks 
In our opinion it is not problematic that the Court pays increased attention to group vulnerability, 
provided that the Court ensures that (i) it is specific about why it considers that group particularly 
vulnerable and (ii) it demonstrates why that makes the particular applicant more prone to certain types 
of harm or why the applicant should be considered and treated as a vulnerable member of that group in 
the instant case. The test should therefore entail two interrelated levels of inquiry: collective and 
individual. Otherwise, the Court may end up essentializing vulnerable groups and stereotyping the 
individuals from these groups; thereby reinforcing their vulnerability rather than lessening it. Besides, 
our suggestion has the advantage that the Court does not lay itself open to the charge that it delivers 
judgments on the situation of particular groups in general, rather than on the facts of the case.121 
Moreover, in order to prevent group-vulnerability reasoning from reducing applicants to pure 
victims and from stigmatizing their vulnerability, the Court should, firstly, always make sure that it does 
not apply vulnerability as simply a “label” (a label easily turns into a stigma), but as a “layered” 
concept.122 The focus should be on the various circumstances that render certain groups vulnerable, not 
on which groups are vulnerable.123 The Court should insist on and strengthen its contextual inquiry to 
determine whether a group may be deemed vulnerable or not. This approach will help avoiding a reified 
conception of group vulnerability, as the focus is expanded towards the social and historical forces that 
originate, maintain, or reinforce the vulnerability of a group. 124  
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All of this is to say that the Court should beware of the temptation to turn group-vulnerability 
into an easy and straightforward narrative: people are rendered particularly vulnerable due to a 
complex set of causes (ranging from economic disempowerment, to social attitudes, and physical 
limitations). Moreover, people always possess sources of resilience in the face of their vulnerabilities.125 
The Court should not trivialize the abilities of persons who belong to an otherwise vulnerable group. So 
for example, in his separate opinion in M.S.S., Judge Sajó points out that the applicant “had money and 
speaks English.”126 In our view Judge Sajó is right to point out these sources of resilience of the applicant 
(even if we do not agree with all he says in his separate opinion). Portraying applicants as purely 
vulnerable will disempower them. 
 
 
IV. The Effect of the Vulnerable-Group Concept in the Court’s Case Law: Substantive Equality  
  
In spite of the perils that group vulnerability may carry in practice, we still believe that the emergence of 
the concept has had positive implications in the Court’s case law. Our overall judgment, therefore, is 
that emphasis on group vulnerability is a welcome development. In particular, its insertion represents a 
crucial step towards an enhanced antidiscrimination case law and a more robust idea of equality.127 The 
Court’s use of the term “vulnerable groups” is therefore not mere rhetorical flourish. The term does 
something: it addresses and redresses different aspects of inequality in a more substantive manner.  
Using Sandra Fredman’s multi-dimensional characterization of substantive equality, we argue 
that the Court’s insertion of the notion of vulnerable groups has addressed substantive equality’s four 
chief aims: participation, transformation, redistribution, and recognition.128 The participative dimension 
of substantive equality, Fredman argues, requires compensating for the “absence of political voice” and 
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opening up “channels for greater participation in the future.”129 Participation, as she explains, is a 
“multi-layered concept,” which entails not only political participation but also “taking part in decisions in 
a wide range of situations affecting individuals or groups, including at the workplace, in education, in 
health care, and in community organization.”130 The transformative dimension seeks to accommodate 
group differences; the point is to remove “the detriment which is attached to difference,” rather than 
difference itself.131 The redistributive aspect of substantive equality, in turn, aims at “breaking the cycle 
of disadvantage,” which encompasses, among other things, “the maldistribution of resources.”132 Last, 
substantive equality’s recognition facet seeks to “promote respect for dignity and worth, thereby 
redressing stigma, stereotyping, humiliation and violence because of membership of an identity 
group.”133  
The capacity of the vulnerable-group concept to address the multiple dimensions of substantive 
equality lies primarily in its particular nature.134 The Court’s particularized understanding of vulnerability 
explained in Part II.B – that is, of vulnerability as shaped by specific group-based experiences of 
prejudice, stigma and social disadvantage – introduces an asymmetrical approach in the analysis of 
equality. The notion of asymmetry, essential to substantive equality, implies that not all differentiations 
are problematic but only those that affect groups suffering disadvantage, prejudice and stereotyping.135 
Thus, as Sandra Fredman notes, “instead of aiming to treat everyone alike, regardless of status, 
substantive equality focuses on the group which has suffered disadvantage.”136 In practice, this means 
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that substantive equality focuses on women rather than men, ethnic minorities rather than ethnic 
majorities, sexual minorities rather than heterosexuals.137  
In the next pages, we discuss three different ways in which the asymmetry implicit in the Court’s 
vulnerable-group approach has manifested itself: (i) the positive obligations resting on the State become 
more pronounced under Article 2 of Protocol 1 (in conjunction with Article 14 ECHR), Article 3 ECHR and 
Article 8 ECHR; (ii) the harm inflicted on the applicant weighs more heavily in Article 3 ECHR scope 
analysis and in Article 8 ECHR proportionality analysis; and (iii) the margin of appreciation in Article 14 
ECHR direct discrimination cases is narrowed.  
 
A) Special Positive Obligations: Article 3 ECHR, Article 8 ECHR, and Article 2 of Protocol 1 (in 
conjunction with Article 14 ECHR) 
 
Substantive equality does not confine itself to a duty to refrain from discrimination.138 Substantive 
equality involves more than that; it requires the State to take a proactive role and to adopt positive 
steps to promote equality.139 The case law examined below shows that the Court has embraced several 
aspects of substantive equality by establishing positive obligations towards vulnerable groups in both 
the context of Article 14 ECHR and of freestanding Convention rights (e.g., Articles 8 and 3 ECHR), which 
may not associate themselves with equality-based reasoning as easily as Article 14 ECHR.  
Moreover, the Court’s recognition of positive obligations towards members of particularly 
vulnerable groups has often involved “special consideration to” or “special protection of” their 
“specificities” and “needs.”140 This kind of reasoning reflects the asymmetry that characterizes 
substantive equality: when it comes to the most vulnerable, States are obliged to provide a level of 
protection that is more responsive or tailored to their particular needs and concerns. Though group 
vulnerability has played an instrumental role in deriving these positive obligations, it would not do to 
overstate the weight the Court attaches to it. The vulnerability of the group in question is always one of 
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a constellation of factors that the Court takes into account in its decisions to establish positive 
obligations. 
The Court has, first of all, furthered the participative dimension of substantive equality. This has 
taken place in the context of Article 8 ECHR. Starting with the so-called caravan-cases, the Court has 
held that because Roma are vulnerable, States are to a certain extent under the obligation to facilitate 
their lifestyle.141 The positive obligation to facilitate a Roma lifestyle in Chapman and its sister cases142 
does not require enabling (Roma) minority members to live according to their culture, which in these 
cases would have meant making available sufficient caravan sites.143 The positive obligation is 
procedural; it requires that State authorities show they have taken into account the Roma’s cultural 
situation both in policy-making and judicial interpretation.144 This kind of positive duty offers redress for 
the vulnerability of minorities whose concerns are most likely to be ignored in legislative, policy and 
administrative decision-making processes. In addition, Chapman and its sister cases take a significant 
step in the direction of transformative substantive equality (accommodation of differences) by 
recognizing a “positive obligation . . . to facilitate the Gypsy way of life.”145 To be sure, the judgments in 
these cases ultimately fall short of achieving transformative equality because the Court did not actually 
require the United Kingdom to accommodate traveling people, but the potential is there. 
In V.C., though the positive duty derived from Article 8 ECHR takes a different form and 
character than in Chapman, the Court similarly furthers the participative aspect of equality. This time, 
the aim is to secure the applicant’s involvement in a procedure that concerns her reproductive health. 
Indeed, the Court realizes that this process did not involve the applicant “to a degree permitting her 
interests to be effectively protected.”146 As a result, the Court demands that the State put in place 
“safeguards to protect the reproductive health of, in particular, women of Roma origin,” enabling the 
applicant, “as a member of the vulnerable Roma community, to effectively enjoy her right to respect for 
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her private and family life.”147 The safeguards the Court has in mind are those aimed at ensuring Roma 
women’s full and informed consent in procedures that concern their reproductive health.  
The Court has also furthered the redistributive aspect of substantive equality in the contexts of 
Articles 8 and 3 ECHR as a result of the socio-economic nature of the positive duty imposed on the State. 
The examples are Yordanova and M.S.S. Though decided against different backdrops, both cases raise 
issues of homelessness. In Yordanova – the case concerning an attempt to remove a Roma community 
from unlawfully occupied State land – the applicants would have become homeless as a result of the 
State’s action. In M.S.S., on the other hand, the applicant asylum seeker was actually rendered homeless 
as a result of the State’s inaction.  
The Court reaffirms in both cases that neither Article 3 ECHR nor Article 8 ECHR can be 
interpreted as giving rise to a duty to provide housing.148 In M.S.S., moreover, the Court says that Article 
3 ECHR does not entail an obligation to give refugees financial assistance.149 Notwithstanding the Court’s 
caveats, the obligations affirmed in the two cases contain socio-economic elements. The Court states in 
Yordanova: “[A]n obligation to secure shelter to particularly vulnerable individuals may flow from Article 
8 in exceptional cases.”150 What exactly the Court means by “exceptional cases” is not clear from the 
judgment. In the context of Yordanova, the scope of the positive obligation to provide shelter seems to 
be tied to the negative obligation not to arbitrarily remove vulnerable individuals from their homes. So, 
if States plan to evict members of a vulnerable group from their unlawful settlement, they should first 
consider whether the eviction would render them homeless. In fact, the Court makes clear that the risk 
of rendering the applicants homeless was not “irrelevant,” as the government had claimed.151  
M.S.S., on the other side, is the first case in which the Court has found a violation of Article 3 
ECHR on the grounds of extreme material poverty for which it held a State responsible.152 The majority 
held: 
                                                          
147
 Id. ¶154 and 179. 
148
 Yordanova v. Bulgaria, App. No. 25446/06, 24 April 2012, ¶ 130; and M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, App. No. 
30696/09, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 2, ¶ 249 (2011). 
149
 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, App. No. 30696/09, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 2, ¶ 249 (2011). 
150
 Yordanova v. Bulgaria, App. No. 25446/06, 24 April 2012, ¶ 130. 
151
 Id. ¶ 126. 
152
 In a complaint that was ruled inadmissible, prior to the judgment of M.S.S., the Court had already held that 
“inhuman or degrading treatment” can occur when “an applicant, in circumstances wholly dependent on State 
support, found herself faced with official indifference when in a situation of serious deprivation or want 
incompatible with human dignity.” Budina v. Russia, App. No. 45603/05, 18 June 2009; similar reasoning is in 
Larioshina v. Russia, App. No. 56869/00, 23 April 2002. 
180 
 
[T]he Court considers that the Greek authorities have not had due regard to the applicant's 
vulnerability as an asylum seeker and must be held responsible, because of their inaction, for the 
situation in which he has found himself for several months, living in the street, with no resources 
or access to sanitary facilities, and without any means of providing for his essential needs.
153
 
This reasoning establishes that it is not only in a context of imprisonment154 that an applicant’s 
vulnerability can be an argument for deriving positive obligations in the social and economic sphere 
from the civil and political right encapsulated in Article 3 ECHR. Though the applicant’s status as a 
member of a particularly vulnerable group carries “considerable importance” in the Court’s decision to 
derive such positive obligations,155 this is not the only factor the Court relies on. Another factor that 
carries much weight is the existence of the EU Reception Directive incorporated into Greek domestic 
law,156 which lays down minimal rules as to the material conditions to which asylum seekers are 
entitled.157  
Last, the Court has advanced the recognition and redistribution aspects of substantive equality 
in the context of education of Roma children (Article 2 of Protocol 1, in conjunction with Article 14 
ECHR). It has furthered recognition by imposing on the State positive obligations “to avoid the 
perpetuation of past discrimination.”158 It has fostered redistribution by requiring the State to put in 
place safeguards guaranteeing that Roma children do not end up in a system of inferior education.159 In 
D.H. and Oršuš, the positive obligation that the Court demanded from the States was in essence 
procedural. For example, in Oršuš the Court speaks of the obligation to put in place “safeguards that 
would ensure that . . .the State had sufficient regard to [Roma children’s] special needs as members of a 
disadvantaged group”. 160 However, in Horváth and Kiss, the Court seems to go a step further by 
demanding from the State a more substantive and far-reaching positive obligation: “to undo a history of 
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racial segregation in special schools.”161 Moreover, in Horváth and Kiss, the Court addresses the 
redistributive concerns by acknowledging that, as a result of their misplacement in special schools, 
Roma children are “unlikely to break out of [the] system of inferior education, resulting in their lower 
educational achievement and poorer prospects of employment.”162 
 
B) Increased Weight of Harm in the Scope and Proportionality Analyses: Articles 3 and 8 
ECHR  
 
Group vulnerability has introduced an asymmetrical approach in the Court’s Article 3 ECHR scope 
analysis and Article 8 ECHR proportionality.163 This approach entails that the ill treatment inflicted on the 
applicant may take a greater dimension if she or he belongs to a particularly vulnerable group. This is 
illustrated in M.S.S. In this case, the vulnerability of the applicant as an asylum seeker plays a role in the 
Court’s decision of whether his conditions of detention reached the “minimum level of severity” to fall 
within the scope of Article 3 ECHR. Indeed, in determining whether the duration of the applicant’s 
detention was significant – the Greek government had argued that it was brief – the Court says: 
 
[The Court] does not regard the duration of the two periods of detention imposed on the 
applicant – four days in June 2009 and a week in August 2009 – as being insignificant. In the 
present case, the Court must take into account that the applicant, being an asylum seeker, was 
particularly vulnerable because of everything he had been through during his migration and the 
traumatic experiences he was likely to have endured previously.
164
 
 
So here, because of the applicant’s vulnerable status as an asylum seeker, the effects of his detention 
take a dimension that they would have not taken if the case had concerned a less vulnerable applicant. 
As Judge Sajó rightly puts it in his separate opinion: “For the Court the duration of the detention in the 
present case is comparable in its effects to much longer stays in detention because of the assumed 
vulnerability of the applicant.”165 Group vulnerability therefore acts as a magnifying glass: the ill 
treatment caused to the applicant looks bigger through the vulnerability lens.  
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Yordonava, on the other side, is an example of the role group vulnerability may play in Article 8 
ECHR proportionality analysis. The Court states: 
 
In the context of Article 8, in cases such as the present one, the applicants’ specificity as a social 
group and their needs must be one of the relevant factors in the proportionality assessment that 
the national authorities are under a duty to undertake.
166
 
 
The Court does not indicate the precise weight that national authorities should attach to the applicants’ 
disadvantaged status. However, it makes clear that when governments do not show that they have 
considered the specificities and needs of particularly vulnerable groups, they will not be able to pass the 
ECHR proportionality analysis. In other words, attention to vulnerability takes the form of a procedural 
requirement.167 As we have pointed out in Part II.A, the Court did not follow this approach in Chapman, 
since vulnerability played no real role in the proportionality analysis in that case.  
It goes without saying that the inclusion of group vulnerability in the proportionality does not 
guarantee a favorable outcome to the vulnerable applicant; vulnerability enters the balance along with a 
host of other factors. Its inclusion may nonetheless increase the applicant’s chances of obtaining 
protection. The idea underlying this argument is that the Court should give the interests of vulnerable 
individuals and groups more weight in the proportionality because they are likely to experience harm 
more acutely. Ultimately, by thus giving weight to group vulnerability in the proportionality analysis, the 
Court furthers substantive equality. Fredman has argued that “substantive equality focuses on the group 
which has suffered disadvantage” with the aim of breaking that cycle of disadvantage.168 In our view, the 
Court takes the first step towards breaking the cycle of disadvantage by recognizing disadvantage (in the 
form of historically developed vulnerabilities) as a relevant factor in the proportionality analysis.  
 
C) Narrowed Margin of Appreciation: Article 14 ECHR   
 
The last way in which the concept of vulnerable groups has introduced an asymmetrical interpretation 
of the Convention, is by narrowing the margin of appreciation in Article 14 cases. A few times now, the 
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Court has applied strict scrutiny in cases that concerned discrimination of vulnerable groups. This 
approach is of recent date; the two seminal cases are Alajos Kiss (2010) and Kiyutin (2011). Both cases, 
as we have seen in Part II.B, concern the direct and outright exclusion of an entire class of individuals 
from the enjoyment of a right. 
In Kiyutin, the case concerning an indiscriminate refusal of residence permit to those living with 
HIV, the Court observes: 
 
If a restriction on fundamental rights applies to a particularly vulnerable group in society that has 
suffered considerable discrimination in the past, then the State’s margin of appreciation is 
substantially narrower and it must have very weighty reasons for the restrictions in question. The 
reason for this approach, which questions certain classifications per se, is that such groups were 
historically subject to prejudice with lasting consequences, resulting in their social exclusion. 
Such prejudice could entail legislative stereotyping which prohibited the individualised 
evaluation of their capacities and needs.
169
 (Emphasis added) 
 
This line of reasoning was in fact first used in Alajos Kiss v. Hungary, which actually concerns the right to 
vote (Article 3 Protocol 1), not Article 14 ECHR.170 Despite the fact that the Court does not explicitly 
examine Article 14, however, its analysis in Alajos Kiss is really about discrimination. The Court states: 
 
The Court further considers that the treatment as a single class of those with intellectual or 
mental disabilities is a questionable classification, and the curtailment of their rights must be 
subject to strict scrutiny.
171
 (Emphasis added)  
 
Thus, in both Alajos Kiss and Kiyutin, the Court indicates that it will scrutinize national authorities’ 
decisions strictly when they limit the rights of members of particularly vulnerable groups. As a result, 
States have to put forward “very weighty reasons” for the Court to accept the justification as objective 
and reasonable. Since neither Russia nor Hungary gave such reasons, the Court concluded that they 
“overstepped the narrow margin of appreciation afforded to them.”172  
                                                          
169
 Kiyutin v. Russia, App. No. 2700/10, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 26, ¶ 63 (2011). 
170
 Alajos Kiss v. Hungary, App. No.  38832/06, 20 May 2010, ¶ 42. 
171
 Id. ¶ 44.  
172
 Kiyutin v. Russia, App. No. 2700/10, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 26, ¶ 74 (2011). 
184 
 
 This approach is noteworthy for a number of reasons. In the first place, it marks a willingness of 
the Court to explain why certain classifications are particularly problematic. In the past, the Court has 
seldom taken the trouble to explain why certain grounds of distinction are problematic, except to note a 
consensus on the topic.173 Distinctions on the ground of sex, for example, require very weighty reasons 
because “the advancement of the equality of the sexes is today a major goal in the member States of 
the Council of Europe.”174 With the type of reasoning issued in Alajos Kiss and Kiyutin, on the other 
hand, the Court takes exceptional care to acknowledge the wrongs of discrimination and clarify the 
rationale for a narrowed margin of appreciation.175  
Secondly, this reasoning provides a highly principled approach to justifications, since certain 
classifications are deemed suspect “per se.” Distinctions are inherently suspect when they concern 
groups of people that have been historically discriminated against; such distinctions run a high risk of 
being based on stereotypes rather than on “rational” grounds.176 The Court acknowledges that past 
discrimination reverberates in the present and contaminates actions and decisions. This highly context-
sensitive approach – which is an expression of the relational character of the Court’s vulnerable-group 
concept – heralds a substantive (rather than purely formal) conception of equality. Moreover, by 
narrowing the margin of appreciation, the Court more carefully scrutinizes the possible misrecognition 
harms of prejudice, stigma and stereotyping, therein advancing the recognition aspect of substantive 
equality. 
However, neither in Alajos Kiss nor in Kiyutin does group vulnerability in and of itself narrow the 
margin of appreciation. As we have noted above, both cases concern direct exclusions of entire groups 
from the enjoyment of a right. The particular nature of the restrictions in question – direct and absolute 
– may further explain the Court’s willingness to reduce States’ margin of appreciation. Indeed, the Court 
states in Alajos Kiss: “The Court cannot accept, however, that an absolute bar on voting by any person 
under partial guardianship, irrespective of his or her actual faculties, falls within an acceptable margin of 
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appreciation.”177 In Kiyutin, moreover, the Court additionally relies on the consensus to narrow the 
State’s margin of appreciation.178 
As regards the other cases that we have examined in this Article, there the relationship between 
the margin of appreciation and group vulnerability is less clear. In fact, in the other cases, the role of the 
margin of appreciation principle is not very prominent. In M.S.S., first of all, the principle is obviously 
absent (it has no role in Article 3 ECHR cases given the absolute character of this provision). In V.C. the 
principle is not explicitly mentioned at all; and in D.H., Oršuš, and Yordanova the Court is ultimately not 
clear on the width of the margin of appreciation. Chapman is the exception. In that judgment the Court 
kept the margin deliberately wide, because the case concerned an area in which, in principle, States 
have a wide margin of appreciation: implementation of planning policies.179  
Chapman shows that the Court does not automatically narrow the margin of appreciation when 
there are countervailing reasons to leave it wide (e.g., implementation of planning policies, 
considerations of economic and social policy). More recently, however, the Court has established a 
significant precedent with Alajos Kiss: group vulnerability may decisively narrow the margin of 
appreciation, even though the case concerns an area in which States are usually granted a wide margin 
(in this case determination of justified restrictions on the right to vote.)180 Future cases will have to tell 
how decisive group vulnerability exactly is within the set of factors that determine the margin of 
appreciation. In the next and final Part, we will turn to a topic that is closely associated with this one: 
the institutional position of the Court. 
 
 
V. The Concept of Vulnerable Groups and the Court’s Legitimacy 
    
The Court has recently been under fire from politicians,181 judges182 and scholars183 for what is perceived 
as its usurpation of power from the Contracting States and its neglect to take seriously its subsidiary 
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role.184 Obviously, these are new variations of an old theme: courts – and supranational courts in 
particular – should be wary of judicial activism. In light of this type of critique, we finish by examining 
the institutional concerns associated with the Court’s use of group vulnerability. Two related aspects of 
the Court’s vulnerable-group reasoning, in particular, could raise concern that the Court is overstepping 
its proper role. The first is the Court’s recognition of special positive obligations towards members of 
vulnerable groups,185 and the second is the Court’s decision to narrow the margin of appreciation in 
Article 14 ECHR cases.186 
 The first type of concern has been powerfully voiced by Judge Sajó in M.S.S. v. Belgium and 
Greece. Judge Sajó raises the specter of unlimited human rights, transforming civil and political rights 
into social rights: “There seems to be only a small step between the Court's present position and that of 
a general and unconditional positive obligation of the State to provide shelter and other material 
services to satisfy the basic needs of the ‘vulnerable.’”187 This kind of reasoning, he claims, would be 
more appropriate for a “constitutional court adjudicating on the basis of a national constitution that has 
constitutionalised the social welfare state.”188 The President of the Belgian Constitutional Court, Marc 
Bossuyt, agrees with Sajó and claims that the Court has fallen through “thin ice.”189  
In our view, those who worry that there is a general tendency on the Court’s part to read too 
many positive obligations into the text of the Convention – thereby putting too great of a burden on the 
Convention States – should not necessarily see group vulnerability reasoning as a threat. We are of the 
opinion that vulnerability might actually be a useful guiding principle: in the prioritization of scarce 
resources, States give preference to those whose needs they consider most pressing. When reviewing 
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States’ actions on the basis of an individual complaint, the Court should have the same priority. 
Vulnerability can thus be viewed as a limiting rather than a limitless principle.190  
 The second institutional issue with the vulnerable-group concept relates to the margin of 
appreciation. Often, the Court’s preferred tactic for guarding against accusations that it is overstepping 
its subsidiary role consists in applying the margin of appreciation principle.191 In the words of Judge 
Spielmann: in applying the margin of appreciation “the Court imposes self-restraint on its power of 
review, accepting that domestic authorities are best placed to settle a dispute.”192 So what if the Court 
were to take the line of Alajos Kiss and Kiyutin further,193 and narrow the margin of appreciation in all 
cases that concern vulnerable groups (not just the cases that concern blanket exclusions of these 
groups)? We emphasize that the Court is not there yet: though it is now established case law that 
vulnerable groups require special protection,194 the vulnerable-group concept has by no means turned 
into a principle that automatically narrows the margin. We do, however, think that the Court is 
increasingly attaching weight to group vulnerability in determining the proper margin of appreciation. 
But does that erode the Court’s legitimacy? What should help calm down legitimacy concerns – both 
with regards to positive obligations and the margin of appreciation – is the fact that the Court never 
uses group vulnerability as an automatic trigger. As we have discussed in Part III, the vulnerable-group 
concept is always one among a set of factors, depending on the facts of the case, which determine the 
proper extent of positive obligations and the width of the margin of appreciation. 
Nevertheless, the concerns about the Court’s supra-national institutional position are real, and 
they are compounded by the open-endedness of the vulnerable-group concept. One way in which the 
Court can navigate this problem is by taking the human rights corpus as its reference point for 
determining group vulnerability: when the activities of international organizations and human rights 
reports confirm that there is a structural failure to protect the human rights of a particular group, this 
should be the Court’s cue. The advantage of this suggestion is that it allows the vulnerable-group 
concept to remain flexible: if the Court continues to base its judgments on recent international human 
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rights reports and other authoritative materials, it can carefully follow developments on the ground.195 A 
group’s vulnerability will thus not be set in stone, but re-evaluated case by case. At the same time, in 
this way the concept does not need to be stretched so thin as to lose all power, nor does it need to 
become so vague as to risk legal uncertainty.196  
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
Be it an asylum seeker struggling against deprivation, Roma children seeking to share classes with other 
children, or persons with mental disabilities wishing to exercise the right to vote; the fact is that all these 
cases reveal that vulnerability to human rights violations is often experienced more routinely and 
acutely by some than by others. Human rights law, however, has not always responded adequately to 
these particular vulnerabilities given the import of the liberal legal subject into its structure and the 
exclusion of those who do not fit the liberal archetype. We have argued that it is in response to these 
exclusions of human rights law that the Court has been forced to attend to the constructed 
disadvantage of certain groups. In doing so, the Court has deployed the concept of group vulnerability. 
In this light, we see the Court’s reasoning as a way of opening up the human rights universal, as a step 
towards a more inclusive universal human rights subject. In our opinion, the Court thus enhances rather 
than undermines its own credibility. 
Accordingly, we perceive the Court’s increasing use of group vulnerability reasoning as a 
welcome development.  It allows the Court to address several aspects of substantive equality, we have 
argued. However, group vulnerability reasoning carries pitfalls with it, most notably essentialism, 
stigmatization and paternalism. If the Court is not careful to avoid these pitfalls, it risks sustaining the 
problematic idea that these groups are the only, “true” and quintessential vulnerable subjects in human 
rights law; thus leaving in place the notion that the “normal” subject of human rights law is autonomous 
and independent.197 In other words, the concept of vulnerable groups is a double-edged tool, which 
should be handled with care. As Martha Minow put it in another context, the concept raises “questions 
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of complexity” rather than “justifications for passivity, because failing to notice another's pain is an act 
with significance.”198 
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“The technique is to focus on a concept or term in common use, but also grossly under-theorized, and 
thus ambiguous.”1  
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
A revolution is quietly taking place in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”, 
“the Court” or “the Strasbourg Court”). Without occasioning much comment, the Court is increasingly 
relying on vulnerability reasoning. The aim of this chapter is to analyse that development and discover 
what potential the concept of vulnerability has to improve the legal reasoning of the ECtHR. By 
“improving the legal reasoning” I have something specific in mind, namely the question of how to 
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include more fully and consistently the specific concerns of marginalized people into the legal tests used 
by the ECtHR.2 
Martha Fineman’s vulnerability thesis opens up new ways of thinking about the Court’s 
reasoning. At its most fundamental, she argues that vulnerability is the universal human condition, and 
that it is this condition that grounds the social contract. Vulnerability, she goes on to reason, requires a 
(more) responsive state. Her thesis was initially developed for an American audience. In the United 
States – where, as Fineman underlines, “the rhetoric of non-intervention prevails in policy discussions”3 
– her claims are radical. But the thesis also holds purchase in the European context, even though Europe 
has traditionally been more interventionist in its orientation and practice. In fact, I am struck by the 
transformative potential of the vulnerability thesis precisely in the European human rights context. 
Through the lens of this thesis, previously overlooked elements of ECtHR case law suddenly come to the 
fore. 
In a previous article, Lourdes Peroni and I have shown that “vulnerable groups” is an emerging 
concept in the case law of the ECtHR.4 The present chapter builds on that work and complements it by 
exploring vulnerability as a judicial tool of the Strasbourg Court in a broader sense. My intention is to 
analyse the tensions and the synergies between Fineman’s vulnerability approach and the Court’s 
vulnerability case law, in order to draw out the potential of the Court’s reasoning. Part I will lay the 
foundations for the case law analysis by briefly discussing the vulnerability thesis and the ways in which 
various commentators have conceptualized its relationship to human rights. Part II will then chart and 
critique the ways in which the ECtHR reasons in terms of vulnerability. Next, part III will explore what 
kind of ability vulnerability reasoning has to change human rights law, and part IV will take an 
institutional perspective to show that the Court is vulnerable itself. Part V concludes the whole with 
some reflections about the extent to which the ECtHR, in effect, adopts an approach that is consistent 
with the vulnerability thesis – and to what extent it has the possibility to do so. 
 
II. The Vulnerability Thesis and Human Rights 
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In the specific context of this chapter, I think of the vulnerability thesis as a conceptual way to bridge the 
gap between the legal subject as currently conceived of and real human beings.5 The vulnerability thesis 
is as an invitation to reimagine the “human” of human rights as a vulnerable subject, and to “redirect” 
human rights law in his/her image.6 My analysis builds primarily on the work of Martha Fineman,7 Anna 
Grear8 and Bryan Turner.9 First this Part will briefly discuss how these authors conceive of vulnerability. 
Then this Part will move to the human rights context and explore what light the vulnerability thesis 
sheds on some of the (liberal) suppositions informing human rights law subjectivity. 
Real human beings – Fineman, Grear and Turner argue – are vulnerable due to their 
embodiment. This ontological fact forms the foundation of the vulnerability thesis. As embodied beings 
we are vulnerable both due to our physical openness to hurt and due to our inevitable dependence 
upon others (including the state) for survival.10 We cannot escape the vulnerable condition and so, as 
Fineman emphasizes, vulnerability is universal and constant.11 As such, vulnerability is not something 
that only attaches to specific population groups. Fineman terms her inquiry “post-identity”.12 However, 
while vulnerability is universal, our experience of it is particular. This experience is profoundly affected 
by social institutions; since each and every one of us is situated in “a web of economic and institutional 
relationships”.13 At the same time, these social institutions are “vulnerable entities in and of 
themselves”14 – this is a point that Fineman and Turner both underline. I will return to this point in my 
analysis of ECtHR case law. 
Vulnerability theorists – and in this sense I can count myself among them – do not conceptualize 
vulnerability as being a purely negative condition. In fact, they attempt to reclaim “vulnerability” from 
its negative connotations; they warn against reducing vulnerability to “harm” and “injurability”.15 
Vulnerability is also in many ways generative: it forges bonds between human beings and leads us to 
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create institutions.16 This is the basis for the normative claim (most strongly formulated in Fineman’s 
work) that vulnerability can be turned into “a powerful conceptual tool with the potential to define an 
obligation for the state to ensure a richer and more robust guarantee of equality than is currently 
afforded”.17 A vulnerability analysis does this by turning critical focus towards the institutional 
production of both privilege and disadvantage.18 
How has vulnerability been deployed as a conceptual tool in the human rights context? In 
different ways, both Turner and Grear have conceptualized embodied vulnerability as being 
foundational to human rights. From a sociological perspective, Turner takes ontological vulnerability as 
the foundation for a defence of the universalism of human rights.19 His work sheds light on one of the 
difficulties facing vulnerability theorists: the fact that (the experience of) vulnerability does not by itself 
have prescriptive force. The problem is that, without more, vulnerability is ethically ambiguous: our 
corporeal vulnerability can invite care and empathy, but also violence and abuse.20 Turner adds to the 
vulnerability thesis by recognizing that vulnerability does not automatically produce sympathy. He 
conceptualizes human rights law as a form of institution-building that attempts to answer this 
dilemma.21 
Grear argues that vulnerability is presuppositional to human rights as both an historical and 
conceptual matter.22 She submits that human embodiment and its attendant vulnerability have played a 
foundational role both in the creation of rights discourse in the eighteenth century and in the creation of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights after World War II.23 But the human rights story is not 
straightforward. Grear shows that the relationship between vulnerability and human rights is complex 
and contested, and that the individual that human rights law seeks to protect is not necessarily always 
the vulnerable subject.24 On the contrary, through tracing a “genealogy of quasi-disembodiment” in 
human rights law, Grear makes a convincing case that the abstract liberal subject is comfortably 
                                                          
16
 Martha Albertson Fineman, “Elderly” as Vulnerable: Rethinking the Nature of Individual and Societal 
Responsibility, 20 THE ELDER LAW JOURNAL 101 (2012). 
17
 Fineman, supra note 1, at 8-9. 
18
 Fineman, supra note 7, at 274. 
19
 TURNER, supra note 9. 
20
 See, e.g., BUTLER, supra note 15, at Xii, 40 and 128-151; and Ann V. Murphy, ‘Reality Check’: Rethinking the Ethics 
of Vulnerability, in THEORIZING SEXUAL VIOLENCE 55, 56 and 60-63 (Renée J. Heberle & Victoria Grace eds., 2009). 
21
 TURNER, supra note 9, at 39-43. 
22
 GREAR, supra note 6. 
23
 Id. at 137-149. 
24
 Anna Grear, email to the author, 24 May 2012. 
194 
 
ensconced within the human rights paradigm.25 One notable offshoot of this reality is that corporations 
now enjoy human rights – something Grear argues against. Human rights, she suggests, need 
“redirecting” towards a full appreciation of human embodiment (as opposed to quasi-disembodied 
understandings of persons and, in particular, the corporate form) and suggests that we can redirect 
human rights precisely by drawing on the presuppositional role of vulnerability. 
In light of Grear’s argument, it is worth pausing for a moment to consider more explicitly the 
figure in the background of the vulnerability thesis: the “liberal subject”. Fineman, Grear and (to a lesser 
extent) Turner all present their vulnerability analysis as an answer to the ills associated with liberal 
notions of (legal) personhood.26 The liberal subject is the one currently dominating both legal and 
political discourse in the United States and Europe: as an archetype, “he” (for this subject is male) 
symbolizes autonomy, independence, personal responsibility and self-sufficiency.27 This is also a familiar 
figure in human rights law; indeed, he is a key target of critical human rights scholars.28 I do not have the 
space here to do justice to the complexity of their arguments nor to develop a full account of legal 
subjectivity in the case law of the ECtHR.29 In a nutshell, the difficulty is that the human rights universal 
is often premised on a mythical invulnerable subject, who is male, white, rational, autonomous, etc.30 
This subject, moreover, is “unable to survive without the existence of an ‘Other’“;31 who is everything 
the supposedly universal subject is not. Thus, the point is that the “allegedly neutral subject of human 
rights law” reproduces time-worn hierarchies of gender, race, nation, socio-economic status, religion 
and sexuality.32 
                                                          
25
 GREAR, supra note 6, at 96-113. 
26
 See generally about the different constructions of legal subjectivity Ngaire Naffine, Who are Law’s Persons? 
From Cheshire Cats to Responsible Subjects, 66 THE MODERN LAW REVIEW 346 (2003). 
27
 MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 34 (2004); Fineman, supra note 1, at 10-
11; and Fineman, supra note 16, at 116. 
28
 See e.g., COSTAS DOUZINAS, THE END OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2000); GREAR, supra note 6; Dianne Otto, Lost in Translation: 
Re-Scripting the Sexed Subjects of International Human Rights Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS OTHERS 318 (Anne 
Orford ed., 2006). 
29
 That would be a fascinating topic for future research. Others have persuasively suggested that the ECtHR fails to 
respond adequately when applicants do not fit the template of the liberal subject. See, e.g., DIVERSITY AND EUROPEAN 
HUMAN RIGHTS: REWRITING JUDGMENTS OF THE ECHR (Eva Brems ed., 2012). 
30
 DEBRA BERGOFFEN, CONTESTING THE POLITICS OF GENOCIDAL RAPE: AFFIRMING THE DIGNITY OF THE VULNERABLE BODY 109 (2012) 
(“current human rights paradigms take their cue from the masculine image of the invulnerable body.”) 
31
 Ratna Kapur, Human Rights in the 21
st
 Century: Take a Walk on the Dark Side, 28 SYDNEY LAW REVIEW 665, 675 
(2006). See also DOUZINAS, supra note 28, at 357-366; and Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims, And Saviors: The 
Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 201, 201 (2001). 
32
 Otto, supra note 28, at 318. 
195 
 
At the heart of the idea of universal human rights subjectivity is the notion of human dignity. 
Despite the voluminous scholarship on this topic,33 the positive links between vulnerability and dignity 
are not often explored. Indeed, dignity is often associated with invulnerability.34 According to classic 
Kant-based readings, dignity is about overcoming vulnerability through the use of reason.35 However, 
some scholars – notably Mary Neal, Anna Grear and Debra Bergoffen – offer very different readings of 
the relationship between dignity and embodied vulnerability. In different ways, their project is to align 
dignity with vulnerability. Their work recognizes that both dignity and vulnerability are inherent in the 
human condition: the vulnerable subject is a subject with dignity. According to Grear, vulnerability is the 
“presuppositional” core of human dignity.36 Neal takes the analysis of the relationship between these 
two concepts a step further, by arguing that “[d]ignity … treats vulnerability as a source of value. … all 
valid uses of “dignity” reflect a valuing of the sense in which human existence (perhaps uniquely) 
embodies a union between the fragile/material/finite and the transcendent/sublime/immortal”.37 I 
summarize these arguments here, because the Court seems to increasingly connect vulnerability and 
dignity (as the next parts of this chapter will show). 
To conclude these reflections, it should perhaps be clarified that the scope of this chapter is 
theoretically less ambitious than the work of Turner, Grear and others: this chapter does not seek to 
proffer a rereading of the foundations of human rights. The comments that are offered here are 
anchored in human rights practice, in the sense that they take the case law of the ECtHR as their focal 
point. I draw on vulnerability theory primarily to inform my reading of the ECtHR’s practice. At the same 
time, I hope that my reading of this practice will contribute – even if only in a small way – towards 
refining and developing the theory. In that context, I note that the case law of the ECtHR sheds light on 
the theoretical question – originally raised by Turner38 – as to whether the vulnerability thesis is directly 
relevant for all human rights, or just for socio-economic rights. Turner maintains that the thesis is more 
directly pertinent to socio-economic than to civil-political rights. Grear disagrees, because in her view all 
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categories of human right presuppose embodied vulnerability.39 Anticipating the next part of this 
chapter, which assesses the case law of the ECtHR, I wish to emphasize that the ECtHR employs 
vulnerability considerations to great effect both in cases that turn on socio-economic issues40 and in 
cases that concern more classic civil and political rights.41 From the perspective of Strasbourg, therefore, 
Grear seems to be right. 
Lastly, it should be emphasized that the ECtHR is by no means developing its vulnerability 
reasoning in a vacuum.42 Care for human vulnerability is part of the culture of human rights both in the 
Council of Europe43 and in the United Nations system44 – as evidenced by the frequent references to 
vulnerability in the output of these organizations. Regrettably this chapter will not be able to address 
the cross-fertilization between the vulnerability reasoning of these different bodies: it will now proceed 
to trace how the ECtHR (and the ECtHR alone) uses vulnerability considerations. 
 
III. Vulnerability in the Case Law of the ECtHR: Thematization and Critique 
 
This part explores how the Court conceives of vulnerability. As vulnerability is such a little-known 
concept of ECtHR jurisprudence, the aim here is first of all to chart the Court’s vulnerability case law. By 
asking the question of what renders people vulnerable in the eyes of the Court, I explore how the case 
law fits or fails to fit with the vulnerability thesis. In order to do this, I find it useful to keep Grear’s 
argument in mind that the historical development of the human rights movement yields two different 
stories: one story adopts a liberal quasi-disembodied subject and the other story adopts a human 
embodied vulnerable subject as the central figure of human rights. Keeping this ambivalence in mind 
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 GREAR, supra note 6, at 134-135 and 156-161. 
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 Such as housing or the provision of medical treatment for prisoners. See infra Part II. 
41
 Such as the right to a fair trial: see Salduz v. Turkey (GC), App. No. 36391/02, 27 November 2008, (2009) 49 Eur. 
H.R.R. 19, and infra Part II.4. 
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 As Lourdes Peroni and I discussed in our joint paper, the Court often refers to these other instruments of human 
rights law when it makes a vulnerability-claim. Peroni & Timmer, supra note 4, at 6-7. 
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 This is evidenced, for example, by the work of the Committee of Ministers, the European Committee of Social 
Rights, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights and the European Commission on Racism and 
Intolerance. See, e.g, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation CM/Rec(2011)5  on reducing the risk of 
vulnerability of elderly migrants and improving their welfare (May 25, 2011); and THOMAS HAMMARBERG, HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN EUROPE: NO GROUNDS FOR COMPLACENCY. VIEWPOINTS BY THOMAS HAMMARBERG COUNCIL OF EUROPE COMMISSIONER FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS (2011). 
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 See, e.g., Audrey R. Chapman & Benjamin Carbonetti, Human Rights Protections for Vulnerable and 
Disadvantaged Groups: The Contributions of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 33 HUM. 
RTS. Q. 682 (2011); and Alexander H.E. Morawa, Vulnerability as a Concept of International Human Rights Law, 6 
JOURNAL ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT 139 (2003). 
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allows one to see that the Court often struggles between these competing narratives and produces 
contradictory impulses in relation to outcomes. On the one hand, it will quickly become apparent that 
the Court does not, like Fineman, conceptualize vulnerability as universal and constant. Instead, 
“vulnerable” is an epithet that the Court attaches to some (groups of) applicants but not to others. This 
part will argue that the result is that, in many ways, the Court’s vulnerability reasoning does not disturb 
the assumptions underpinning the liberal subject.45 On the other hand, even though the Court’s 
vulnerability reasoning might not signal a complete paradigm shift, this part shall show that it does spur 
many sensitive and substantive case-assessments. 
 
A) Thematization 
 
i. Inherent vulnerability: children and persons with mental disabilities 
 
The Court comes closest to embracing Fineman’s vulnerability thesis in its case law concerning children 
and people with a mental disability. Fineman’s thesis has origins in her earlier work on the inevitability 
of dependency: “All of us were dependent as children, and many of us will be dependent as we age, 
become ill or suffer disabilities.”46 Fineman’s vulnerability approach is therefore responsive to the fact 
that abilities differ over the course of a lifespan.47 The Court is responsive to this too; at least when it 
concerns children and people with a mental disability. These are the two types of applicants that the 
Court considers to be inherently and constantly vulnerable. The Court does not often make it explicit 
why it conceives of their vulnerability in this way, but the case law contains many references to their 
dependency upon the care of others,48 and their difficulty or inability to complain of abuse or of their 
treatment more generally.49 It is noteworthy that the Court has not really applied vulnerability reasoning 
yet in cases concerning elderly applicants. There are a few judgments in which the Court recognized that 
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 See infra Part II.B. 
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 FINEMAN, supra note 27, at 35.  
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 See, e.g., Fineman, supra note 1, at 12; and Fineman, supra note 16. 
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 See, for example, Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium, App. No. 13178/03, 12 October 2006, 
(2008) 46 E.H.R.R. 23, ¶ 51. 
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 M.C. v. Bulgaria, App. No. 39272/98, 4 December 2003, (2005) 40 E.H.R.R. 20, ¶ 183 and 58 (rape of young girl); 
Juppala v. Finland, App. No. 18620/03, 2 December 2008, (2010) 51 E.H.R.R. 4, ¶ 41-42; M.B. v. Romania, App. No. 
43982/06, 3 November 2011, ¶ 52 (rape of a woman with mental disabilities); Keenan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 
27229/95, 3 April 2001, (2001) 33 E.H. R.R. 38, ¶ 111 (imprisonment and subsequent suicide of person with a 
chronic mental disorder). The Court has recognized that the same can apply to elderly people: Heinisch v. 
Germany, App no 28274/08, 21 July 2011, ¶ 71. 
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an elderly person was in a vulnerable situation,50 but the Court has not developed a jurisprudence that 
reflects the fact that people are differently vulnerable towards the end of their lives.51 
For children and people with a mental disability, however, the Court’s vulnerability reasoning has had a 
real effect both in participation-related and protection-related cases.52 Mostly via the doctrine of 
positive obligations (about which the next part of this chapter will say more), the Court has developed a 
jurisprudence that requires states to pay attention to the specificities of children53  and of people with a 
mental disability and thus to provide them with adequate protection from human rights abuses. An 
example is the case of C.A.S. and C.S. v. Romania, concerning the failure of the authorities to investigate 
the sexual abuse of a seven-year-old boy: 
 
Concerning notably the weight attached to the victim’s reaction, the Court considers that the 
authorities were not mindful of the particular vulnerability of young people and the special 
psychological factors involved in cases concerning violent sexual abuse of minors, particularities 
which could have explained the victim’s hesitations both in reporting the abuse and in his 
descriptions of the facts.
54
 
 
Similarly, the Court has emphasized that “the vulnerability of mentally ill persons calls for special 
protection”.55 
Both children’s rights theorists and disability rights theorists have long insisted that human 
rights discourse is disempowering if vulnerability is stressed to the exclusion of agency.56 The Court 
shows that it is aware that vulnerability and agency go hand in hand. The Court knows how to rely on 
vulnerability in a way that is empowering, especially in participation-related cases. This passage from 
Stanev v. Bulgaria, a case concerning the placement of a mentally disabled man in a social care home, is 
an example: 
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 See, for example, Mudric v. The Republic of Moldova, App. No. 74839/10, 16 July 2013, ¶ 51 (concerning 
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Muskhadzhiyeva and others v. Belgium, 19 January 2010, in DIVERSITY AND EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS: REWRITING 
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The Court considers that any protective measure should reflect as far as possible the wishes of 
persons capable of expressing their will. Failure to seek their opinion could give rise to situations 
of abuse and hamper the exercise of the rights of vulnerable persons. Therefore, any measure 
taken without prior consultation of the interested person will as a rule require careful scrutiny.
57
 
 
ii. Vulnerability due to State control: persons in detention 
The paradigmatic image of the vulnerable person who cannot protect himself from the power of the 
state is found in the case law concerning detainees. It is firmly established in the Court’s case law on 
Articles 2, 3 and 5 that people who are deprived of their liberty by the state are in a vulnerable 
position.58 The Court considers persons in custody to be vulnerable because they are within the control 
of the authorities and, as such, their physical well-being depends on the state.59 This has had one 
spectacular effect, namely that the burden of proof is reversed in detention cases: when death or injury 
occurs in prison, it is for the authorities, and not for the applicant, to establish what happened.60 
Conceptualizing vulnerability so narrowly that state control is the only criterion has significant 
limitations, however. The Court’s exclusive focus on physical state control does not allow for a response 
to the political vulnerability of prisoners and ex-prisoners, for example. In Scoppola v. Italy (no. 3) the 
Court paradoxically held that disenfranchising certain prisoners for life could serve the legitimate aim of 
ensuring the proper functioning and preservation of the democratic process.61 If prisoners and ex-
prisoners are not allowed to vote, who will represent them? It is relatively obvious that disenfranchising 
prisoners renders them more vulnerable. Another example of the Court’s narrow notion of vulnerability 
is found in Stummer v. Austria; a case concerning the non-affiliation of prisoners to the pension system 
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 Stanev v. Bulgaria (GC), App. No. 36760/06, 17 January 2012, ¶ 153. 
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 Foundational cases include Kurt v. Turkey in which the Commission held: “Article 5 (Art. 5) aims to provide a 
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 See, for example, Salman v. Turkey (GC), App. No. 21986/93, 27 June 2000, (2002) 34 E.H.R.R. 17, ¶ 99–100. 
61
 Scoppola v. Italy (no. 3) (GC), App. No. 126/05, 22 May 2012, ¶ 91. 
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for work they performed while imprisoned.62 The seven dissenting judges held that ex-prisoners are 
vulnerable too, as they have less access to social services.63 The majority disagreed: apparently, once 
outside the prison walls and therefore beyond the physical control of the state, ex-prisoners cannot 
count on a responsive state (or a responsive court). 
 
iii. Vulnerability due to gender: women in domestic violence or precarious reproductive 
health situations  
In recent cases concerning domestic violence the Court has come close to adopting a vulnerability 
approach. Fineman advocates that we should shift our attention to “the individual’s location within 
webs of social, economic, political, and institutional relationships that structure opportunities and 
options”.64 In line with this, the Court acknowledges that the vulnerability of female victims of domestic 
violence is both physical and psychological,65 and that this is the result of a combination of individual 
and social circumstances. The following quote from Opuz v. Turkey, the Court’s ground-breaking 
domestic violence case from 2009, is in this respect illustrative: 
 
The Court considers that the applicant may be considered to fall within the group of ‘vulnerable 
individuals’ entitled to State protection … In this connection, it notes the violence suffered by the 
applicant in the past, the threats issued by H.O. following his release from prison and her fear of 
further violence as well as her social background, namely the vulnerable situation of women in 
south-east Turkey.
66
 
 
In this case, the Court found a violation of the Convention because the state failed to comply with its 
positive obligation to take effective measures to protect the applicant from the violence of her 
husband.67 In the cases of Bevacqua and S. v. Bulgaria (2008) and in Hajduová v. Slovakia (2010) the 
Court went a step further, categorically declaring that victims of domestic violence as such are 
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 Stummer v. Austria (GC), App. No. 37452/02, 7 July 2011, (2012), 54 Eur. H.R.R. 11. 
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 Id. (Tulkens, Kovler, Gyulumyan, Spielmann, Popović, Malinverni and Pardalos J. dissenting, ¶ 10). 
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 Fineman, supra note 16, at 129. 
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 Opuz v. Turkey, App. No. 33401/02, 9 June 2009, (2010) 50 E.H.R.R. 28, ¶ 132. 
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 Id. ¶ 160. 
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 The link between vulnerability reasoning and positive obligations will be discussed in the next part of this 
chapter. See infra Part III.B. 
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particularly vulnerable.68 This could also be conceptualized as a form of ex-post vulnerability; a person is 
particularly vulnerable after (and because of) suffering this kind of human rights abuse.69 The Court’s 
approach, however, is not consistent. In some recent domestic violence cases the Court did not 
acknowledge the particular vulnerability of the applicant.70 
The other area of case law in which the Court increasingly often – but not always71 – reasons 
from gendered vulnerability72 concerns reproductive health. In three well-known judgments against 
Poland concerning access to abortion, Tysiac v. Poland (2007), R.R. v. Poland (2011) and P. and S. v. 
Poland (2012), the Court held that the applicants in these cases were in a vulnerable situation.73 It seems 
that their vulnerability is a result of their physical condition, their distress on account of their own (in 
the case of Tysiac) or their foetus’s health (in the case of R.R.),74 and their dependence upon their 
doctors to provide them with timely and correct information about their health and access to abortion. 
The first applicant in P. and S. was a 14-year-old girl who was pregnant as a result of rape, so these were 
additional factors that exacerbated her vulnerability. Dependency on doctors was also stressed as a 
vulnerability factor by Judges Sajó and Tulkens in a dissenting opinion in a case that concerned the 
question whether women should have the right to give birth at home.75 Thus we see that the theme of 
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 Bevacqua and S. v. Bulgaria, App. No. 71127/01, 12 June 2008, ¶ 65; Hajduová v. Slovakia, App. No. 2660/03, 30 
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 Tysiac v. Poland, App. No. 5410/03, 20 March 2007, (2007) 45 Eur. H.R.R. 42, ¶ 127; R.R. v. Poland, App. No. 
27617/04, 26 May 2011, (2011) 53 Eur. H.R.R. 31, ¶ 159; P. and S. v. Poland, App. No. 57375/08, 30 October 2012, 
¶ 110 and 162-166. 
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 In R.R. the Court held that “the applicant was in a situation of great vulnerability. Like any other pregnant 
woman in her situation, she was deeply distressed by information that the foetus could be affected with some 
malformation.” The Court shows great empathy for the situation that this woman was in and recognizes that she 
suffered “painful uncertainty” and “acute anguish” and that she was “humiliated”. R.R. v. Poland, App. No. 
27617/04, 26 May 2011, (2011) 53 Eur. H.R.R. 31, ¶ 159–60. 
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 Ternovszky v. Hungary, App. No. 67545/09, 14 December 2010 (Sajo J and Tulkens J dissenting) (“the expectant 
mother has to interact during the period of pregnancy with authorities and regulated professionals who act as 
figures of some kind of public authority vis-à-vis the pregnant person, who is understandably very vulnerable 
because of her dependency”). 
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dependency – which is also very important in the work of Martha Fineman – is recurring throughout 
different areas of the Court’s vulnerability reasoning. 
 
iv. Vulnerability due to a legal power imbalance: persons who are accused & persons 
who lack legal capacity  
One of the Court’s successful deployments of vulnerability reasoning is found in the influential76 case of 
Salduz v. Turkey.77 In Salduz, the Court has held that “an accused often finds himself in a particularly 
vulnerable position” in the investigative stage of criminal proceedings.78 The Court continued: “In most 
cases, this particular vulnerability can only be properly compensated for by the assistance of a lawyer 
whose task it is, among other things, to help to ensure respect of the right of an accused not to 
incriminate himself.”79 This has since become the standard under Article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention 
(right to a fair trial). This is a sound instance of vulnerability reasoning, because the Court convincingly 
diagnoses the reason why people who are accused of a crime are particularly vulnerable – they could 
easily experience pressure to incriminate themselves – and, subsequently, the Court requires that a 
“responsive State”80 “counter[s] the power imbalance”81 by giving the accused the right to legal 
assistance. 
In the same line of successful vulnerability reasoning concerning legal power imbalances is 
Zehentner v. Austria.82 In fact, the applicant in that case had no legal power at all, as she had a legal 
guardian appointed for her. Her complaint at Strasbourg related to the fact that she had not been able 
to institute legal proceedings against the forced sale of her house. The Court holds that: “persons who 
lack legal capacity are particularly vulnerable and States may thus have a positive obligation under 
Article 8 to provide them with specific protection by the law”.83 
 
v. Vulnerability due to espousal of unpopular views: demonstrators and journalists  
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 As a result of this ruling, many European states had to amend their laws. See, e.g., Chrisje Brants, The Reluctant 
Dutch Response to Salduz, 15 EDINBURGH LAW Review 298 (2011).  
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In the context of Article 11 of the Convention (the right to peaceful assembly and association), the Court 
has held that: [the positive obligation of the state to secure the effective enjoyment of these freedoms] 
“is of particular importance for persons holding unpopular views or belonging to minorities, because 
they are more vulnerable to victimisation.”84 This reasoning comes from the judgments in Baczkowski 
and Others v. Poland and Alekseyev v. Russia, both concerning applicants who wanted to organize a 
demonstration to draw attention to discrimination against gays and lesbians. The Court has also been 
known to recognize the vulnerability of Ukrainian journalists “who cover politically sensitive topics” and 
who thereby “place themselves in a vulnerable position vis-à-vis those in power (as evidenced by the 
death of eighteen journalists in Ukraine since 1991)”.85 
What makes these various people who espouse unpopular views vulnerable? One way of looking 
at these cases is that they all concern human rights defenders.86 Another way of looking at them is that 
these cases all concern people who are isolated from the mainstream. The theme that was just 
discussed – vulnerability due to a power imbalance – also clearly plays a role here. 
 
vi. Vulnerability in the context of migration: detention and expulsion of asylum seekers 
The Court’s vulnerability reasoning with regard to “irregular” migrants is complex and problematic. 
Regrettably but not surprisingly, the Court often fails to respond to the vulnerability of asylum seekers.87 
However, there are also positive developments in the jurisprudence. The Court now struggles between a 
classical liberal human rights discourse – a discourse bound up with Westphalian sovereignty88 – and a 
discourse that is more receptive of real lived vulnerability. I will illustrate the Court’s difficulties with 
formulating an appropriate response to the vulnerability of asylum seekers through an analysis of the 
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case law concerning detention conditions and non-refoulement.89 Both these types of cases are litigated 
under the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment (Article 3). 
The Court’s deportation cases, in particular, are inconsistent and distressing from a vulnerability 
perspective. The question the Court seems most concerned with in such cases is the question of which 
state should bear the responsibility of taking care of migrants: the receiving state or the state of origin. 
When defining the scope of the term “ill-treatment” under Article 3 in deportation cases, the Court 
makes a distinction between future harm that would emanate from “the intentional acts or omission of 
public authorities or non-State bodies” and the kind of harm that emanates from “a naturally occurring 
illness and the lack of sufficient resources to deal with it in the receiving country”.90 Only when a rights-
holder is in danger of suffering the first kind of harm – namely political persecution – is there a chance91 
that the ECtHR will interfere. In other words, only when a migrant is vulnerable to political persecution 
in her home country can this put a responsibility on the receiving European country not to deport her. 
Within these narrow confines, the expulsion case that is most promising from a vulnerability perspective 
is Salah Sheekh v. Netherlands.92 This case is promising since the Court’s vulnerability analysis combines 
both individual elements (concerning the applicant’s own history of victimization and his family’s) and 
group-based elements (concerning the vulnerability of the Ashraf minority). 
(In)famously, in N. v. UK the state-oriented approach that only recognizes vulnerability on the 
ground of political persecution,93 has led the Court to approve the expulsion of a woman who suffered 
from AIDS after she had lived in the UK for ten years.94 The woman was in a stable condition thanks to 
the medication that she had received in the UK, but the Court knew that deportation to her native 
Uganda would quickly lead to her death due to lack of available medication. Fineman’s vulnerability 
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 N. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 26565/05, 27 May 2008, (2008) 47 Eur. H.R.R. 39, ¶ 43; Sufi and Elmi v. United 
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thesis calls attention to the utter inadequacy of conceiving of vulnerability in this truncated manner: 
embodied vulnerability to sickness, drought, and food shortage cannot be separated from embodied 
vulnerability to – say – violence and government-led exploitation. 
However, as I suggested at the start of this sub-paragraph, there are also glimmers of hope that 
the Court is moving towards a fuller recognition of lived vulnerability.95 Most significant in terms of 
developing a vulnerability thesis that can do justice to asylum seekers is the Grand Chamber case of 
M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece from 2011, concerning an Afghan asylum seeker who entered Europe 
through Greece where he was first held in detention and later released on the streets from where he 
eventually made his way to Belgium.96 As regards the conditions of his detention, the Court held: “In the 
present case the Court must take into account that the applicant, being an asylum seeker, was 
particularly vulnerable because of everything he had been through during his migration and the 
traumatic experiences he was likely to have endured previously.”97 Moreover, as regards his living 
conditions once he was released from detention, the Court held: 
 
[T]he Court considers that the Greek authorities have not had due regard to the applicant’s 
vulnerability as an asylum seeker and must be held responsible, because of their inaction, for the 
situation in which he has found himself for several months, living in the street, with no resources 
or access to sanitary facilities, and without any means of providing for his essential needs.
98
 
 
In this context, the applicant’s dependency on the state was certainly a consideration for the Court.99 
On top of this, the Court held that Belgium violated Article 3 of the Convention, by sending M.S.S. back 
to Greece and thereby back to such appalling detention and living conditions. That makes this case 
directly relevant for future expulsion cases. M.S.S. represents an important step towards an embrace of 
the vulnerable subject in asylum law. Lourdes Peroni and I have extensively analysed this case in our 
article on vulnerable groups so I will not discuss it here any further,100 except to say that, in some cases 
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that have been delivered since M.S.S., the Court finds it difficult to reconcile the traditional approach 
epitomized in N v. UK with the vulnerability approach of M.S.S.101 
 
vii. Vulnerability due to group-membership: Roma, people with impaired health, and (to 
some extent) asylum seekers  
M.S.S. leads to the next strand of case law in which the Court reasons from vulnerability: the cases that 
concern discrimination on account of group-membership. The Court has used the concept of “vulnerable 
groups” in relation to Roma,102 people with mental disabilities,103 people living with HIV104 and – to a 
limited extent – asylum seekers.105 Lourdes Peroni and I have discussed this concept in our joint 
paper,106 but I just mention it here in order to be as complete as possible in this thematization of 
vulnerability in the Court’s case law. We came to the conclusion that the Court’s use of the “vulnerable 
group” concept does not chime well with Fineman’s vulnerability thesis – which explicitly rejects an 
identity-based focus – but we have nevertheless welcomed the concept as a positive move towards a 
more robust notion of equality. 
 
viii. Compounded vulnerability  
The Court’s docket includes a high number of complaints of people considered to be vulnerable due to a 
combination of the reasons mentioned above, such as children who are held in asylum seekers 
centers;107 physically and/or mentally disabled persons who are held in prison108 (or who died there and 
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whose cases are judged with regard to their vulnerability while alive109); female detainees who have 
been subjected to a forced gynaecological examination;110 and, more generally, particularly vulnerable 
women (read: young, old, imprisoned, disabled, etc.) who have been sexually abused.111 Analogous to 
the idea of compounded discrimination,112 I would call this “compounded vulnerability”. In such 
situations, the Court sometimes speaks of “extreme vulnerability”,113 “double vulnerability”,114 or “great 
vulnerability”.115 
It appears that when the Court is of the opinion that an applicant is vulnerable on multiple 
grounds, the Court is inclined to attach great importance to this fact. Indeed, compounded vulnerability 
has been known to trump other considerations. This is most clearly stated in a case concerning the 
detention of children in a Belgian asylum centre. The Court held in Muskhadzhiyeva and Others v. 
Belgium: “la situation d’extrême vulnérabilité de l’enfant était déterminante et prédominait sur la 
qualité d’étranger en séjour illégal” (which I would loosely translate as: “the extremely vulnerable 
situation of the child was decisive and took precedence over her status as an illegal immigrant”).116 This 
reasoning is very promising, as the Court explicitly distances itself from a sovereignty approach in favour 
of a vulnerability approach. 
 
B) Critique 
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Does this overview of the Court’s quite extensive vulnerability reasoning show that the Court has 
adopted the vulnerability thesis? No. The Court does not conceptualize vulnerability as universal and 
constant, nor does it fully move beyond liberal notions of legal subjectivity. The crux of the problem is 
that the Court’s vulnerable subjects (prisoners, people with a mental disability, migrants, etc.) are 
examples of marginalized and stigmatized subjects: they do not function as an alternative to the liberal 
subject, but are classic examples of liberalism’s “Others”.117 Labelling only these subjects as vulnerable 
does not challenge the idea that there is such a thing as an invulnerable subject (who does not suffer 
from all the impediments described in the paragraph above, such as dependence), nor does it challenge 
the hold of this fictional creature on human rights law. In other words, the Court does not really disrupt 
the vulnerable/invulnerable binary – nor for that matter the related binary of 
autonomous/dependent.118 
Drawing on the work of Fineman and Dianne Otto, the somewhat bleak suggestion presents itself that as 
long as the Court does not do something radical, namely jettisoning the liberal subject and putting the 
universally vulnerable subject in its place, it is doomed to reinforce the marginalization of the very 
people it seeks to protect.119 I am, however, not prepared to draw the conclusion that the Court’s 
vulnerability reasoning is a failure:120 on the contrary, my analysis so far has shown that this reasoning 
has resulted in many context-sensitive judgments. The next part of this chapter will explore this further. 
On a more ideological level, the Court does in some ways move beyond liberal assumptions, in my 
opinion. The results of the Court’s vulnerability reasoning in the context of existing human rights theory 
and practice will also be discussed below. 
 
 
IV. The Ability of Vulnerability 
 
So far, this chapter has noted that in important ways the Court’s vulnerability reasoning does not fit 
Fineman’s thesis, but that there are aspects to it that are encouraging and constructive. The present 
part will further unpack the power and transformative promise of the Court’s reasoning. How does 
vulnerability add to the Court’s existing jurisprudence? My analysis will show that proportionality and 
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positive obligations are the primary jurisprudential conduits through which vulnerability is leaving its 
mark. The result is, I argue, (A) a prioritization among the different claims on the ECtHR, and (B) an 
extension of rights. 
 
A) Prioritizing among Different Claims 
 
This sub-paragraph will show that vulnerability considerations lead the Court to prioritize both in its 
workload and in its case-assessments. Vulnerability’s potential to prioritize – and the role that the 
judiciary can play in this respect – has not been much explored in the work of the theorists that was 
discussed in Part I. This is therefore an area in which the ECtHR’s practice could inform the vulnerability 
thesis. 
 
i. Workload prioritization: vulnerability and the priority policy determining the order of 
cases 
Vulnerability considerations play a role in the Court’s arrangement of its work schedule. This is 
evidenced by the Court’s “priority policy”. This policy is designed to allow the Court to face its massive 
caseload crisis by giving precedence to the cases that are most urgent. The policy has devised seven 
categories of cases. A case that is classified in one of the lower categories is likely to “remain on the 
docket virtually eternally” and so this classification carries huge practical significance.121 Vulnerability 
considerations are not mentioned in any of the categories but in my opinion they are implicit in the first 
– as well as pertinent to the third: 
 
I. Urgent applications (in particular risk to life or health of the applicant, other 
circumstances linked to the personal or family situation of the applicant, particularly 
where the well-being of a child is at issue, application of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court). 
III. Applications which on their face raise as main complaints issues under Articles 2, 3, 4 
or 5 § 1 of the Convention (‘core rights’), irrespective of whether they are repetitive, and 
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which have given rise to direct threats to the physical integrity and dignity of human 
beings.122 
 
The first category makes specific mention of two groups that are considered especially vulnerable:123 
children and applicants who have requested an interim measure – these are often “irregular” migrants 
who face deportation.124 The third category mentions physical integrity and dignity of human beings 
together; thus linking dignity to embodiment. In different ways, therefore, embodied vulnerability is key 
to both categories.125 
 
ii. Substantive prioritization: vulnerability and proportionality  
By substantive prioritization I mean the kind of prioritization that occurs in the case law itself: a 
prioritization between claims. Here, a distinction should be made between Article 3 cases, concerning 
the absolute prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, and cases that concern 
qualified Convention rights (meaning rights which do permit of balancing). In the first type of case the 
central question is whether treatment reaches “the minimum level of severity” in order to engage 
Article 3. In this test, vulnerability weighs heavily and can have absolute prioritizing force. The case of 
Muskhadzhiyeva and Others v. Belgium is a good example.126 
The focus here is on the second type of case; namely the type that concerns rights which – by 
virtue of their formulation in the Convention – can be restricted. As is well known, the ECtHR performs a 
proportionality analysis in such cases. The virtues of proportionality analysis in human rights law are 
contested,127 as is the Court’s application of the analysis.128 From the perspective of the vulnerability 
thesis, the Court’s proportionality reasoning – with its attendant discourse of “conflicts of rights” – is 
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troubling. The problem is that harm to real and vulnerable individuals gets reduced to harm to 
“conflicting rights and interests”,129 while, in the meantime, the vulnerable human being risks getting 
“lost in translation”.130 
Leaving aside the conceptual critique for a moment, vulnerability does play an increasingly 
prominent role in the Court’s proportionality analysis. To quote from a dissent by Judge Power: 
“vulnerability is a factor to be weighed in the balance.”131 How much weight the Court attaches to 
vulnerability is ambiguous, however. Nevertheless, a bottom line has emerged: the Court insists that – at 
the very least – the state should take the particular vulnerability of the persons it is dealing with into 
account. Whenever a Government completely omits to consider the particular vulnerability of an 
individual rights-holder, it will not be able to pass the Strasbourg proportionality analysis.132 In other 
words, paying attention to the particular construction of vulnerability has turned into a procedural 
requirement.133 This insistence on an appreciation of particularity is very promising and I see no reason 
why this kind of analysis cannot inform more than the marginalized subjects cases described in Part II, 
above. Once the state can prove that it has complied with the minimum (procedural) requirement of not 
ignoring particular vulnerabilities, then it will depend on the circumstances of the case – and of the sort 
of vulnerability in question – how far the Court will go in prioritizing the protection of particularly 
vulnerable people over other (often economic) considerations.134 There is no readily available formula 
that determines the weight – and thereby the prioritizing force – of vulnerability. 
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B) Extending Rights (via the Doctrine of Positive Obligations): The Court as an Asset-
Conferring Institution 
 
Christopher McCrudden has argued that one of the uses of human dignity in human rights law is to 
“justify the creation of new, and the extension of existing, rights”.135 Vulnerability reasoning is put to 
similar use by the Strasbourg Court – sometimes alone and sometimes explicitly in conjunction with 
dignity reasoning. It is mainly through the doctrine of positive obligations that the Court has repeatedly 
extended existing rights on the ground of vulnerability considerations.136 
In the first place, the Court has relied on vulnerability considerations to legitimize the gradual 
extension of positive obligations into the socio-economic sphere. The asylum case of M.S.S. v. Belgium 
and Greece, which was discussed in the last part, is a good example.137 Another example comes from a 
Roma rights case (which is reasoned from group-vulnerability), namely Yordanova and others v. 
Bulgaria. The Court held: 
 
Article 8 does not in terms give a right to be provided with a home … and, accordingly, any 
positive obligation to house the homeless must be limited … However, an obligation to secure 
shelter to particularly vulnerable individuals may flow from Article 8 of the Convention in 
exceptional cases. (citations omitted)
138
 
 
Secondly, the Court has also responded to vulnerability by deepening existing positive obligations; for 
example by turning an obligation of care into an obligation of result. In the case of M.S. v. UK, the Court 
has held that the authorities are under an obligation to ensure detainees with mental health problems 
are given adequate treatment.139 This is a good example of a case in which obeying the minimum rule of 
heeding particular vulnerability was not enough:140 even though the police showed “real concern” 141 for 
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the detainee, the Court still found a violation of the Convention. The Court held the government 
responsible for degrading treatment, because: 
 
[T]he applicant was in a state of great vulnerability throughout the entire time at the police 
station, as manifested by the abject condition to which he quickly descended inside his cell. He 
was in dire need of appropriate psychiatric treatment, as each of the medical professionals who 
examined him indicated. The Court considers that this situation, which persisted until he was at 
last transferred … early on the fourth day, diminished excessively his fundamental human 
dignity.
142
 
 
In these paragraphs, the Court relies on vulnerability to create a richer understanding of what it means 
to respect human dignity. By underpinning dignity with vulnerability considerations, the Court creates a 
holistic picture of the sufferings of the applicant: a picture that includes contextual factors such as 
embodiment, location, mental state and material realities. These vulnerability considerations lead the 
Court to insist on a substantive obligation (the authorities should have arranged for timely psychiatric 
treatment) rather than just a procedural obligation of care. 
The positive obligation cases that were quoted in this paragraph, Yordanova and others v. 
Bulgaria and M.S. v. UK, illustrate that vulnerability reasoning can be understood as the Court’s way of 
specifying what rights mean to differently situated people. At the same time, these cases are examples 
of the ways in which the Court interprets the Convention in an evolutive manner. Commentators usually 
focus on the “the Convention as a living instrument” concept when discussing the Court’s progressive 
manner of interpretation;143 but it is time to acknowledge that vulnerability is also part of the Court’s 
toolbox of concepts that it uses to create its dynamic approach.144 
Importantly, the Court’s reliance on vulnerability considerations to deepen positive obligations 
and to extend them into the socio-economic sphere is perfectly consistent with Fineman’s thesis. 
Fineman does not use the term “positive obligations” (which is not surprising as this is human rights law 
jargon), but when she describes “the responsive state” I think this is an important part of what she has 
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in mind. Indeed, she has argued that the current American antidiscrimination paradigm is not delivering 
real equality, and that “some more positive state action is required”.145 This comes close to the way 
Alastair Mowbray has characterized positive obligations: “the duty upon states to undertake specific 
affirmative tasks”.146 Through the concept of positive obligations the Court has achieved some of the 
things that Fineman advocates a “responsive state” should do. For example, the Court has deployed 
vulnerability reasoning to lay down positive obligations that bridge the traditional public–private in the 
domestic violence case of Opuz v. Turkey.147 This is in line with Fineman’s argument that “a particular 
strength of a vulnerability analysis is its institutional focus that blurs the line between public and 
private”.148 In Fineman’s vocabulary, the Court becomes an asset-conferring institution; providing 
applicants with the assets that give them resilience in the face of vulnerability.149 
To summarize the argument so far: this chapter has identified two ways in which the Court’s 
vulnerability reasoning is changing the face of its case law. Firstly, both as a matter of caseload-
management and as a matter of jurisprudence, vulnerability has developed prioritizing force in 
Strasbourg. Secondly, vulnerability considerations result in the extension of rights through the doctrine 
of positive obligations. These two functions combined make for a human rights law that is more 
responsive to vulnerable and often marginalized people. 
 
 
V. The Vulnerability of the Court Itself 
 
One of the central tenets of both Fineman’s and Turner’s vulnerability analysis is that social institutions 
are vulnerable in and of themselves.150 The Strasbourg Court is no exception, as torrents of criticism 
leading up to the Brighton Declaration of April 2012 have painfully revealed.151 Withdrawing from the 
Convention has seriously been discussed in Russia and the UK, because many voters and politicians feel 
that the Court is unduly infringing on their state’s sovereignty.152 The former President of the Court, 
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Judge Costa, identified several factors that led to this criticism of the Court: the fight against terrorism; 
the current financial and socio-economic crisis; the rise of populist movements in Europe; and the rise of 
Euroscepticism.153 Especially in places where these last two developments converge, the Court is 
vulnerable.154 Costa notes: 
 
[H]uman rights are becoming less popular, especially seen from the point of view of a Court 
which treats equally all human beings, including ‘unpopular’ categories of the population: the 
prisoners, the criminals, the aliens, the asylum seekers, the immigrants, the vagrants, people 
belonging to minorities.
155
 
 
In other words, the Court’s very protection of especially vulnerable and unwanted people renders the 
Court vulnerable and unwanted itself.156 At times, the response to the Court is even virulent. The idea of 
giving prisoners voting rights makes UK Prime Minister Cameron “physically ill”, for example.157 
The Court’s case law in relation to immigrants and asylum seekers, specifically, is provoking a lot 
of indignation. Marc Bossuyt, President of the Belgian Constitutional Court, has been among those who 
vocally object to what I have described in the last paragraph: extending certain rights on the basis of 
vulnerability considerations. He is of the opinion that the ECtHR is on a slippery slope when it comes to 
asylum seekers, because in his view the Court is continuously lowering the threshold of Article 3.158 
Responding to the ruling in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, he has literally asked how many more 
vulnerable groups we can expect.159 Bossuyt appeals to what Kenji Yoshino has aptly termed our 
“pluralism anxiety”; apprehension of “new” kinds of people and “newly visible” kinds of people”.160 In 
doing so, Bossuyt re-enacts the very us-against-them discourse that the vulnerability thesis seeks to 
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challenge. Grear’s work enables us to see that this kind of resistance to the ruling in M.S.S. is resistance 
to the idea of replacing the liberal subject with the vulnerable subject in human rights law. 
Again, this confirms that the Court’s adoption of the vulnerability thesis – even if only partially – 
renders the Court itself more vulnerable. This diagnosis leads to the conclusion that there are limits to 
the Court’s ability to affect a revolution through its vulnerability reasoning. Fact is that the Court is part 
of a liberal paradigm.161 Its vulnerability reasoning is therefore not going to do the full extent of the 
transformative work the supporters of the thesis (including myself) want it to do – mostly because no 
state would listen anymore. 
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
The ECtHR has clearly not fully embraced the vulnerability thesis. Lourdes Peroni and I have argued that, 
“while scholars like Turner and Fineman support vulnerability for its potential of capturing the universal, 
the Court does it for its ability to capture the particular”.162 Still, I do not believe that these two 
approaches are necessarily at odds with each other. In my understanding, the Court’s focus on specific 
vulnerability can go hand in hand with universal vulnerability as the (implicit) presupposition of human 
rights law.163 
By delineating the Court’s case law, this chapter has shown that, when vulnerability is explicitly 
used in human rights jurisprudence, it functions as a prioritization or as an extension/specification tool. 
Vulnerability is thus an important judicial concept that helps create a more inclusive human rights law: 
in other words, a human rights law that is more responsive to the needs of vulnerable people. At the 
same time, the quiet revolution that I have analysed in this chapter is definitely accompanied by 
struggle. The work of Fineman and Grear illuminates the fact that the Court struggles between a liberal 
subject approach and a vulnerability approach. Somewhat ironically, their thesis also helps to see why 
the Court is attacked by critics in the process. The vulnerability thesis thus predicts its own limits in the 
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 Grear, supra note 8, at 535-38. 
162
 Peroni & Timmer, supra note 4, at 5. 
163
 The judges of the ECtHR might intuitively link their work to universal vulnerability. When Lourdes Peroni and I 
asked a judge about the Court’s reasoning, he replied: “All applicants are vulnerable, but some are more 
vulnerable than others.” In this one sentence, the judge neatly reconciled the apparent tension between universal 
and particular vulnerability in human rights law. 
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ECtHR context: as a social institution the Court is vulnerable in and of itself, which is a reality that the 
Court will have to take seriously in order to survive as a supranational human rights court. 
At this point, a sceptic might object that the Court is just taking the old approach of “cautious 
incrementalism” and that no real revolution takes place at all.164 In response, I would point out that 
some of the rulings analysed in this chapter are not “cautious” in the least; think for example of M.S.S. v. 
Belgium and Greece, Opuz v. Turkey, Salduz v. Turkey, Yordanova v. Bulgaria and M.S. v. UK. On a more 
profound level, I wish to connect the Court’s reasoning to what Costas Douzinas has famously claimed: 
“human rights have only paradoxes to offer”.165 The same holds true for vulnerability. Ontologically, 
vulnerability is both particular and universal;166 as a thesis it concerns both the “is” and the “ought”; and 
as human rights reasoning it sits between law and critique.167 In short, the Court’s vulnerability 
reasoning is partly a genuine shift in discourse (a revolution), and partly a manifestation of the status 
quo. The title of this chapter is an attempt to capture the paradoxical nature of the role of vulnerability 
in human rights law. 
Revolution or no revolution, vulnerability is a concept to keep an eye on. Vulnerability 
considerations are at the frontlines of the Court’s case law: this is where it happens, especially in case 
law concerning migrants. The vulnerability thesis promotes a radical restructuring of societal institutions 
and also of our way of thinking about the foundations of law. It invites a reimagining of the human of 
human rights law. “[T]he challenge is to think beyond current ideological constraints”.168 The 
vulnerability approach celebrates a shared humanity instead of casting us as antagonists in a bitter fight 
over limited state resources.169 Surely, this appeals to the heart of the human rights project. 
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 PETER BARTLETT, OLIVER LEWIS & OLIVER THOROLD, MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 256 
(2007). 
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 DOUZINAS, supra note 28, at 21. 
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 Cf. BERGOFFEN, supra note 30, at 30 (“Our bodies, in establishing the boundaries that separate, distinguish and 
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 Cf. GREAR, supra note 6, at 169. 
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 Fineman, supra note 7, at 274. 
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 See contra Dimitris Xenos, The Human Rights of the Vulnerable, 13 THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
591 (2009). 
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6. Conclusion 
 
I. Introduction 
 
There is much to celebrate in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR as regards the protection of non-dominant 
groups. Generally speaking I agree with Dia Anagnostou that “the ECtHR has become increasingly 
receptive to claims from marginalized individuals and minorities”.1 This thesis has suggested ways in 
which the Court can strengthen its case law still further. As the first study to present stereotyping and 
vulnerability as conceptual lenses through which to analyze the jurisprudence on non-dominant groups, 
it seeks to provide fresh inspiration on how the Strasbourg Court can integrate a more powerful notion 
of equality in its legal reasoning. 
Part II will discuss the key findings as regards the question how the ECtHR can use the concept of 
stereotype to develop a more transformative version of equality. Part III will do the same as regards the 
question what potential the concept of vulnerability has to strengthen the ECtHR’s reasoning as regards 
non-dominant people. Part IV brings the concepts of stereotyping and vulnerability together, and 
addresses the synergies as well as the tensions between my proposals. Part V concludes this thesis with 
some reflections on exciting topics for future research. 
 
 
II. Stereotyping  
 
This part will draw the key findings from Chapters Two and Three together, which allows me to draw 
some general conclusions about the concept of stereotype in relation to the case law of the Strasbourg 
Court. 
 
                                                          
1
 Dia Anagnostou, The Strasbourg Court, Democracy and the Protection of Marginalised Individuals and Minorities, 
in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHT AND THE RIGHTS OF MARGINALISED INDIVIDUALS AND MINORITIES IN CONTEXT 1, 19 (Dia 
Anagnostou & Evangelia Psychogiopoulou eds., 2010).  
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A) On how to understand stereotypes2 
 
Stereotypes are beliefs about groups of people. This description shows that, contrary to what is often 
assumed, stereotypes are neither necessarily inaccurate generalizations, nor are they necessarily 
negative. On the one hand stereotypes fulfill necessary functions in our lives, namely those of 
information-processing device and self-image booster. But on the other hand stereotypes cause much 
harm. They confine groups of people to certain roles and positions. Thus stereotypes act as control 
mechanisms: they limit individuals in their options.3 The effects of stereotypes are manifested in several 
different domains. First, stereotyping can have recognition effects, meaning that through harmful 
stereotyping some groups are seen as socially less worthy. Second, it can have distribution effects, in the 
sense that it can impact on the distribution of material resources. And third, it can cause psychological 
harm: through what is known as “stereotype threat”4 and “covering”,5 stereotypes can cause inter alia 
anxiety, depression and underperformance.6   
The Strasbourg Court should be aware that stereotypes come in different shapes. The case law of 
the American Supreme Court provides a particularly rich account of these different shapes.7 Based on 
the U.S. jurisprudence, this thesis distinguishes four kinds of stereotypes. Role-typing stereotypes are 
the first kind. These are assumptions about the proper roles or modes of behavior of people who belong 
to a certain group. Examples are the notions that women carry the responsibility for child-care8 and that 
Roma are thieves.9 Second are false stereotypes. False stereotypes are either based on consciously or 
unconsciously held prejudice or they simply have an unsound empirical/statistical basis. Examples of 
                                                          
2
 REBECCA J. COOK & SIMONE CUSACK, GENDER STEREOTYPING: TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES, Ch 1 (2010) 
(“Understanding Gender Stereotyping”). 
3
 Susan T. Fiske, Controlling Other People: The Impact of Power on Stereotyping, 48 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 621, 623 
(1993). 
4
 Stereotype threat occurs when we fear that we conform to the negative stereotypes of the social group to which 
we belong. People experience stereotype threat because they are usually aware of the stereotypes concerning 
their own group. See generally CLAUDE M. STEELE, WHISTLING VIVALDI AND OTHER CLUES TO HOW STEREOTYPES AFFECT US 
(2010). 
5
 Covering is a term coined by Kenji Yoshino to denote the process whereby people hide or tone down disfavored 
identity traits in order to fit into the mainstream. KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 
(2006). 
6
 See supra Chapter Two.III.  
7
 See supra Chapter Three.III.B. 
8
 See, e.g., Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switserland, App. No. 14518/89, 16 Eur. H. R. Rep. 405 (1993); and Andrle v. Czech 
Republic, App. No. 6268/08, 17 February 2011. 
9
 These examples serve as a reminder that role-types – like other stereotypes - can be both positive (women care 
for children) and negative (Roma are thieves). The stereotype “Roma are thieves” was at issue in Aksu.  
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stereotypes that are based on prejudice are the ideas that Roma are thieves (this notion is therefore 
both a role-type and a false stereotype) and that immigrants want to leech on social benefits.10 An 
example of a stereotype that is false because it lacks a sound empirical basis is the notion that Muslim 
women are oppressed or, relatedly, that they are pressured to wear headscarves or face covers.11 
Thirdly there are statistical stereotypes. These are stereotypes that reflect a statistical truth about the 
group as a whole, but which does not accurately reflect the situation of the individual. In other words, 
they are largely accurate but overbroad assumptions. An example is the notion that men work more 
hours in the paid labor force than women.12 Fourth and final are prescriptive stereotypes. Prescriptive 
stereotypes stipulate a particular form of behavior, or standard of appearance, for certain groups of 
people. An example is the notion that real rape victims will try to fight off their rapists.13 It should be 
emphasized that many stereotypes will fall under multiple headings at the same time. Take one of the 
most evident examples, namely the idea that women are homemakers. This is a role-type and a 
statistical stereotype and a prescriptive stereotype. Indeed, because of the prescriptive force of such 
stereotypes, they become a self-fulfilling prophecy: they cause themselves to become true. 
This thesis should not be understood as a wholesale attack on stereotyping, nor does it advocate 
that the Strasbourg Court commence such an attack. To some extent it is inevitable that both individuals 
and lawmakers rely on generalizations about groups of people. Instead, what this thesis argues is that 
the Strasbourg Court is faced with the challenge of distinguishing between harmful and allowable 
stereotypes, and that the Court should vigorously contest harmful stereotyping if it wants to address 
structural inequality. 
 
B) On the links between stereotyping, equality and discrimination  
 
The thesis has shown that there have been significant developments in the non-discrimination case law 
of the Strasbourg Court in the past decades: the Court has first embraced formal equality, then the 
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 Cf. Bah v. United Kingdom, App. No. 56328/07, 27 September 2011, ¶ 48. 
11
 Dahlab v. Switzerland, App. No. 42393/98, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 447;and Leyla Şahin v. Turkey (GC), App. No. 
44774/98, 10 November 2005. Unfortunately, in these cases the Court reinforced this stereotype about Muslim 
women. See Carolyn Evans, The “Islamic Scarf” in the European Court of Human Rights, 7 MELBOURNE JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 52 (2006). 
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 In Abdulaziz the UK said something similar, namely that “men were more likely to seek work than women”. 
Abdulaziz, Cabales, and Balkandali v. United Kingdom A 94 (1985); 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 471, ¶ 75. 
13
 Without calling this a stereotype, the Court debunked this myth in M.C. v. Bulgaria, App. No.39272/98, 4 
December 2003, ¶ 164. 
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jurisprudence deepened to include substantive equality, and recently the Court shows signs of being 
willing to take on board equality as transformation.14 These different approaches to equality now 
coexist.  
Anti-stereotyping reasoning can be used to simply boost a formal equality approach,15 but that 
is not how this thesis envisions the concept. Rather, this thesis argues that the Strasbourg Court should 
conceive of stereotypes as the covert structures that underlie inequality and discrimination. As legally 
mandated overt discrimination has on many fronts receded in the Council of Europe, the Strasbourg 
Court should at present focus its energies on contesting and transforming the structures that continue 
nevertheless to generate inequality: that is what this thesis terms transformative equality. The central 
tenet of Chapter Two was that stereotypes are both cause and manifestation of the structural 
disadvantage and discrimination of certain groups of people. The comparative research in Chapter Three 
allowed me to refine this position: in fact, stereotyping and discrimination are connected in a self-
reinforcing invidious cycle. The cycle consists essentially of three components: stereotypes can form a 
manifestation of discrimination, as well as a rationalization and a cause of discrimination. Stereotypes 
thus legitimize and sustain unequal power relations: in other words, they help preserve the social status 
quo.16 An example of the self-sustaining circle that connects stereotyping to discrimination is found in 
the case of Konstantin Markin v. Russia. In this case the Russian Constitutional Court remarked that it 
was justified to only provide parental leave to servicewomen firstly due to “the limited participation of 
women in military service and, secondly, the special social role of women associated with 
motherhood.”17 To begin, the stereotype that women do not play major roles in the military is 
statistically correct: women only constitute approximately 10% in de Russian military and are extremely 
underrepresented in leadership positions within the military.18 In the eyes of the Government, this fact 
then justifies giving parental leave to servicewomen but not servicemen (as giving it too servicemen 
would have too much of impact on the operational effectiveness of the military). This rule then forces 
servicewomen to assume care for the children and forces servicemen to continue working; which then 
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 See supra Chapter 1.II and III.A; and Chapter 2.II. 
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 Several American legal scholars think that the anti-stereotyping principle can only deliver formal equality. See 
supra Chapter 3.I and III.D. 
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 There is extensive social psychological research that supports this claim: see, e.g., Peter Glick & Susan T. Fiske, 
An ambivalent alliance: Hostile and benevolent sexism as complementary justifications for gender inequality, 56 
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 109 (2001); and John T. Jost & Aaron C. Kay, Exposure to benevolent sexism and 
complementary gender stereotypes: Consequences for specific and diffuse forms of system justification, 88 JOURNAL 
OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 498, 499 (2005). 
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 Konstantin Markin v. Russia (GC), App. No. 30078/06, 56 Eur. H.R. Rep. 8 (2013), ¶ 34. 
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 See supra Chapter 2.V.A. 
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has the effect of reinforcing the initial gender stereotypes. As this example shows, stereotyping and 
discrimination are joined in a circle that sustains itself.  
 
C) On the problems with the Strasbourg case law 
 
There are two main problems with the Strasbourg case law in respect of stereotypes.19 The first and 
most fundamental is that the Court regularly fails to name stereotypes; the Court often simply 
disregards whether laws or State practices are based on stereotypes. This is true for cases wherein 
stereotyping implicitly played a part, as for example in the sex trafficking case of Rantsev v. Cyprus and 
Russia,20 but also for cases where the Government explicitly relied on stereotypes. The result is that any 
engagement with the issue is foreclosed: the Court’s ability to address invidious stereotyping depends 
on its willingness to identify stereotypes. You cannot change a reality without naming it.21 
This thesis envisages a more pedagogical role for the Court. There are many judgments in the 
Strasbourg annals in which the Court found a violation of Article 14 when it was confronted with a 
discriminatory stereotype, without naming the stereotype as such and explaining what was wrong with 
it. Take for example the following three cases. The ruling in Schuler-Zgraggen v. Zwitserland (1993) 
concerned a woman who received an invalidity pension following an illness that made her unable to 
work. 22 This pension was discontinued after the birth of her first child. The relevant domestic Court 
upheld the decision to discontinue the pension by referring to the classic role-type of the woman-
homemaker: “the experience of everyday life” is, so the domestic court held, that “many married 
women go out to work until their first child is born, but give up their jobs for as long as the children need 
full-time care and upbringing.”23 The inference the domestic Court drew from this stereotype was that 
“the applicant, even if her health had not been impaired, would have been occupied only as a housewife 
and mother."24 Ms. Schuler-Zgraggen complained to the Strasbourg Court that these proceedings 
regarding her pension infringed her right to a fair and non-discriminatory trial (Article 6 in conjunction 
with Article 14 ECHR). In the case of Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal (1999) the applicant 
complained that his ex-wife had been awarded parental responsibility of their child because he was 
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 See supra Chapter 3.II.D. 
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 Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, App. No. 25965/04, 7 January 2010; see supra Chapter 2.V.B. 
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 Cf. CATHARINE MACKINNON, WOMEN’S LIVES, MEN’S LAWS 89 (2005). 
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 Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switserland, App. No. 14518/89, 16 Eur. H. R. Rep. 405 (1993). 
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 Id. ¶ 29. 
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homosexual and living with another man.25 The Lisbon Court of Appeal had ruled that it was not in the 
best interest of the child to stay with her father, because homosexuality is “an abnormality”; the 
applicant “had definitively left the marital home to go and live with a boyfriend, a decision which is not 
normal according to common criteria”; and the child should live in “a traditional Portuguese family, 
which is certainly not the set-up her father has decided to enter into”.26 The Court of Appeal thus 
imprints the false stereotype that homosexuals cannot be good fathers and simultaneously the 
prescriptive stereotype that proper fathers should not live with their male partners. Zarb Adami v. Malta 
(2006) concerned a man who complained under Article 4 (the prohibition on forced or compulsory 
labor) in conjunction with Article 14 that jury service was imposed on him in a discriminatory manner, 
because the burden of jury service de facto fell predominantly on men.27 The Government explained this 
practice by a combination of statistical and false stereotypes: namely the fact that “jurors were chosen 
from the part of the population which was active in the economy and professional life”; the fact that the 
rules governing jury service allowed exemptions for people who had to take care of their family and this 
applied more to women than to men; and that “’for cultural reasons’, defence lawyers might have had a 
tendency to challenge female jurors” (thus implying that women were often held to be unsuitable 
jurors).28 What these three cases have in common is that the Court did find a violation of Article 14, but 
that the sum of the Court’s reasoning consisted of the remark that the Governments’ arguments did not 
constitute valid reasons.29 The Court does not permit the stereotypes, but it does not name them either. 
Such brief reasoning does not teach the Member States anything about the harm of stereotypes. The 
Court could and should have a much stronger educational role in this field. 
The second problem with the jurisprudence is that the Court but seldom analyzes stereotyping as a 
inequality/discrimination issue. If it does touch upon stereotypes, the Court often does so under one of 
the freestanding Convention articles (frequently Article 8).30 While it is certainly true that stereotyping 
can infringe on one of the other rights laid down in the Convention, it is important that the Court frames 
stereotyping as an Article 14 matter. The essence of the wrong of stereotypes is that they justify and 
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 Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, App. No. 33290/96, 21 December 1999. 
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 Zarb Adami v. Malta, App. No. 17209/02, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 3 (2006). 
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found another violation of the Convention.  See supra Chapter 1.II.C. 
224 
 
perpetuate inequality and discrimination. Stereotypes trap groups of people in the kinds of self-
sustaining discriminatory circle that the last section described; thus, stereotypes are a structural cause 
of inequality. The Court’s legal reasoning should acknowledge this. To be sure, on the level of the 
individual applicant stereotyping can impact the right to private life; the right to education – indeed, arguably 
all the substantive rights in the Convention. But stereotypes are beliefs about groups of people: as a 
result, stereotyping is a social experience, not just an individual experience. The Court loses that group-
based, wider social justice dimension if it does not apply a discrimination analysis. The stereotype 
concept’s ability to diagnose and contest the structural causes of inequality depends on its first being 
framed as an inequality issue. In other words, if the Court does not address stereotyping as an equality 
issue, the concept loses its transformative potential. 
 
D) On the importance of considering other jurisdictions 
 
As the concept of stereotyping is still very fresh and underdeveloped in the case law of the ECtHR, this 
thesis has turned to other jurisdictions for inspiration on how the concept can be deployed. It seems 
that the Strasbourg Court can learn a lot in terms of good legal reasoning about stereotypes from other 
jurisdictions. To start the Court could turn to other human rights bodies. The CEDAW Committee in 
particular has developed an insightful interpretation of the stereotyping concept in the field of gender 
equality.31 Article 5(a) CEDAW forms the premier legal basis for the obligation to address gender 
stereotyping. Importantly, all States of the Council of Europe are party to CEDAW. The CEDAW 
Committee is by no means alone, however, in attempting to address the harm of stereotypes. The Inter-
American Court, for instance, has also handed down several judgments in which it addresses 
stereotypes head on.32 The European Court of Justice, too, has addressed stereotypes.33 
 As regards the national level, Chapter Three has argued that the Strasbourg Court can learn a 
lot from the lines of reasoning that the American and Canadian Supreme Courts have developed about 
stereotypes in their equal protection jurisprudence.34 Some core lessons that the ECtHR should take 
away from the courts across the Atlantic are that stereotypes take different shapes and that statistical 
and prescriptive stereotypes can also be invidious (as was just discussed); that stereotyping is connected 
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 See supra Chapter 1.III.A; and Chapter 2.III. 
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 See, e.g., Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Feb. 24, 2012); Artavia Murillo et. al. (“in vitro 
fertilization”) v. Costa Rica, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., 28 November 2012. 
33
 See, e.g., ECJ, Case C-104/09, Roca-Álvarez v. Sesa Start España ETT SA (2010), ¶ 36. 
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 See supra Chapter 3.V. 
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to discrimination in a self-reinforcing circle (as was also just discussed); and that in distinguishing 
whether a stereotype is invidious, context is everything (see next section for discussion). The South-
African Constitutional Court has also extensively used the concept of stereotype in its legal reasoning.35 
Regrettably, this thesis could not provide a comparison with all these jurisdictions; the jurisdictions that 
were not addressed would provide interesting materials for future research on the concept of 
stereotypes. 
 
E) On the integration of an (anti-) stereotyping approach in the legal reasoning of the 
ECtHR  
 
Chapters Two and Three both contain suggestions how the Strasbourg Court might integrate an anti-
stereotyping approach in its legal reasoning.36 There are commonalities as well as slight differences 
between these proposals. This section will therefore construct a synthesis of these proposals.  
The most basic point is that the Strasbourg Court will have to start to name stereotypes and, in 
so doing, assess whether a particular instance of stereotyping is harmful or not. The Strasbourg Court 
faces the double challenge of detecting stereotypes and then distinguishing between permissible 
generalizations and harmful stereotypes. For many reasons, this is a difficult enterprise: stereotypes 
might be so deeply embedded and widely accepted in European society that judges will not even notice 
them,37 seemingly positive or benevolent stereotypes might also turn out to be harmful,38 and the 
harmfulness of stereotypes might be ambiguous. The only way the Court can detect stereotypes and 
assess whether they are harmful is, in my opinion, by carrying out a contextual analysis. Here are some 
contextual factors that the Court should take into account, most of which are familiar from the Canadian 
case law discussed in Chapter Three:39 
 
o Historical context/pre-existing disadvantage 
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 See, e.g., President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v. Hugo, 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (S. Afr.). For 
discussion see, e.g., Mark S. Kende, Gender Stereotypes in South African and American Constitutional Law: The 
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First of all, a contextual analysis will put the impugned rule or practice in a historical context. Does the 
applicant belong to a group that has suffered particular discrimination in the past? Does the applicant or 
the group that she belongs to suffer from pre-existing disadvantage? In what kind of socio-political 
context was the law/practice in question developed? Was the group concerned (e.g., women generally, 
specific groups of women in particular, people with a mental disability, homosexuals) formerly 
prevented from enjoying the particular right at issue? As the Court has already done in numerous 
judgments, for example judgments concerning Roma, it can rely on the materials from other 
international human rights bodies and NGO’s to establish whether the applicant’s group suffers from 
pre-existing disadvantage.40 The concept of group vulnerability due to a history of discrimination, which 
has been extensively discussed in Chapter Four on the basis of such cases as D.H. and Others v. Czech 
Republic and Kiyutin v. Russia, is also well-suited to this aspect of the contextual analysis that serves to 
determine whether a stereotype is harmful.41 
 
o Effects 
What are the effects of the challenged rule or practice on both the applicant’s group and the applicant 
individually? What kind of harm is caused to whom? The Court should be aware that stereotypes can 
have harmful recognition, distribution and psychological effects and take these various dimensions of 
harm into account. The Court should also be aware that the harms of stereotyping can be felt by more 
than just one group. Take for example again the case of Zarb Adami v. Malta, concerning the de facto 
discrimination in the allotment of jury service, as a result of which “only a negligible percentage of 
women were called to serve as jurors.”42 The Government explained this situation by enumerating a 
number of stereotypes about women: that they do not much participate in socio-economic life and that 
they often have stay at home to care for family members. Using a contextual anti-stereotyping 
approach, the Court should have made clear that both men and women feel the unfavourable effects 
from these stereotypes. The applicant, a man, complains of maldistribution: the argument is that he as a 
man had to carry an annoying civic burden that women did not have to carry. It is almost implied that 
women profit from this situation. But that leaves out of the picture how these stereotypes have the 
effect of relegating women to a position outside the civic domain and inside the home. In other words, 
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 D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic (GC), App. No. 57325/00, 47 Eur. H. R. Rep. 3, ¶182 (2007). 
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 See also infra Part IV.B. 
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 Zarb Adami v. Malta, App. No. 17209/02, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 3, ¶ 75 (2006). 
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the stereotypes that cause jury service to fall almost exclusively on men, have a harmful distribution 
effect on men and a harmful recognition effect on women. 
o Fit43 
To what extent, the Court might ask, does the impugned unequal treatment correspond to the reality of 
the applicant’s group? Put differently, if a stereotype is being used, to what extent is the stereotype 
accurate? Statistically accurate stereotypes might still be harmful, but the degree of accuracy is 
nevertheless a factor to consider. The idea of fit has particular traction in cases that concern formal legal 
classifications and bright line rules. One example is Alajos Kiss v. Hungary, which concerned the 
automatic disenfranchisement of people with a mental disability who have been appointed a legal 
guardian.44 This rule was based on the stereotype that people with a mental disability are incapable of 
making informed political choices.45 This is probably a highly inaccurate stereotype; in any event, the 
Government did not substantiate this claim. In other words, the fit between the stereotype and the 
actual capacities of people with mental disability is weak. Another ruling that concerns a salient 
question of “fit” is the well-known case of Pretty v. UK (2002). Ms. Pretty, who had a terrible neuro-
degenerative disease and who was facing an undignified and painful certain death, wanted her husband 
to assist her in committing suicide as she was unable to do that by herself. The Government did not 
allow assisted suicide and based this refusal on the stereotype that terminally ill people are vulnerable 
to abuse and therefore in need of protection. Pretty, however, strongly emphasized that she was not 
vulnerable nor in need of protection.46 How strong is the fit here between the stereotype and the reality 
of applicants who are terminally ill? The Court recognized that Pretty was not vulnerable,47 but assumed 
that the fit was still a relatively strong one.48 Yet another example is a case that is currently pending 
before the Grand Chamber; S.A.S. v. France, concerning the French “burqa ban”.49 When the Court 
would investigate to what extent the ban fits the reality of women wearing the burqa, it would come to 
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the conclusion that the ban is largely based on false stereotypes.50 The stereotypes underlying the ban 
are namely that women who wear the face veil are commonly forced or pressured to do so, and that 
women who wear the face veil are not able or do not wish to interact with others.51 Empirical research 
amongst women who wear the face veil has established that these assumptions are false.52 
 
o Ameliorative purpose 
If the Court finds that an impugned law or practice is based on a stereotype, it could examine whether 
the law has an ameliorative purpose. Was the law designed to improve the position of a disadvantaged 
group? If so, this might indicate that the stereotyping was permissible. This requires a careful analysis, 
since Governments very easily and often claim that their laws serve an ameliorative purpose. So, for 
example, the Turkish Government argued in Ünal Tekeli v. Turkey (2004) that a law prohibiting married 
women from using maiden name protects their disadvantaged position in the family.53 This patriarchal 
rule did clearly no such thing; on the contrary, it was part of a system of rules which ensured women’s 
subordinated position within the family. S.A.S. v. France is an example of a more ambiguous case. To the 
extent that the French authorities have instituted the burqa ban to protect Muslim women, it could be 
argued that the ban has an ameliorative purpose. On the other hand, the ban can also be viewed as anti-
Islam. Some measures, however, do genuinely have an ameliorative purpose. Pretty is again an example: 
the stereotype that “terminally ill people are vulnerable to abuse” was truly deployed here with the idea 
of protecting a disadvantaged group.  
This is not to suggest that the Court should always go through this whole list of factors.54 The 
first two factors – historical context and (current) effects – are in my view most important, because they 
will be useful in practically every case. Which contextual factors and questions are relevant ultimately 
depends on the circumstances of the case however. These factors are merely presented here as being 
indicative of the kind of analysis the Court should undertake to distinguish stereotypes and assess their 
harm.  
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 See Written submissions by the Human Rights Centre of Ghent University in the case of S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 
43835/11 (on file with author). 
51
 Id. 
52
 Id. 
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 Ünal Tekeli v. Turkey, App. No. No.29865/96, 16 November 2004, 42 Eur. H.R. Rep. 53 (2006), ¶ 16 and 46. 
54
 The Canadian experience is that if these factors are applied too rigidly, they will obstruct rather than facilitate a 
contextual equality analysis. See generally MAKING EQUALITY RIGHTS REAL, MAKING EQUALITY RIGHTS REAL: SECURING 
SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY UNDER THE CHARTER (Fay Faraday, Margaret Denike & M. Kate Stephenson eds., 2009) 
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My argument throughout has been that the Court should start seeing stereotyping as a discrimination 
issue. This raises the question how the Court should incorporate the above mentioned contextual 
analysis in its review of Article 14 of the Convention (in conjunction with another provision from the 
Convention of course). In essence the Court’s analysis of the prohibition on discrimination proceeds in 
two steps: (i) is there a difference in treatment between persons in otherwise similar situations; and if 
so, (ii) is this difference justified? These questions relate respectively to the scope and to the 
justifications stage of the analysis. Correspondingly, the Strasbourg Court can take two routes as regards 
the incorporation of the contextual analysis which is aimed at identifying harmful stereotypes: it can do 
this either under the scope of Article 14, or under the proportionality analysis of Article 14.55  
The advantage of naming stereotypes already in the scope-stage of the Article 14 analysis is that 
it helps the Court to recognize that stereotyping is a discrimination issue. If reasoning about stereotypes 
remains confined to the second stage of the analysis, many cases – such as notably Aksu v. Turkey56 – 
will not pass the Article 14 gate. In order to perform a stereotype-sensitive scope analysis, however, the 
Court will have to make some adjustments in its jurisprudence. First of all, a rigid comparability test is 
not suited to the reality of stereotyping, which is why Chapter Two suggests – based on work of Janneke 
Gerards – that the Court had better employ a disadvantage test.57 This means that, in order to establish 
that there is a case of unequal treatment, the Court does not compare whether persons in similar 
situations have been treated differently, but whether treatment disadvantages some persons in 
particular. The other jurisprudential feature that has hampered the Court in detecting unequal 
treatment is the intent heuristic as evidence of such treatment. The Court has frequently made the 
mistake of relying on intent in cases that concern invidious stereotyping. In V.C. v. Slovakia, for example, 
a case about the involuntary and unnecessary sterilization of a Roma woman, the Court notes that “the 
objective evidence is not sufficiently strong in itself to convince the Court that it was part of an 
organised policy or that the hospital staff’s conduct was intentionally racially motivated.”58 The Court 
then proceeds to declare that it is not necessary to examine whether Article 14 was violated. The Court’s 
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 See supra Chapter 3.V.D. 
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 Aksu v. Turkey (GC), App. Nos. 4149/04; 41029/04, 15 March 2012. See supra Chapter 3.II.D. 
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 See supra Chapter 2.IV.C.iii. 
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 V.C. v. Slovakia, App. No. 18968/07, 8 November 2011, ¶ 177; and similarly I.G. and Others v. Slovakia, App. No. 
15966/04, 13 November 2012, ¶ 165, and N.B. v. Slovakia, App. No. 29518/10, 12 June 2012, ¶ 121 (both also 
about the involuntary sterilization of Roma women). Other cases where the Court refers to intent include Aksu v. 
Turkey (GC), App. Nos. 4149/04; 41029/04, 15 March 2012, ¶ at 45. 
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focus on intent is misconceived in V.C. and other cases that concern stereotyping,59 because 
stereotyping often occurs unconsciously and automatically.60 This is not to imply that the comparator 
and the intent heuristics are constant fixtures in the Court’s Article 14 case law; the Court by no means 
always refers to these concepts. But they have certainly prevented several stereotyping cases from 
passing the Article 14 gates, especially cases that concern more covert forms of unequal treatment. The 
misguided reliance on comparability and intent explains, for example, why – within the space of one 
week – the case of Konstantin Markin v. Russia succeeded to fall within the scope of Article 14, whereas 
the case of Aksu v. Turkey failed.  
The advantage, on the other hand, of incorporating an analysis of the invidiousness of 
stereotypes under the second (justifications) step of Article 14 review is that this seems to fit better with 
the Court’s existing case law. The contextual factors which were just mentioned (historical context; 
effects; fit; and ameliorative purpose) lend themselves well to the analysis of proportionality in the strict 
sense, namely balancing. This route could deliver fine anti-stereotyping reasoning, as long as the ECtHR 
recognizes that stereotyping gives rise to an Article 14 claim and examines stereotypes and their 
invidiousness carefully. 
 
F) On the margin of appreciation from an (anti-)stereotyping perspective 
 
It is by now a commonplace to say that the margin of appreciation doctrine is opaque and confusing. 
The extensive legal literature about this doctrine has established that there are actually different kinds 
of margins of appreciation in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.61 At the core of the margin of appreciation 
lies the idea that the Court should show deference.62 Jan Kratóchvil rightly points out that this is still 
very abstract, the question being: deferent with regards to what?63 The first answer is that the margin of 
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  There is abundant legal literature on this topic in the U.S., as a response to the American courts’ premise that 
discrimination occurs intentionally. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence, The Id the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning 
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STANFORD LAW REVIEW 317 (1987); and Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our 
Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STANFORD LAW 
REVIEW 1161 (1995). 
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 See, e.g., Susan T. Fiske & Ann Marie Russell, Cognitive Processes, in The SAGE HANDBOOK OF PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING 
AND DISCRIMINATION 115, 117-119 (John F. Dovidio et al. eds., 2010).     
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 See, e.g., Jan Kratóchvil, The Inflation of the Margin of Appreciation by the European Court of Human Rights, 29 
NETHERLANDS QUARTERLY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 324 (2011); and George Letsas, Two Concepts of the Margin of 
Appreciation, 26 OXFORD JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 705 (2006). 
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 See, e.g., Kratóchvil, supra note 61, at 327. 
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 Id. 
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appreciation is a doctrine which states that the Court should maintain a certain deference toward the 
judgment of the domestic authorities when it comes to applying the norms of the Convention to a 
certain set of facts.64 In this sense, the margin of appreciation is a doctrine that determines the 
strictness of review of the Court.65  
The claim of the last section, namely that the Court ought to examine stereotypes and their 
harm carefully by carrying out a contextual assessment, might be taken to imply that there is little room 
for this type of margin of appreciation within an (anti-)stereotyping approach. Especially if the Court 
takes the second route that was just suggested (of analyzing the invidiousness of stereotypes under the 
proportionality analysis of Article 14), a “careful analysis” could be taken to mean that the Court should 
show little deference in its review of the domestic decision. But that is going too fast: a careful analysis, 
meaning one that names the problem of stereotyping, is not necessarily an analysis that lacks in 
deference. In other words, it is not true that an (anti-)stereotyping approach automatically calls for a 
narrow margin of appreciation. The anti-stereotyping approach dictates no such outcome; it only calls 
for better legal reasoning. Particularly when a stereotype is ambiguous – when, on balance, it is not 
quite clear how much harm a stereotype does – as for example in the Pretty case which was just 
discussed, the Court is well advised to leave the matter in the hands of the domestic authorities. 
However, in areas where the Court has already announced that it will apply a very weighty reasons test, 
as with discrimination on the grounds of sex or sexual orientation, it is submitted that the Court should 
be consistent and really perform a strict scrutiny.66 
On the topic of strict scrutiny it should be added that, from an (anti)stereotyping perspective, it 
seems that some of the factors that the Court currently uses to determine the width of the margin of 
appreciation are more suitable than others.67 A factor that currently68 narrows the margin of 
appreciation in the Courts jurisprudence which strokes well with an anti-stereotyping agenda is group 
vulnerability due to a history of discrimination. This and other synergies between anti-stereotyping and 
                                                          
64
 Cf. id. at 330.  
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 This is what Letsas calls “the structural concept of the margin of appreciation” and Kratóchvil calls “the margin of 
appreciation in norm application”. See also ODDNÝ MJÖLL ANARDÓTTIR, EQUALITY AND NON-DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 58-67 (2003). 
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 See supra Chapter 2.IV.C.ii. 
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 See generally about the factors that determine the width of the margin of appreciation, e.g., Eva Brems, The 
Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights, 56 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKRECHT 240 (1996); more specifically about the factors that determine the 
width of the margin in Article 14 cases see supra Chapter 1.II.C. 
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 See supra Chapter 4.IV.B. 
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vulnerability reasoning will be explored in part IV of this Chapter.69 On the other hand, two factors that 
jar with an (anti-)stereotyping perspective are consensus and moral/social sensitivity. The Court has 
used the argument of consensus amongst Member States both to widen and to narrow the margin of 
appreciation,70 but either way it is an ill-fit with a concern about stereotyping. The problem is that the 
degree of consensus is not a good predictor of the harmfulness of a stereotype. In fact, quite the 
reverse: the more deeply embedded a stereotype is, the more consensus there will be about it. Thus 
some of the most pernicious and lasting stereotypes – such as the man-breadwinner/woman-
homemaker notion – enjoy great support in Europe.71 This means that by deploying the consensus factor 
to widen the margin of appreciation, the Court risks reinforcing some of the most powerful – because 
widely shared – harmful stereotypes. And something similar applies to the social/moral sensitivity 
factor. The Court has in many cases indicated that “particularly where the case raises sensitive moral or 
ethical issues, the margin will be wider”.72 Here the problem is that many of these sensitive issues 
concern culturally preordained roles, such as the idea that women ought to be mothers, which is of 
relevance for example in abortion cases;73 or the idea that homosexuals do not have such real and 
enduring relationships as heterosexuals, which is relevant in the discussion about same-sex marriage.74 
To put it differently: stereotypes (both harmful and acceptable ones) are rooted in culture. If the Court 
declines to closely review culturally sensitive cases, it will let many harmful stereotypes pass by. 
Ultimately, from the perspective of an (anti-)stereotyping approach, the margin of appreciation 
could lay in the “choice of means”.75 Council of Europe Member States ought to be able to show that 
they are aware of the perniciousness of stereotyping and that they are addressing the problem to the 
best of their ability. What kind of measures States take to address stereotyping, falls within their margin 
of appreciation.  
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 See infra Chapter 6.IV.B. 
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 See generally about consensus supra Chapter 1.II.C note 109 and the literature mentioned there. 
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 This is precisely why Margot Young is extremely critical of the stereotype concept. She writes: “the more 
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 Van der Heijden v. Netherlands (GC), App. No. 42857/05, 3 April 2012, ¶ 60. See also, e.g., A, B and C v. Ireland 
(GC), App. No. 25579/05, 16 December 2010, ¶ 232; and S.H. and Others v. Austria (GC), App. No. 57813/00, 3 
November 2011, ¶  94. 
73
 See, e.g., A, B and C v. Ireland (GC), App. No. 25579/05, 16 December 2010. 
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 Cf. Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, App. No. 30141/04, 24 June 2010, ¶ 92-94 (where the Court explicitly holds that 
same-sex couples can also enjoy “family life” in the sense of Article 8 ECHR). 
75
 I thank my supervisor, Professor Eva Brems, for this suggestion. See generally about “choice of means”, 
Kratóchvil, supra note 61, at 333-334.  
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G) On the feasibility of my proposals in light of the Court’s institutional reality 
 
This thesis envisages a more active role for the Court on a topic that has so far largely escaped the 
Court’s explicit attention; a topic, moreover, that many might consider outside the purview of the 
judiciary. But is stereotyping really best addressed outside of the legal arena? Harmful stereotyping is a 
widespread and diffuse problem, arguably impacting all spheres of life and society. It is submitted that 
combating such stereotyping requires a wide range of both legal and non-legal measures,76 the latter 
predominating. Non-legal measures will be required in fields such as civil society,77 education,78 and 
media.79 Legal measures can perform but a small part in the battle against suffocating stereotypes that 
keep people in assigned places. Within the category of legal measures, an anti-stereotype approach 
through human rights law generally – and ECtHR jurisprudence even more specifically – is but a small 
component.80 In other words, the role that this thesis envisages for the Strasbourg Court in the broader 
project of combating stereotypes is a limited one: the Strasbourg Court is only one little radar in a much 
bigger clockwork. In that sense, I do not think that the proposals this thesis has put forward as regards 
the integration of an anti-stereotyping perspective in the Court’s legal reasoning, overtax the Court’s 
strength. 
Undeniably, however, there is a tension between the (anti-)stereotyping perspective and 
traditional values. Indeed, that is part of the point: the Court should not unthinkingly accept dominant 
ideas about group identities. Not surprisingly, the (anti-)stereotyping approach has been the target of 
some “traditionalist critique”, notably from the President of the Russian Constitutional Court, Valery 
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 From a social psychology perspective, see, e.g., DAVID J. SCHNEIDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF STEREOTYPING  376-433 (2004) 
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 See for example the documentary “Miss Representation”, concerning the misrepresentation of women in the 
media, available at: http://www.missrepresentation.org/.  
80
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“Combating sexist stereotypes in the media” (2010). 
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Zorkin, who has vehemently objected against the Chamber judgment in Konstantin Markin v. Russia.81 
According to this type of critique, when the Court adopts an anti-stereotyping approach, it 
misunderstands the sociological reality in many European countries.82 Or, in other words, the Court 
would indulge in too much judicial activism if it were to integrate an anti-stereotyping perspective in its 
legal reasoning. This kind of critique does erode the Court’s legitimacy, but at the same time the damage 
should not be overestimated as the Court’s position as a quasi-constitutional Court of Europe in the field 
of human rights makes it inevitable that it receives this kind of criticism.83 The Court is doomed to 
navigate between Scylla and Charybdis: on the one hand the Court risks incurring censure for meddling 
too deeply in the culture and social affairs of the Member States, and on the other hand the Court risks 
incurring censure for being a toothless tiger that is incapable of addressing the persistent problems 
affecting millions of people in the Council of Europe. 
Ultimately, the Court will have to convince through the quality of its legal reasoning. The 
argument that the Court should name stereotypes and carefully examine their harm, and then contest 
harmful stereotypes under the Convention’s non-discrimination provision, is a plea for a more vigorous 
response to the inequalities that still plague the countries of the Council of Europe. Surely the European 
Court of Human Rights acts within bounds by acting against inequality. 
 
III. Vulnerability 
 
This part will draw the key findings from Chapters Four and Five together, regarding the concept of 
vulnerability in relation to the case law of the Strasbourg Court. 
A) On how to understand vulnerability 
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 That judgment had taken issue with the notion that mothers have a special role to fulfill in the upbringing of 
children. Amongst other things, Zorkin wrote in a newspaper article that contemporary psychology defends this 
notion. Furthermore, according to Zorkin, the Court’s preoccupation with the rights of homosexuals, a minority 
which “violates cultural, moral and religious code[s]”, is taking “grotesque forms”. Lauri Mälksoo, Markin v. Russia, 
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University maintained that it was a mere “gender stereotype” to contend that fighting and military service were 
for men rather than for women—do not correspond to sociological realities in European countries”. Id. at 841-842.  
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 See supra about the Court’s institutional position generally Chapter 1.IV.B. I do not think that an anti-
stereotyping approach gets the Court in any hotter waters than it already is, in areas such as asylum, the rights of 
(alleged) terrorists, or prisoner’s rights.  
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Vulnerability is a concept that consists of paradoxes. To start, it is both a universal human condition, yet 
it is experienced by everyone particularly. Everyone is vulnerable, but some people are rendered more 
vulnerable than others. Next, vulnerability entails both positive and negative features: it connotes a 
susceptibility to harm and injury, but is also generative of empathy, relationships and institutions. 
Similarly, vulnerability can invite empathy and care, but also violence and abuse. Lastly, as a thesis, 
vulnerability straddles both the realms of “is” and “ought”: it provides a descriptive diagnosis of the 
human condition and a prescription on the proper response to this condition. All these sides of 
vulnerability (paradoxical as they may seem) need to be recognized in order to release the concept’s 
potential to strengthen the legal reasoning of the Strasbourg Court. 
 
B) On vulnerability and human rights subjectivity 
 
At the heart of Chapters Four and Five are questions of human rights subjectivity. The underlying 
question in Chapter Four is this: is human rights law so construed as to protect the most vulnerable 
people?84 The underlying question in Chapter Five is even more fundamental: does human rights law 
protect vulnerable people? Or, in other words, is the human of human rights vulnerable? It is tempting 
to either answer “yes of course, human rights law protects everybody”, or to narrate human rights as a 
progress-story in which human rights exist along a continuum that progressively includes vulnerable 
groups.85 This thesis cautions against too easily adopting these sanguine views: the relationship between 
vulnerability and human rights is complex and contested. 
Drawing on the work of Anna Grear and other critics, this thesis recognizes that there is an 
ambivalence at the core of human rights. The history of human rights law yields two different stories: 
one story adopts a liberal quasi-disembodied autonomous subject and the other story adopts a human 
embodied vulnerable subject as the central figure of human rights. The liberal story is a very powerful 
one in human rights law (including in European human rights Convention law86) and as a result the 
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 Cf. Michael Ashley Stein, Disability Human Rights, 95 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 75, 114 (2007) (“One way to view 
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236 
 
human rights universal is often premised on a mythical invulnerable subject, who is male, white, 
rational, autonomous etc.87 As a result, people who do not fit this archetype have often found great 
difficulty in obtaining protection trough human rights law. On the other hand, human rights are 
undeniably – and perhaps par excellence – an emancipatory tool for diverse, embodied, and vulnerable 
people. To this day, human rights law struggles with these paradoxical inheritances.88  
C) On the applicants whom the Court has referred to as ‘vulnerable’ 
 
Chapter Five has delineated which applicants the Court considers vulnerable and why.89 In the first 
place, there are applicants that the Court considers inherently vulnerable, namely children and people 
with a mental disability. Secondly, there are applicants who the Court considers vulnerable because they 
fall under State control; these are persons in detention. Thirdly, the Court considers some applicants 
vulnerable due to gendered power differences, namely women in domestic violence or precarious 
reproductive health situations. Fourth, some applicants are deemed vulnerable due to legal power 
imbalances, namely people who are accused of a crime and persons who are deprived of legal capacity. 
Fifth, the Court has also in some situations referred to people who espouse unpopular views as 
vulnerable; these are cases of journalists and demonstrators. Sixth, the Court sometimes recognizes that 
people are rendered vulnerable due to their forced migration, namely asylum seekers. Seventh, the 
Court has spoken of vulnerability due to group-membership, this regards Roma, people with impaired 
health, and (to some extent) asylum seekers. The cases about group vulnerability have been extensively 
discussed in Chapter Four. Eighth and last, there is a great amount of case law in which the Court 
considers an applicant vulnerable due to a combination of the factors just described: this thesis suggest 
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 Feminist legal theorists have argued that formal equality thinking is so pervasive in human rights law because of 
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 See supra Chapter 5.III.A. 
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calling this “compounded vulnerability.”90 Examples are cases about (mentally) disabled prisoners,  or 
young children who have been (sexually) abused. 
It should be emphasized that this list is continuously evolving and that the Court by no means 
constantly uses vulnerability to refer to these different kinds of applicants. Especially as regards 
immigrants and asylum seekers, Chapter Five has argued, the Court is inconsistent and irresolute in its 
use of the concept of vulnerability.91 In the context of deportation, the Court only seems to 
acknowledge vulnerability due to political persecution but not embodied vulnerability due to illness, 
food shortage and other factors. The Court thus regularly ends up denying the vulnerability of asylum 
seekers who claim to be vulnerable.92   
  
D) On the effects of (group-)vulnerability in the case law of the ECtHR 
 
Once the Court holds that an applicant is vulnerable this has real consequences in the case law. These 
consequences are quite far-reaching. Chapter Four mapped what the effects are of group-vulnerability 
and Chapter Five did the same for the concept of vulnerability more generally.93 On the basis of this 
research, the conclusion is that whether the Court reasons from group-based vulnerability or from 
individual vulnerability, the effects are quite similar. What follows is an overview of these effects.  
 
i. Enhanced positive obligations 
Vulnerability prompts enhanced positive obligations on the part of the State.94 This effect of 
vulnerability is not limited to any of the Convention rights in particular. The Court routinely holds that 
particularly vulnerable people require “special consideration to” or “special protection of” their 
“specificities” and “needs.”95 These extra positive obligations have taken many forms, and only the most 
noteworthy developments will be mentioned here.  
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Greece, App. No. 30696/09, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 2, ¶ 251 (2011); and Yordanova v. Bulgaria, App. No. 25446/06, 24 
April 2012, ¶ 128 and 129; Zehentner v. Austria, App. No. 20082/02, 16 July 2009, (2011) 52 Eur. H.R.R. 22, ¶ 63. 
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To start, vulnerability considerations have led to the Court on several occasions to extend 
positive obligations into the socio-economic sphere. In M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, for example, the 
Court held Greece responsible under Article 3 of the Convention for not addressing the situation of 
extreme material deprivation in which the applicant, an asylum seeker, found himself.96 Another 
example is the tragic case of Nencheva and Others v. Bulgaria (2013).97 In this case the Court held the 
Government responsible for the deaths of 15 children and young adults (violation of Article 2 ECHR). 
These young people were all severally mentally and/or physically disabled and lived in a State-run care 
home in the village of Dzhurkovo, where they had been placed with the consent of their parents or after 
they were abandoned by their parents. They died as a result of lack of food, medical services and 
heating during the harsh winter of 1996-1997. The Court held that the State should have prevented the 
deaths of these vulnerable applicants, positioned as they were within the control of the authorities.98 
Next, considerations of vulnerability have often induced the Court to deepen existing positive 
obligations; for example by turning an obligation of care into an obligation of result,99 or by making a 
duty to protect more pressing. For instance, in a case concerning domestic violence against a woman, 
Hajduová v. Slovakia (2010), the Court held: “owing to the particular vulnerability of victims of domestic 
violence which the Court has highlighted on a number of occasions . . . the domestic authorities should 
have exercised an even greater degree of vigilance”.100 
Lastly, (group-)vulnerability considerations have formed the basis for an obligation on the part 
of the State to adopt positive steps to promote equality, as for example when the Court decided in 
Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary that the Hungarian Government is under an obligation “to undo a history of 
racial segregation in special schools.”101 
 
ii. Narrowing of the margin of appreciation 
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Chapter Four noted that group-vulnerability has caused the Court to narrow the margin of appreciation 
in direct discrimination cases affecting people with a disability.102 The key cases in this respect are Alajos 
Kiss v. Hungary and Kiyutin v. Russia, where the Court held:  
 
If a restriction on fundamental rights applies to a particularly vulnerable group in society 
that has suffered considerable discrimination in the past, then the State’s margin of 
appreciation is substantially narrower and it must have very weighty reasons for the 
restrictions in question.
103
 
 
 In my view, this reasoning might well expand to judgments that concern discrimination on grounds 
other than disability. Interestingly, the Court has already transposed the Alajos Kiss/Kiyutin reasoning in 
terms of group-vulnerability to judgments concerning other human rights violations affecting people 
with a disability. Thus, the Court has held that group-vulnerability also triggers strict scrutiny under 
Article 5(1) (the right to liberty and security of person).104 The idea of group-vulnerability as a rationale 
for tightening the Court’s scrutiny is definitely on the rise.  
  
iii. Weight in the proportionality analysis / relevance in determining whether a case 
falls within the scope of Article 3 
A further impact of applicants’ vulnerability is manifested in the Court’s proportionality analysis.105 As 
Judge Power said in a dissent; “vulnerability is a factor to be weighed in the balance.”106 Take for 
instance Yordanova v. Bulgaria, about the planned forced eviction of a decades-old Roma settlement.107 
The Court held: 
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In the context of Article 8, in cases such as the present one, the applicants’ specificity as a social 
group and their needs must be one of the relevant factors in the proportionality assessment that 
the national authorities are under a duty to undertake.
108
 
 
In this quote the Court does not mention the vulnerability of the Roma as a social group, but in the text 
of the judgment the reference to their vulnerability comes in the same paragraph. Yordanova makes 
clear that States are under an obligation to take the vulnerability of a group in consideration when 
determining the proportionality of measures that affect it,109 and, by extension, that the Court will also 
weigh vulnerability in its own proportionality assessment.  
In parallel, vulnerability is an aggravating factor in Article 3 cases: ill-treatment of vulnerable 
persons is more likely to reach “the minimum level of severity” required to fall under the scope of that 
provision. The idea is that vulnerable applicants are likely to experience harm more acutely.110 An 
example is the Belgian “Tabitha” case.111 Tabitha was a five-year-old Congolese girl who was detained all 
by herself for two months in a closed center for illegal immigrants near Brussels, before being deported 
back, alone, to Congo. The Court held: 
 
The second applicant’s position was characterised by her very young age, the fact that she 
was an illegal immigrant in a foreign land and the fact that she was unaccompanied by her 
family from whom she had become separated so that she was effectively left to her own 
devices. She was thus in an extremely vulnerable situation. In view of the absolute nature of 
the protection afforded by Article 3 of the Convention, it is important to bear in mind that this 
is the decisive factor . . .
112
 
 
The Court subsequently found that Article 3 was breached both on account of Tabitha’s detention and 
on account of her deportation. Tabitha’s extremely vulnerable situation is what makes the treatment of 
her by the Belgian authorities so egregious as to amount to inhuman treatment. 
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The inclusion of (group-)vulnerability in the proportionality analysis by no means guarantees a 
favorable outcome to the vulnerable applicant; there are always also other factors laying in the 
balance.113 At a minimum, vulnerability considerations have created a bottom line in the Court’s 
proportionality analysis: Governments that completely ignore the particular situation of vulnerable 
applicants will not pass the Strasbourg proportionality test.114 What is more, Lourdes Peroni and I 
argued in Chapter Four, the inclusion of vulnerability in the proportionality analysis will increase some 
applicants’ chances of obtaining protection. It is partly for this reason that Chapter Five referred to 
vulnerability as a “prioritization tool”: it can serve to prioritize the claim of the applicant over the 
countervailing-interests brought forward by the Government.115 In Nencheva the Court explicitly 
mentions that vulnerability ought to have prioritizing force. The Court recognizes that the winter of 
1996/97 was an exceptionally difficult time for Bulgaria due to a deep financial crisis.116 Nevertheless, 
the Court held, the authorities should have prioritized responding to the needs of the vulnerable young 
persons in the care home.117 
 
iv. Prioritization in the Court’s agenda-setting  
The other way in which the vulnerability of applicants acts as a prioritization tool relates to the manner 
in which the Court manages its workload. The Court has developed a “priority policy”, which determines 
the order in which the Court reviews cases. Chapter Five has argued that embodied vulnerability is a key 
consideration underlying this policy: some particularly vulnerable applicants – like children and people 
who are facing deportation – receive an accelerated review of their case by the Court.118  
 
E) On the ability of vulnerability in the case law of the ECtHR  
 
In the final analysis, the increasing emphasis on the concept of vulnerability is a welcome development 
in the legal reasoning of the Strasbourg Court. Vulnerability reasoning has resulted in many context- and 
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applicant-sensitive judgments. The question is how deep the concept reaches. In my view, which is 
informed by Fineman’s thesis, the Court’s vulnerability reasoning oscillates between substantive 
equality and transformative equality, just as it oscillates between inclusion and transformation.119 
Lourdes Peroni and I argued in Chapter Four that the emergence of the vulnerable group 
concept has contributed toward a more substantive interpretation of equality in the Court’s case law.120 
As was mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, a “hallmark of a formalist approach to equality is 
that it is decontextualized; it employs disembodied reasoning and it privileges ‘abstract principles over 
material facts’.”121 Vulnerable group reasoning redresses this in the Strasbourg jurisprudence: it is 
reasoning that is much more sensitive to context, embodiment and concrete materiality. On a 
conceptual level, Lourdes and I offered the following diagnosis: in response to the exclusions of human 
rights law, the Strasbourg Court has been forced to attend to the constructed disadvantage of certain 
groups, and in so doing, has deployed the concept of group vulnerability.122 On this level, therefore, the 
Court’s use of group vulnerability can be seen as an attempt at including previously excluded groups in 
the human rights universal. It does this through an asymmetrical approach to the Convention: focusing 
on groups that have suffered disadvantage and who experience human rights violations more routinely 
or more acutely.123 This is a valuable endeavor, but it does not necessarily signal a fundamental 
transformation of the not-really-universal human rights universal. Nor, Chapter Five has argued, does 
the Court completely move beyond deeply entrenched notions of liberal legal subjecthood.124 
The main problem bedeviling both the more specific “vulnerable groups” concept (discussed in 
Chapter Four)as well as the Court’s vulnerability reasoning generally (discussed in Chapter Five), is that – 
unlike Fineman – the Court conceptualizes vulnerability as something some groups have the misfortune 
to suffer from. The Court’s vulnerable subjects (described above in section III.C) are examples of 
marginalized and stigmatized subjects; as such they are no alternative to the liberal subject, but typical 
examples of liberalism’s “Others”.125 Through the lens of Fineman’s vulnerability thesis, it becomes 
apparent that labeling only prisoners, people with a disability, children etc. as vulnerable, does not 
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dislodge the fiction that the normal subject of human rights law is an invulnerable subject (who does not 
suffer from such impediments as dependence on the State or power differences).  
Moreover, as regards the vulnerable group concept more specifically, Lourdes Peroni and I have 
argued that it risks reinforcing the very exclusion and inequality it seeks to redress. It is in that sense a 
double-edged sword. Drawing on the case law of the Court, Chapter Four has established that, if the 
concept is not applied carefully, an emphasis on group-vulnerability can be essentialistic, stigmatic, and 
paternalistic.126 Chapter Four argued that the Court can avoid these pitfalls by carrying out a contextual 
analysis that consists of two levels of inquiry: collective and individual. This means that the Court should 
in the first place specify why it considers a certain group particularly vulnerable, and then demonstrate 
how the group’s vulnerability reflects on the situation of the concrete applicant. These two levels of 
inquiry are also necessary to avoid harmful stereotyping: labeling an applicant “vulnerable” only 
because her group is vulnerable, can have very disempowering consequences.127 
At the same time, the Court’s vulnerability reasoning holds seeds of transformation. For one 
thing, the implications of vulnerability as a prioritizing tool, as a rationale for narrowing the margin of 
appreciation, and as a tool to further develop positive obligations, are potentially quite far reaching. 
Moreover, vulnerability reasoning could be used to inform more than just cases brought by marginalized 
subjects such as asylum seekers, prisoners, people with a mental disability and female victims of 
domestic violence.128 The case law holds out hope that the Court may, one day, transcend the 
vulnerability/invulnerability binary and take legal reasoning into a far more radical direction; namely 
towards the vulnerable subject as being, not just a marginal subject, but the paradigm subject of 
rights.129 This is the ideal posited by Martha Fineman, Anna Grear and other vulnerability theorists.130 
A likely objection is that when the Court starts considering everybody vulnerable, the concept 
loses its power. If we are all vulnerable, what potential has this concept then to enrich legal reasoning? 
True, as both Chapters Four and Five noted, the Strasbourg Court utilizes vulnerability more for its 
ability to capture the particular than for its ability to capture the universal. It is submitted, however, that 
the Court could do both. The Strasbourg Court can continue relying on vulnerability to explore what 
renders applicants vulnerable in particular situations, and simultaneously also rely on vulnerability to 
underline what all people have in common – like dignity. What this would change are the stigmatic and 
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equality-reinforcing effects of vulnerability. It would underline that not just “others” are vulnerable and 
that not just “others” need the human rights protection that is offered by the Strasbourg Court.131 It is 
not the aim of this thesis to provide “a blueprint for judicial review” on the basis of a vulnerability 
thesis,132 nevertheless the case law analysis of Chapter Five does raise one suggestion as to how the 
Court might frame vulnerability in more universal terms.133 That is that the Court could perhaps connect 
dignity and embodied vulnerability more solidly together – making clear that the injunction to respect 
human dignity needs to be interpreted in light of vulnerability considerations – as, indeed, the Court has 
already done in Article 3 cases concerning detainees and prisoners.134 
 
F) On the vulnerability of the Court itself  
 
In my view, what ultimately and inescapably bounds the transformative potential of the Court’s 
vulnerability reasoning is the vulnerability of the Court itself. Thus, within the ECtHR context, the 
vulnerability thesis predicts its own limits. Especially the Court’s recognition that vulnerability can 
prompt special positive obligations and can trigger a stricter margin of appreciation has raised concerns 
that the Court is overstepping its proper role.135 If the Court takes its vulnerability reasoning too far – 
and on a conceptual level this would mean jettisoning the liberal subject in favor of a vulnerable subject 
– no State would listen any more. The Court would not survive as a supranational human rights court. 
 Inherent in a vulnerability approach – such as this dissertation envisages it, based, e.g., on the 
work of Fineman – is the recognition of the vulnerability of the very institute it encourages to adopt a 
transformative approach. This raises the objection that this study wants to be idealistic and realistic at 
the same time. That is true. In fact, it is another of the paradoxes of vulnerability that this thesis does 
not seek to iron out: as a thesis, vulnerability is destined to sit in between the real and the ideal, 
between the is and the ought, and between law and critique.136 On the level of ideals, vulnerability aims 
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to create a discourse that does not pit “us” against “them”, but instead celebrates a shared humanity. In 
view of all the recent disparagement of the Strasbourg Court, it seems to me that this would be exactly 
the kind of discourse the Court needs right now.  
 
IV. Stereotype and vulnerability: tension and synergies 
 
To a large extent, (anti-)stereotyping and vulnerability are presented here as two separate approaches – 
or methods, if you will – of strengthening the Strasbourg Court’s legal reasoning. These approaches are 
also different in their origins: the focus on stereotyping is developed in this thesis as a response to a 
social/empirical problem, whereas the focus on vulnerability is conceived in response to the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence.137 It is now time to address both the synergies and the tension between these two 
approaches. 
 
A) Tension  
 
It might appear contradictory to turn to both the concept of stereotype and the concept of vulnerability 
to argue in favor for a more transformative notion of equality in the legal reasoning of the Strasbourg 
Court. The anti-stereotyping approach can after all be perceived as a species of classic equal protection 
law analysis. An anti-stereotyping approach does not reject the idea of protected grounds such as sex, 
race, disability, sexual orientation and religious belief, which then correspond to protected identity 
groups.138 In contrast, the vulnerability approach, at least as formulated by Fineman, proposes a 
universalist perspective. Fineman has formulated her thesis as a direct challenge to group- and identity-
based equality thinking.139 I expect, therefore, that especially in American quarters this PhD thesis would 
raise the objection of inconsistency. Fineman herself recently wrote: 
   
The state should have a rigorous duty to ensure for everyone both equal protection of the law 
and equal opportunity to enjoy the benefits of society. If monitoring is restricted to rooting out 
discrimination against or stereotyping of personal characteristics, however, the state will only 
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ever be able to partially achieve that objective. To reflect a rigorous commitment to equality it 
will be necessary to move beyond identities and beyond our current understanding of 
discrimination to a more universal perspective. . . in order to have a more robust equality-based 
society it will be necessary to move beyond individual identities and discrimination as it is now 
understood and adopt a more structural and institutional perspective.
140
 
 
There is admittedly an ambivalence in the double focus of this PhD, in that it supports both a 
particular/identity-based approach and an universal approach. But whereas Fineman explicitly opts for 
universality as the most promising road to equality,141 In common with many other commentators, I 
think on the other hand that “a rigorous commitment to equality” encompasses both an appreciation of 
universality and an appreciation of identity.142 In my view, a vulnerability approach is not necessarily at 
odds with an (anti-)stereotyping approach. That would only be the case if the stereotype concept can 
only deliver formal equality (as, indeed, some American scholars maintain143). My reading of the concept 
of stereotype, however, is that it can be deployed to advance transformative equality goals. An anti-
stereotyping approach could and should aim at the underlying structures of discrimination and 
inequality, which is precisely what Fineman also wants a vulnerability approach to do. 
 
B) Synergies 
 
In order for the stereotype and vulnerability approaches to be complementary strategies in the goal of 
equality as transformation, this section will draw out the linkages between these two concepts.  
On the empirical level, stereotyping and vulnerability are interconnected in at least two ways: 
human vulnerability is frequently the driving force behind the formation of stereotypes, and 
stereotyping renders some people extra vulnerable. To start with the first observation: the notion that 
individuals, as well as cultures, develop stereotypes as a response to their particular vulnerabilities, is 
studied by social psychologists within the framework of what is known as “terror management theory”. 
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This “theory suggest that people have culturally derived views of the world and their place in it – views 
that, among other things, protect them from their own fears of death and vulnerability to injury.”144 In 
other words, the content of stereotypes is in part shaped by the experience of vulnerability: stereotypes 
“provide protection against deeply rooted existential fear.”145 Terror management theory also suggests 
that there is an increased likelihood that people use stereotypes when they are confronted with their 
own vulnerability to death.146  
The second empirical observation, namely that stereotyping renders some (groups of) people 
extra vulnerable, perhaps requires no further explanation. This fact is unfortunately amply illustrated in 
the case law of the Strasbourg Court. Take for example the case of P. and S. v. Poland (2012).147 P. was a 
14 years old girl who was pregnant as a result of rape. When she sought to obtain a legal abortion, 
several hospitals refused to help her. Several doctors, anti-abortion groups and a priest tried to convince 
her to carry the pregnancy to term. The medical information she received was misleading. In its 
judgment, the Court rightly recognizes that P. was in a “situation of great vulnerability” as a teenager 
who was pregnant as a result of rape.148 What happened in this case was that her vulnerability was 
further compounded by the authorities who tried to impose the prescriptive stereotype that “a 
(prospective) mother should sacrifice herself for her child”. Because they acted on this stereotype, P. did 
not receive the medical care that she was entitled to and, furthermore, she was humiliated, 
manipulated and harassed. The prescriptive stereotyping of P. clearly further exacerbated her 
vulnerability.149  
On the level of legal reasoning, the stereotype and vulnerability concepts can work together. In 
the first place, the vulnerable group reasoning explored in Chapter Four is a form of stereotyping. Thus it 
is, for example, a statistical stereotype to say that “Roma are vulnerable”: the Roma are indeed 
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statistically more vulnerable than other groups, but that does not mean that all the individuals from this 
group fit the statistic in every circumstance. Some Roma will in fact be highly successful and not 
particularly vulnerable. To repeat, this is why Lourdes and I have proposed that the Court carries out an 
inquiry at the individual level as well as the collective level when faced by applicants from so-called 
vulnerable groups: to ensure that the stereotype does not turn harmful.150 When it is deployed well, the 
Court’s vulnerable group concept is a form of “strategic stereotyping”,151 though it is doubtful whether 
the Court thinks of it in those terms. 
Secondly, vulnerability considerations can play a role in the assessment of whether the 
application of a stereotype is harmful or not. The specificities of a person’s or a group’s vulnerability will 
namely to a large extent determine what impact the application of a stereotype has on that person or 
group. In all four contextual factors that this thesis has urged the Court to take into account when 
assessing stereotypes – historical context, effects, fit and ameliorative purpose – vulnerability reasoning 
can be incorporated, depending on the case.152  
Lastly, an (anti-)stereotyping approach can help uncover the constructed vulnerability of certain 
groups of people. In Alajos Kiss and Kiyutin, for example, the Court recognized that legislative 
stereotyping helped construct the vulnerability of people with a mental disability, and people living with 
HIV respectively. Moreover, in these judgments the Court already seems to acknowledge that 
stereotyping and vulnerability amplify each other. The Court namely notes that: 
 
. . . such [vulnerable] groups were historically subject to prejudice with lasting consequences, 
resulting in their social exclusion. Such prejudice could entail legislative stereotyping which 
prohibited the individualised evaluation of their capacities and needs.
153
 
 
Stereotyping and vulnerability are held here to amplify each other, because stereotyping increases the 
vulnerability of certain groups and – at the same – these groups’ vulnerability is what makes the 
stereotyping in these cases so particularly egregious.  
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These are some of the ways in which the (anti-)stereotype and vulnerability concepts are 
complementary in the legal reasoning of the Strasbourg Court. Possibly there are more synergies 
between these concepts. It is hoped that, together and separately, these concepts can help strengthen 
the Court’s legal reasoning about non-dominant groups and help create a more transformative equality 
analysis. 
 
 
V. Topics for Future Research 
 
In the context of human rights law, both the concept of stereotype and the concept of vulnerability raise 
many questions that unfortunately fell outside the remit of this thesis. Both concepts call for further 
exploration by human rights law scholars.   
To start, it will be interesting to explore stereotyping more broadly as a human rights issue. The 
Strasbourg Court’s emergent recognition of the harm of stereotyping can be viewed as part of a broader 
development in which several international human rights bodies – including the CEDAW Committee, the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Committee on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (CRPD) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights – increasingly address the issue. 
Most of the time, however, scholars of stereotyping have limited their investigations to individual 
human rights bodies. Moreover, the bulk of the literature focuses narrowly on only one kind of 
stereotype, namely gender stereotypes. In my opinion a broader set of questions now need attention: 
How do invidious stereotypes affect the enjoyment of human rights? How came the language of 
stereotyping to be included in human rights treaties such as CEDAW and CRPD? Does human rights law 
manage to capture the harms of stereotyping? How are compounded stereotypes addressed in human 
rights law? Can human rights law be improved in these respects? What potential has a focus on 
stereotypes to develop a more robust notion of equality in human rights law? How could the Strasbourg 
Court benefit by the approach other international human rights bodies have taken towards 
stereotyping?  
These and other questions related to stereotyping as a human rights issue will be thought through 
at a seminar which is organized by Eva Brems and myself at Ghent University on December 4, 2013. For 
this seminar I plan to delve into the issue of remedies: what kinds of remedies for stereotyping are 
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indicated by human rights law? More specifically, I hope to address the question of what kinds of 
positive obligations the obligation to address stereotyping entails. 
As regards the concept of vulnerability, this invites a far more extended level of theoritization in 
the context of human rights law than has been attempted in the literature so far. Such a project could 
consist of both a descriptive and a prescriptive part. The descriptive part could put central the question 
to what extent the human rights project is based on an appreciation of universal human vulnerability. 
This would require an interdisciplinary investigation on the crossroads of law, history and philosophy. 
Subsequently, the prescriptive part of the project could explore what implications a theory of universal 
vulnerability as the foundation of human rights has for human rights practice. Going one step further, 
perhaps this research project could even attempt to fashion a model of judicial review for the 
Strasbourg Court and/or other human rights adjudicating bodies on the basis of the vulnerability thesis. 
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